North Korea Subversion and Protests (or lack of)

Today I get to combine social movements with North Korea - two concepts rarely put together in the same sentence.

I attended Andrei Lankov's CFR presentation, "How to Make Subversive Engagement with North Korea Work." Examples of subversive engagement include the following: expose DPRK to the outside world, promote the flow of Western goods ideas, products, broadcast radio programs, support projects which enable interaction between North Koreans and outsiders), how do we enable outside forces to intersect with insiders who are trying to promote regime change. Access is difficult

My question for Andrei was how one translates discontent with the regime (which Andrei insists there is plenty of) into political action in the absence of any true civil society, associational life, or organizations such as independent labor unions. Subversive engagement succeeded in Eastern Europe during the Cold War thanks to the existence of civil society and mobilizing structures such as the Catholic Church. However, in the DPRK, we will not likely see an Arab Spring-like unrest because of1) closed political opportunities; 2) no mobilizing structures; 3) no apparent leadership

Since North Koreans can't be mobilized yet, the best hope is to continue flooding NK with information and perhaps take advantage of the expertise of defectors/refugees who may be able to help organize political protests inside the DPRK. The problem with this plan is that its more of a long term strategy. In the meantime, thousands more may die out of hunger or abuse.

The Future of Iraq

“The image of the American soldier is as a killer, not a defender. And how can you give a killer immunity?” Did civilian killings in Haditha and elsewhere turn the tide against long-term US military presence? Washington had hoped to keep Iraq as a staging ground for U.S. presence in the region.

Is this a sign of anti-base victory? Sovereignty was certainly the dominant motif (i.e. master frame) when giving the Americans the boot. It was clear that the majority of Iraqis - at least the ones who had decision power in charting the future of Iraq - did not want an extension of U.S. military. While there was no anti-base movement per se, then anti-base sentiment I imagine was still fairly widespread in Baghdad. But here, base politics also played out on the US side. Insiders claim Obama did not try to oversell the ideas of US troop presence. After all, he too had a campaign pledge to end the war in Iraq.

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki still visited Washington this week to mark the beginning of a new strategic course for US-Iraqi relations, sans US troops. Whether he caved to domestic nationalist pressure or believed that the Iraqis were ready to take responsibility of their own security (likely the former), US troops will exit on Dec. 31 (update, two weeks before deadline so troops can enjoy Christmas at home). Questions will continue to loom, however, whether this was the right decision.