Between Action and Inaction in Syria

This is the most damning op-ed I've seen to date regarding President Obama's foreign policy on Syria. The Washington Post editorials have been highly critical of U.S. inaction for some time as you can read on Aug. 16, 2016, and July 2, 2016, and from editorial page editor Fred Hiat who states that the Obama Administration not only failed  to take action in Syria, but "soothed the American people into feeling no responsibility for the tragedy." But the op-ed by Leon Wieseltier is scathing, calling Obama's words "outrageously hypocritical." Wieseltier writes, "The administration creatively pioneered a third option, which it pursued not only in Syria but also in Ukraine and elsewhere: Between action and inaction, it chose inconsequential action (italics mine). There is the Obama doctrine!"

 

It's hard to place blame on the Obama Administration for the tragedy taking place right now in Aleppo. One might instead blame Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, or perhaps Iran and Russia for inflicting hurt and destruction as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Powers did in a speech which has gone viral (to which the Russian ambassador replied, "I don't want to remind these three countries [US, France, UK] about their role in unwinding the Syrian crisis, which led to such difficult consequences, and let terrorists spread in Syria and Iraq). But where questions lie for the next Administration is whether the U.S., as a great power, has a moral responsibility to push harder militarily against the Syrian government an do more to protect civilians.

Obama's critics argue that there are serious costs to inaction. In contrast, proponents have argued that greater U.S. involvement would have only made the conflict worse, with more death and suffering. Can the U.S. to do more to take a stand against al-Assad in which the costs (in lives and treasure) do not exceed the benefits? I can clearly see the administration has been wrestling between a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness resulting in such inconsequential inaction.

Amid Scandal, Protests Force South Korean President to Resign

Rarely does one find a case of social movement protest so effective that they bring down the democratically elected leader of a country in a matter of months. Yet that's exactly what happened in South Korea. Following a bizarre scandal of corruption and extortion involving South Korean president Park Geun-Hye exposed in March, President Park announced yesterday that she would resign.

Source: Kim Jong-hi/Reuters

For a blog titled Social Movements and World Politics, and a scholar who writes about South Korean civil society, I've ignored this case for far too long. Rather than wade into the complexities of the scandal and the rise of protests myself, however, I'll take the easy road and link some of the best analysis in English I've found to date.

Deep ties between Choi Soon-sil, the figure at the center of the scandal, and President Park are explained in the blog Ask a Korean!

Stephan Haggard on the Witness to Transformation blog has thus far a 4 part analysis on "Park Geun-hye Unravelling". Part I focuses on her approval rating and decline in popularity. Part II, perhaps the most useful, spells out the players and issues involved in the scandal. Part III focuses on political options for Park, and leading candidates of other political parties should Park step down. Part IV provides text of the prosecutor's statement specifically outlining Park's illegal transgressions including: abuse of authority and coercion against specific companies and individuals; divulgence of state secrets; and attempted fraud.

An Asan Institute brief published on Nov. 21, 2016 provided a list of allegations against Choi Soon-Sil, weekly protest numbers, and approval ratings of political parties and potential presidential political candidates.

Asan Institute: Original sources in footnotes of briefing

Eunjung Lim at SAIS-Johns Hopkins has a short analysis on Park's resignation in historical context. The New York Times' Choe Sang-Hun explains the steps of impeachment, although this is now a moot point. 

To be updated...

Here's a video of the protests last weekend to give you a sense of the size and scope of protest, although I cringe at the misleading analysis of how protests actually mobilize and operate.

 

Update 12/9/16

 

Park was impeached. Here's analysis by Scott Snyder from Forbes, and a piece by Darcie Draudt at JHU (and Scott's former research assistant). And of course, Steph Haggard's post and a video interview with Marcus on the Witness to Transformation blog.

 

Update 12/19/16

 

Some guidance on what happens next. Most importantly, power is transferred to the Prime Minister

 

Update 12/22/16

 

Here's an EAI opinion brief from SNU sociologist Seokho Kim that places the recent anti-Park protests within the broader context of (the failure of ) South Korean civil society the past decade. Basically, civil society had been defunct since the 2008 anti-U.S. beef protests, and only with the sinking of the Sewol did we begin to see its revival. As the EAI summary states:

Seokho Kim of Seoul National University explores whether popular opinion that led to the protests against Park Geun-hye is a sure sign that civic space is undergoing a revival in South Korea. Kim emphasizes that these protests are not spontaneous outburst of anger, but rather a culmination of the condensed anger and frustration of the citizens fuelled by social inequality, intensified polarization, and declining opportunities for social mobility. In order for the protests in 2016 to not end up as a one-time eruption, Kim urges that the civil society must expand its outreach to the citizens

 

 

Advice on Edited Volumes

One of my co-editors sent me this link about the pitfalls of participating in edited volumes. Since I'm currently in the middle of editing a volume, and organizing a conference to produce another volume, I found this article dreadfully amusing. Here's an excerpt of what Joseph Weiler, President of EUI writes:

The routine is well-known and well-practised. You receive an invitation to present a paper at some conference. You accept (see below). You may adapt something you have already written or something that you are working on which is in some way connected. It is often not exactly what the conveners had asked for or had in mind, but perhaps close enough so as not to have to reject the invitation. The conveners are often accomplices in this little approximation. They are committed to the conference; it is often part of some grant they have received. Almost always you are pressed for time – after all it is not as if these invitations arrive when you are sitting back, twiddling your thumbs and looking for things to do. In general they are disruptive of your flow of work. So the result is not as good as it might have been... 

You attend the conference. It shows. The papers presented are of very variable quality and relevance. There is the usual conference overload so that the habitual 10-15 minute ‘commentator’ input may be interesting but of limited value to your paper... 

...The book is then published with an enticing title and on occasion wonderful artwork. More often there is ‘programmatic artwork’: flags, a globe, whatever. The publishers assess the captive market and act accordingly. The print runs are small, the price typically exorbitant and in any event unattractive for individual purchase. It is common that the conveners have budgeted a subsidy to the publishers. An expensive cemetery – rightly so. If you are lucky, the book may be reviewed. And if you are even luckier, the review will be more than, well, a rehashed version of the ‘Introduction’ and road map.

Part of our group at a conference at Deakin University
(Melbourne) in June 2015. We already replaced someone
from this group which attests to some of the challenges of  pursuing
edited volumes, but also our commitment to ensuring quality.
Photo Credit: Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation 

I pretty much agree with everything above and the entire blog post. But based on my limited experience (n=2) organizing collaborative projects, I still believe there is much intellectual and professional merit in putting together such volumes. To give the concrete example of our work on North Korean human rights (NKHR) discourse and advocacy, I have learned much about this issue from our collaboration. I do believe our understanding of NKHR discourse and advocacy networks is poorly understand, and that collectively we have something to say on this matter which is new and different, and hopefully useful.

The volume is not simply a check box to satisfy our funders. There is no way my co-editor and I would spend countless hours, at times neglecting family duties. to do this project if we didn't believe there was some intellectual and practical value behind our efforts. Admittedly, the hardest part has been getting our collaborators to get on board and push them in the direction we'd like. But I'm confident our upcoming conference and follow-up book workshop will motivate us to put together something coherent and meaningful. That's the challenge ahead of us as we approach our big event in a few weeks!

Faith, Political Parties, and Elections

This comes more out of my personal than professional academic thinking, but The Atlantic laid out a good piece for how hard it is to align faith with politics, particularly when it comes to supporting a particular political party. This is why we advocate the separation of church and state, even though in reality our political culture is shaped by religion (and vice-versa). To quote the opening paragraph

There are lots of ways to be a Catholic public leader in the United States. But the only path that’s impossible, it seems, is to advocate policies that fully follow the Church’s teachings on Jesus. Politicians of both parties have to pick and choose their theology, sticking to party lines that defy the United States Conference on Catholic Bishops’ guide to faithful citizenship. For their part, lay Catholics have largely blended into the general electorate. Far from taking positions that are distinctive to their faith, many hold views that reflect their partisan allegiances.

Intro to IR Roundup: Nukes, Migration, Syria and IR Research

Today is the first day of fall 2016-17 classes. I usually teach Intro to International Relations in the fall, but am out of my routine due to a conference I'm organizing. However, I thought I'd post several good sound bytes which I would have offered to students had I been kicking off class with a dose of current events and international crises.

Syria: Why is the war so damn long and bloody. It's gets more violent by the day. Drawing on IR

 AFP/Getty Images

research, Max Fisher of the New York Times provides a run-down of some of the factors contributing to the ugly nature of the Syrian war. The usual suspects like multiparty factions and ethnic/sectarian divisions. But a big culprit appears to be foreign sponsorship/intervention. As Fisher writes:

"Foreign interventions that were intended to end the war ...have instead entrenched it in a stalemate in which violence is self-reinforcing and the normal avenues for peace are all closed...Whenever one side loses ground, its foreign backers increase their involvement, sending supplies or air support to prevent their favored player’s defeat. Then that side begins winning, which tends to prompt the other’s foreign backers to up their ante as well. Each escalation is a bit stronger than what came before, accelerating the killing without ever changing the war’s fundamental balance."

Intervention: Recent interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) have left us pondering the costs of such intervention.  Anne Applebaum asks what the costs of non-intervention have been in Syria in terms of total deaths, the refugee crisis, the destabilization of the region, and security threats in Europe . Of course, intervention could have made all of this even worse. Fareed Zakaria earlier argued that it was probably best for the U.S. not to intervene, but it could/should have done much more on humanitarian assistance, even if it rightfully chooses not to pursue humanitarian intervention. Part of the problem may be the politicization of aid.

Nuclear Weapons: Obama is toying with the idea of changing U.S. strategic doctrine by declaring a no first use nuclear weapons policy. Some pros and cons of a first no use policy are outlined by the WSJ.  While reducing nukes sounds good in theory, Stephen Sestanovich of CFR pushes back against this change.

Migration: Want to know the difference between migrants and refugees. A CFR video and backgrounder explains here.

Russia, Turkey, and IR Paradigms

In a nod to ideological alliances, Anne Applebaum argues that dictators will choose other dictators at the end of the day and cites Turkish President Recep Erodgan's recent meeting with Russia's Vladimir Putin as an example. Despite Turkey's membership in NATO, Edrogan has used the military coup to crackdown on even the slightest potential for opposition.  As Applebaum writes:

(Alexander Zemlianichenko/Associated Press)

Geostrategic, military and even historical calculations should make Turkey and Russia antagonists. But their meeting illustrates something that many Western politicians and “realist” thinkers find difficult to understand: that ideas and ideology sooner or later trump “interests.” If Turkey were still a democracy, Erdogan would be looking to his Western allies to help him push back against Russia. But contact with the West also means contact with Western ideas. Dependence on the West means dependence on states that believe in the legal norms which Erdogan wants to repress, states that might support the people Erdogan wants to lock up.

Victory for constructivists? Does this really mean ideas trump interests? Well, Turkey's move does indicate the power of ideas. But ideas too reflect particular interests. What's important here (for IR students) is the relationship between ideas and interests and whether in the case of Turkey and Russia, ideas are defining actors' interests.

What Psychology Tells Us About Dispelling Worldviews

Apparently it's difficult. This piece by David Ignatius on why facts don't seem to matter for Trump supporters is apt for my own research on contrasting views between peace activists and policymakers. In fact, trying to persuade the other and convincing them why they're wrong (or you're right) seems particularly onerous if the research of this 1979 study, "Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence" stands correct. It appears that attempts to debunk myths even has the potential opposite effect of reinforcing myths.

So applied to the politics of peace, activists are socialized at an early stage to hold particular views about nukes, bases, drones etc...As they interact with policymakers, who themselves are socialized into viewing peace through a different lens (i.e. realist, liberal international etc...), neither side cedes ground in trying to understand the facts. The result is polarization of views.

I'm going to need to find some collaborators in psychology and sociology to help me out here.

What Psychology Tells Us About Dispelling Worldviews

Apparently it's difficult. This piece by David Ignatius on why facts don't seem to matter for Trump supporters is apt for my own research on contrasting views between peace activists and policymakers. In fact, trying to persuade the other and convincing them why they're wrong (or you're right) seems particularly onerous if the research of this 1979 study, "Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects ofPrior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence" stands correct. It appears that attempts to debunk myths even has the potential opposite effect of reinforcing myths.

So applied to the politics of peace, activists are socialized at an early stage to hold particular views about nukes, bases, drones etc...As they interact with policymakers, who themselves are socialized into viewing peace through a different lens (i.e. realist, liberal international etc...), neither side cedes ground in trying to understand the facts. The result is polarization of views.

I'm going to need to find some collaborators in psychology and sociology to help me out here.

IPR Conference on Declining Trust in Social and Political Life

National Catholic Reporter finally came out with an article featuring a conference I organized on rebuilding (or really declining) trust. This was something I started two years ago as I felt like I was being bombarded by news stories screaming mistrust, declining trust etc...in our political system, among ethnic and racial minorities, between police and black youth, and in our institutions. To help me make sense of all this, I started a series of informal brownbag lunches which eventually led to the conference. To find out why trust is broken and how we get it back, watch our conference!

Worldviews, Beliefs, and Psychology

So apparently, neither Trump nor Clinton supporters will change their minds according to this study. More relevant to my research is the reasoning outlined below:

As much as we like to think that we use reason to evaluate evidence and come to conclusions, “It really goes back assward, a lot of times,” said Peter Ditto, a psychologist at University of California, Irvine. “People already have a firm opinion, and that shapes the way they process information.” We hold beliefs about how the world works and tend to force new information to fit within these pre-existing narratives. Psychologists call this motivated reasoning, and it means that once people have thrown their support behind Trump or Clinton, they will tend to downplay or ignore things that paint their candidate in a bad light.

In a similar vein, once activists (i.e. anti-war groups) adopt a particular position about nukes, drones, bases etc....they rarely change minds and adopt the alternative view often represented by government officials.

Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Views

I almost never sign on-line petitions, but recently put my name on an open letter penned by Ali Wyn. I rest my case with this recent interview between Donald Trump and the New York Times.

I've pasted part of the transcript below, and two things strike me which are worth bringing up the next time I teach Intro to Int'l Relations, and also for research on the politics of peace. First, Trump fails to realize that maintaining alliances and troops abroad are in our own interest, not just that of allies. Even if allies aren't paying their full share in dollar terms, by hosting U.S. troops, they are contributing to the liberal international order advanced by all previous U.S. administrations since WWII. It's the free-rider problem that Trump is concerned with, but even then, we permit a degree of free-riding b/c to not supply military power in certain parts of the world would in the long-run hurt our interests.

Second, his comments on Korea evokes arguments raised by the political left: reunification may have happened without U.S. presence. He also questions notions of peace. For instance, we claim that U.S. presence brought about peace, yet we see a hostile, nuclear North. Maybe Trump is right. But this is all counterfactual thinking, and we could equally plausibly argue that the absence of U.S. forces may have resulted in a second Korean War (started by either the North or South), or have led to greater provocations from North Korea.

Here's a portion of the transcript with relevant parts highlights.

SANGER: So what we want to do is pick up where we left off in March

. We were listening to Speaker Ryan last night, and he presented a much more traditional Republican, engaged internationalist view of the world. One in which he said that the United States would never lead from behind. In our conversation a few months ago, you were discussing pulling back from commitments we can no longer afford unless others pay for them. You were discussing a set of alliances that you were happy to participate in.

TRUMP:

And I think, by the way, David, I think they will be able to afford them.

SANGER:

They may be.

TRUMP:

We can't.

SANGER: But I guess the question is, If we can't, do you think that your presidency, let's assume for a moment that they contribute what they are contributing today, or what they have contributed historically, your presidency would be one of pulling back and saying, "You know, we're not going to invest in these alliances with NATO

, we are not going to invest as much as we have in Asia since the end of the Korean War because we can't afford it and it's really not in our interest to do so."

TRUMP:

If we cannot be properly reimbursed for the tremendous cost of our military protecting other countries, and in many cases the countries I'm talking about are extremely rich. Then if we cannot make a deal, which I believe we will be able to, and which I would prefer being able to, but if we cannot make a deal, I would like you to say, I would prefer being able to, some people, the one thing they took out of your last story, you know, some people, the fools and the haters, they said, "Oh, Trump doesn't want to protect you." I would prefer that we be able to continue, but if we are not going to be reasonably reimbursed for the tremendous cost of protecting these massive nations with tremendous wealth - you have the tape going on?

SANGER:

We do.

HABERMAN:

We both do.

TRUMP:

With massive wealth. Massive wealth. We're talking about countries that are doing very well. Then yes, I would be absolutely prepared to tell those countries, "Congratulations, you will be defending yourself."

SANGER:

That suggests that our forward deployments around the world are based on their interests - they're not really based on our interests. And yet I think many in your party would say that the reason that we have troops in Europe, the reason that we keep 60,000 troops in Asia, is that it's in our interest to keep open trading lines, it's in our interest to keep the North Koreans in check, you do that much better out away from the United States.

TRUMP:

I think it's a mutual interest, but we're being reimbursed like it's only in our interest. I think it's a mutual interest. ...

SANGER:

We were talking about alliances, and the fundamental problem that you hear many Republicans, traditional Republicans, have with the statement that you've made is that it would seem to them that you would believe that the interests of the United States being out with both our troops and our diplomacy abroad is less than our economic interests in having somebody else support that. In other words, even if they didn't pay a cent toward it, many have believed that the way we've kept our postwar leadership since World War II has been our ability to project power around the world. That's why we got this many diplomats --

TRUMP:

How is it helping us? How has it helped us? We have massive trade deficits. I could see that, if instead of having a trade deficit worldwide of $800 billion, we had a trade positive of $100 billion, $200 billion, $800 billion. So how has it helped us?

SANGER:

Well, keeping the peace. We didn't have a presence in places like Korea in 1950, or not as great a presence, and you saw what happened.

TRUMP:

There's no guarantee that we'll have peace in Korea.

SANGER:

Even with our troops, no, there's no guarantee.

TRUMP:

No, there's no guarantee. We have 28,000 soldiers on the line.

SANGER:

But we've had them there since 1953 and --

TRUMP:

Sure, but that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be something going on right now. Maybe you would have had a unified Korea. Who knows what would have happened? In the meantime, what have we done? So we've kept peace, but in the meantime we've let North Korea get stronger and stronger and more nuclear and more nuclear, and you are really saying, "Well, how is that a good thing?" You understand? North Korea now is almost like a boiler. You say we've had peace, but that part of Korea, North Korea, is getting more and more crazy. And more and more nuclear. And they are testing missiles all the time.

SANGER:

They are.

TRUMP:

And we've got our soldiers sitting there watching missiles go up. And you say to yourself, "Oh, that's interesting." Now we're protecting Japan because Japan is a natural location for North Korea. So we are protecting them, and you say to yourself, "Well, what are we getting out of this?"

SANGER:

Well, we keep our missile defenses out there. And those missile defenses help prevent the day when North Korea can reach the United States with one of its missiles. It's a lot easier to shoot down from there --

TRUMP:

We've had them there for a long time, and now they're practically obsolete, in all fairness.

SANGER:

Relatively new missile defenses would allow us --

Politics of Peace and Nuclear Weapons

As a reminder for what to read for research on the politics of peace and nuclear weapons, I've added a a couple books to my reading list. The first is Dan Zak's Almighty: Courage, Resistance, and Existential Peril in the Nuclear Age. The book opens with the story of three activists - a nun, Vietnam vet, and housepainter - breaking  into a nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge, TN as a launching point for investigating America's history, horror, and fascination with nuclear weapons. Richard Rhodes who penned a four volume set on nuclear history, including The Making of the Atomic Bomb provided a good review in the WaPo.  Rhodes highlights an important passage from the book detailing the hypocrisy of non-proliferation from the nuclear five. Excerpted from the review:

 The most important single idea in “Almighty” emerges in the assertion of an exasperated South African ambassador to the United Nations, Abdul Samad Minty: “If for security reasons the [five original nuclear powers] feel that they must be armed with nuclear weapons, what about other countries in similar situations? Do we think that the global situation is such that no other country would ever aspire to nuclear weapons . . . when the five tell us that it is absolutely correct to possess nuclear weapons for their security?”

The second book I learned about at a book launch event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for Brad Roberts's  The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. As the title suggests, Roberts cautions against our haste in promulgating (unilateral) nuclear disarmament. Existing international realities (particularly in relation to China and Russia) make it very difficult for the U.S. to give up its nuclear weapons. Roberts told me after the event that there's a fairly wide consensus among U.S. policymakers on nuclear policy - which I assume to believe that maintaining a limited supply of nukes is still in our national interest. How do policymakers and the activists highlighted by Zak come to different logical conclusions about nuclear policy and the utility of nuclear weapons.

An Early Indication of China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The AIIB, China's new multilateral development bank, held its first annual meeting over the weekend. As is well known, last spring, the Obama Administration received flak for opting out of the AIIB and pressuring its allies also not to join. As explained in the Diplomat, two concerns prompted the U.S. to remain leery of the AIIB:

 "1) Its voting structure gives China a disproportionate voting share, which means it can effectively manipulate the bank to further its own economic and strategic goals in the region; 2) The AIIB will not follow the same high standards as existing financial institutions when deciding which projects to fund, forgoing important criteria like environmental protection, human rights, and anti-corruption."

Source: Xinhua/Li Xin

Moreover, there were concerns that the AIIB would become yet another regional institution (along with the One Belt One Road and the Maritime Silk Road initiatives) used to strengthen China's influence in Asia, undermining the work of existing multilateral banks, if not the broader liberal international order. Such concerns continue to linger as the AIIB sets its sights on bringing in new members and financing projects outside of Asia (i.e. Latin America and Africa).

An early look at the AIIB following its first annual meeting suggests that some of the concerns, at least regarding the AIIB's institutional design, may be unfounded. An article published last weekend in the Washington Post headlined, "Asia’s new infrastructure bank is out to prove it’s not China’s pawn." reports that the AIIB is actually co-financing 3 of its 4 initial projects with other multilateral banks, including the World Bank. According to a British VP at the AIIB, this collaboration is only possible if the AIIB meets standards adopted by other multilateral banks. In terms of voting power, China is the largest shareholder at 26%, but it does not give China an outright majority to impose its preferences.

What does this mean for Asia' growing institutional architecture? Contrary to notions of "rival regionalism" or "institutional balancing," institutional overlap may actually foster positive global goods for the region. Despite the potential redundancies of overlapping institutions, they can facilitate greater interaction among states and help fill in governance gaps. Perhaps the AIIB can complement existing institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank. I wouldn't be surprised to see if the U.S. comes around to the AIIB in the near future if it can find some face saving way to do it.

Revisiting the Rebalance to Asia

Joshua Kurlantzick of CFR posted an interesting graphic of US security assistance to Southeast Asia, indicating a net decrease in resources to Southeast Asia between 2010 and 2015 by $34.5 million. Meanwhile assistance to the Middle East and North Africa rose by about $1.3 billion during the same period. The statistics imply that the rebalance to Asia is more rhetoric than actual policy.

However, security assistance and military aid is only one aspect of the rebalance. And it certainly does not factor economic (i.e. TPP) and diplomatic initiatives in the region promoted by the U.S. Aside from security assistance, the rebalance also calls for strengthening bilateral partnerships, both old and new; encouraging the growth of intra-network alliances, and actively participating in multilateral regional forums and dialouges.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter gave his own remarks at CFR on the rebalance. Three things stood out about his remarks. First, India, often seen on the periphery of U.S. Asia policy, is factored more significantly in Washington's conception of Asia's regional architecture. Second, Asia is fine, and perhaps better off, without a formal alliance structure like NATO. Third, the U.S. envisions the regional architecture less as a formal structure, and more as a network.

On this last point, Carter made the following remarks:

America’s bilateral relationships remain the bedrock of our presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific. But in a large and interconnected region, especially one with so many strong, capable, and dedicated players, it makes sense to network and link relationships and produce gains for all....  

Regional security, stability, and prosperity have required nations working together less formally. And the United States has been an important builder, cement, and participant in this arrangement. Today, as the region changes, the United States is augmenting our bilateral relationships and alliance with trilateral and multilateral arrangements. We’re weaving these partnerships together to more effectively bolster American and regional security. This network, with its shared values, habits of cooperation, and compatible and complementary capabilities, will expand the reach of all, responsibly share the security burden, and help ensure peace and stability in the region for years to come. 

This burgeoning networks builds in three ways. First, the Department of Defense is strongly emphasizing trilateral mechanisms to bring together like-minded allies and partners to maximize individual contributions to regional peace and security, and link together nations that previously worked with us mostly separately. .. Second, to improve regional security, we’re encouraging our allies and partners to actively develop their own interconnected security relationships...Third, we’re helping create an interconnected regional architecture, from one end of the region to another, through engagement and activities in multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting ...It’s important to remember that our bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relationships, and the developing network they comprise, is not aimed at any particular country. Rather, it demonstrates that the region wants cooperation, not coercion; and a continuation, not an end, of decades of stability, peace, and progress. The network’s not closed. It excludes no one. We want cooperation and shared leadership so that other nations who want to contribute to regional stability and security, they can work with the other nations of the region to do so... By operationalizing the rebalance, by transforming old alliances and new partnerships, and by networking security, we can . . . promote and defend the principles that have allowed so many in the region to rise and prosper for so long.

Given constant crises unfolding in the Middle East and Europe, the rebalance to Asia may seem like an after thought to the White House. Of even if one accepts the rebalance at face value, the graphics above may suggest that the U.S. is conducting Asia policy on the cheap. That's a fair assessment in a period of tightened budgets. But that should not mean that the rebalance itself is not built on "smart power" principles in which military, economic, and diplomatic elements are channeled to address long term regional goals.

Japan-Korea Relations and Comfort Women

(Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images)

I have an unfinished blog post discussing Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder's recent book, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash. Unfortunately, I can't resurrect it at the moment because its on my old laptop.

Anyway, in light of last month's comfort women "resolution" I'm putting links to two good articles assessing where things stand at the moment. The first appears in CFR's Asia Unbound blog where Scott Snyder commends President Park and Prime Minister Abe's "act of political leadership and statesmanship" but then lays out challenges for both governments in maintaining forward momentum. The biggest and most immediate challenge related to satisfying the comfort women themselves, who were shut-out of the process (for not entirely bad reasons contrary to what activists might claim) and the removal of the comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The second is from Celeste Arrington who highlights the perspective of the comfort women and their advocacy movement since the 1990s, shedding additional insight on the challenge in satisfying victims' grievances.

March for Life: Catholics and Evangelicals

For years, Catholic University students have supported March for Life, the pro-life (or anti-abortion if you're on the other side of the debate) rally held annually in Washington DC. Several of my students informed me they would be participating on Fri. and thus absent from class. I decided to cancel class for Fri, although mother nature later took care of this.

One difference this year is the prominent participation of evangelical Christians in the March for Life. One would assume evangelicals would embrace the movement given their opposition to abortion, but Washington Post reporter Michelle Boorstein offers: "the reasons evangelicals haven’t been joining Catholics in public activism recently are theological, cultural and political." Pro-life advocate and Liberty University faculty Karen Swallow Prior probes deeper:

"Evangelical Protestants were deeply anti-Catholic . . .Some thought, whatever Roman Catholics were for, we should be . Evangelicals are more politically conservative and come at abortion opposition with a different language. Catholics have long spoken of abortion as a 'social justice' cause not unlike fighting poverty, while evangelicals saw the issue through an individual morality lens and were wary of Catholic language that to them sounded liberal."

The recent joining of Evangelicals and Catholics is a reminder that "religion" neither necessarily divides or unites potential activists. Mobilization strategy and political opportunity in this case outweigh religious identity/ideology.

Business in North Korea

There's a debate among North Korea observers about the wisdom, viability, and profitability of doing business in the most isolated country in the world. Some see North Korea as an untapped and potentially ripe market for business ventures. Others see such ventures as an exercise in futility, citing the country's unpredictable legal infrastructure for foreign businesses. If some see business as a means of engaging North Korea and encouraging leaders to pursue reforms, others will view such activities as morally reprehensible, providing the regime with hard currency and cash.

A couple years ago I blogged about the rapid rise of cell phone users in North Korea. The numbers continue to rise (close to 3 million now). But from the standpoint of Orascom, the Egyptian telecom company which owns a 75% stake in Koryolink, its business venture under the Kim regime has not fared well. As Andrei Lankov writes in NKNews

In late November the Egyptian building and telecom company Orascom finally admitted what had been known in narrow circles for two years: that its North Korean state partners had taken over the joint Koryolink cellphone network, and that Orascom had been unable to reap any profit from its seemingly successful investment in North Korea.

The Wall Street Journal provided further details.

Koryolink, which now accounts for 85% of Orascom’s revenue and profit, says it hasn’t been able to send any funds out of North Korea in 2015 due to local currency controls and international sanctions targeting Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program...The setback [for Orascom], underscores the risk of doing business in North Korea, where foreign firms have complained that property and profits have been appropriated by the government.

It could be possible that industries such as telecommunications which have implications for regime control, or mining which relates to security, may be more restricted than other industries. On the whole then, foreign business in NK, while no cake walk, has potential given Kim Jong-Un's desire in recent years to boost investments through special economic zones. As if to counter negative press on Orascom, the Pyongyang Times claimed to have "hundreds" of foreign investors. Likewise, a credible source mentioned that 2015 was a pretty good year for North  Korean tourism, ,despite the Ebola ban barring travel to North Korea the first few months. In fact, Uri Tours has organized snowboarding trip to Masikryong ski resort, even bringing professional snowboarders to accompany tourists. In short, there's no conclusive evidence to argue that business ventures are either good or bad for investors.