Russia, Turkey, and IR Paradigms

In a nod to ideological alliances, Anne Applebaum argues that dictators will choose other dictators at the end of the day and cites Turkish President Recep Erodgan's recent meeting with Russia's Vladimir Putin as an example. Despite Turkey's membership in NATO, Edrogan has used the military coup to crackdown on even the slightest potential for opposition.  As Applebaum writes:

(Alexander Zemlianichenko/Associated Press)

Geostrategic, military and even historical calculations should make Turkey and Russia antagonists. But their meeting illustrates something that many Western politicians and “realist” thinkers find difficult to understand: that ideas and ideology sooner or later trump “interests.” If Turkey were still a democracy, Erdogan would be looking to his Western allies to help him push back against Russia. But contact with the West also means contact with Western ideas. Dependence on the West means dependence on states that believe in the legal norms which Erdogan wants to repress, states that might support the people Erdogan wants to lock up.

Victory for constructivists? Does this really mean ideas trump interests? Well, Turkey's move does indicate the power of ideas. But ideas too reflect particular interests. What's important here (for IR students) is the relationship between ideas and interests and whether in the case of Turkey and Russia, ideas are defining actors' interests.

Recent Protests in Turkey and Brazil

For a blog on social movements, I haven't done much tracking of the two recent major protests in Turkey and now Brazil. This AP article provides a basic comparison of the two protests. David Meyer has a better comparison here. In trying to understand protests, everyone looks for parallels: Student rebellions of 1968, Occupy Wall Street, Iranian Green Revolution of 2009, the Arab Spring?

Source: Reuters

Mass protests at the outset appear random and chaotic. The spark which triggers mobilization is rarely predictable. Yet, once a protests gets underway, for those well-versed in social movement theory, mobilization patterns and behavior all seem fairly predictable. At a broad level, there is nothing particularly unique about either protest. As Christian Davenport argues, however, the media would have you think otherwise.

Let's start with Turkey. Few people realize that the protests over Gezi Park had actually been ongoing for a couple of years on a very small scale by one main group (Taksim Solidarity). Only when the government began the process of razing the park did protests escalate, triggering mass protests. The police overreacted and cracked down on protesters. Images of violent clashes circulated in the media fueling more attention, resources, and warm bodies for the movement. At this point, the protests became less about saving Gezi Park, and more about grievances against the Erodgan government. This opened the door for a wide variety of groups to join the fray. It's unclear whether any formal coalition has organized. Soli Ozel believes that the protests are rooted in political dissatisfaction with Erdogan and his authoritarian handling of social and economic issues. This suggests that protests will continue to reemerge, even if this current protest cycle dies down. But on the other hand, without the right political timing or without additional resources and leadership, the movement risks losing momentum and becoming co-opted by the state.  Of course, the local-cultural nuances at the micro-level are always unique.But the broader dynamics of movement escalation and state-societal interaction spelled out here are almost identical to what I witnessed regarding anti-base movements on Jeju Island a couple years ago. They also follow patterns similar to protests during the Arab Spring or the Occupy movements.

Moving onto Brazil, we see a similar chain of events. Long standing grievances about poor public services relative to Brazil's high tax rate have irked Brazilians. But only with the announced fare hike did a political opportunity for larger scale protests exist. Civil societal pressure led to modest concessions from the government in hopes that part o the movement might seek asylum. What next? This excellent article in the Post raises that very question and highlights a key dilemma: "If protests focus too narrowly on single issues such as bus fares, they risk losing steam when the issue is addressed. And if they embrace too many issues, they risk spreading themselves too thin to achieve any of their goals."

Source: Tasso Marcelo - AFP/Getty Images

The concessions intended to ease and co-opt protests seems to have failed in the short-run. But where is this all heading? The motive and grievances of protesters go well beyond fare hikes at this point. Contrary to this interview on NPR where a young activist states, "We don't believe in organiz[ing] ourselves in leadership, and someone just following orders. And I think that leadership is not something that would help us. On the opposite, I think we should all be organizing as equals,"  Contrary to the preceding quote, I'm certain there is some form of organization and leadership being assembled as we speak. But still, protesters (as in Turkey) have yet to form a list of specific demands or form any clear leadership. In that sense, the comments of the young protester seem a little naive. But who am I to judge. It is after all their movement. For protesters in Turkey and Brazil, simply being able to vent and letting their government and the entire world know that they are fed up with government restrictions or poor government service may be the ultimate goal. Maybe politicians and policymakers will listen and make changes. Maybe they won't.

Going back to my original point, the recent protests in Turkey and Brazil follow broad patterns outlined by social scientists. This increases my confidence in academic theory and that theory can actually be useful.

Update: A similar sort of argument from Anne Applebaum looking at Brazil, Turkey, Egypt.