Closure of Manas Air Base

I was contacted a few weeks ago by Stars and Stripes, the U.S. military's news organization to comment on the closure of Manas Air Base in Kyrgzstan and base relocation to Romania. Despite the time I put in researching and answering questions, my comments were never used. So I've put up my responses to the questions below. Here's additional commentary from Alex Cooley, a true expert on this subject.

1. What are your general thoughts on the Manas Base?

Political instability and conflict in the Middle East have been ongoing if not rising the past few years. Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan is winding down. Therefore, it makes a lot of strategic sense for the U.S. to shift air transit operations from Kyrgyzstan to Romania which is much closer to current global hot spots along the Mediterranean and the Middle East .

2. Do you think they (the Kyrgz) actually wanted the U.S. operations to leave, or were they hoping for better terms and the U.S. called their bluff?

The Kyrgyzstan government has played base politics with the United States before, ratcheting upward the "rent" for Manas during negotiations in 2006. More importantly, in 2009, the Kyrgyz president announced his decision to terminate the base agreement, only to have the U.S. triple its offer to keep U.S. flights operating.  I'm not aware if the U.S. and Kyrgyz government attempted to negotiate a deal again, but it should have been obvious to the Kyrgyz that their bargaining power had been significantly reduced with the war in Afghanistan drawing to a close. So it does not seem likely that the Kyrgz were expecting to extract better terms from the U.S. 

3. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Russia has its own base in Kyrgyzstan and is a major economic benefactor so the Kyrgyz may have felt some pressure from Moscow, if not directly at least indirectly, to support its patron. But the decision was most likely one emanating from the Kyrgz themselves given the declining utility of the base for the U.S. and demonstrated by the overwhelming support in Parliament to not renew the base agreement.  

4. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Romania is a much more reliable partner than Kyrgyzstan.  Romania is a member of NATO and has a proven track record of defense cooperation with the U.S. The presence of U.S. bases in Romania should therefore be more stable and less politicized. We are also less likely to see economic opportunism from the Romanian government. 

News Roundup: Asia Pivot; Philippine Disaster; Kony 2013; Korean Politics and More...

There's so much news and so little time to post these days that I've decided to adopt something similar to the Duck's "Morning Linkage" news updates. These are basically news, academic research, and reports which revolve around my research & teaching interests.

Disaster and Relief Effort in the Philippines

• Typhoon Haiyan  has crippled the middle islands of the Philippines. The U.S. military is once again playing a leading role in disaster relief efforts in Asia. Foreign Policy published this article interestingly titled, "Everyone Hate U.S. Bases in Asia - Until Disaster Strikes." Goodwill efforts go far for the military as was the case in Indonesia in 2004 and Japan in 2011. This is in comparison to China's alleged $100,000 pledge (yes, that's correct, 100K). Diplomatic reasons for the paltry sum are given here. Reuters may be exaggerating to make the Chinese look really bad, but the general point about aid and goodwill still stands.
• I'm sure it's been done already, but it might be interesting to conduct a study on the role of the U.S. military and overseas U.S. military presence following foreign disasters? How does U.S. military participation in relief efforts affect local and regional opinion of the U.S. and U.S. military? Does "goodwill" have longer term regional effects? Does disaster relief draw the U.S. military far from its traditional mandate/mission and to what extent can/should the U.S. military be involved in providing humanitarian assistance.
•  Josh Busby had a good  post on thinking about natural disasters and insecurity. We often lump such studies under the rubric of "human security," but Busby, reflecting on his own work on climate change and security in Africa, suggests ways to think about natural hazards and "harder" security issues (i.e. bringing back guns, bombs, bullets). One interesting aspect noted by Busby (via Max Fisher) is the importance of governance and its relationship to disaster response. Looting, violence, and a general breakdown in order is very well a function of governance, state capacity, and perhaps civil-military relations.Jennifer Keister makes excellent points on governance and disaster response here.  The aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan certainly brings interesting comparisons to disaster response in Japan after the 2011 tsunami or the United States after Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Asia pivot related content

• Bob Kelly at the Duck had a long, but insightful piece on ROK-Japan relations, an issue I've also blogged about in the past. What was more interesting was his sweeping overview of East Asian security, the Asia Pivot, and US-Sino relations and where ROK and Japan fit in the broader strategic landscape. This makes a good read for undergrads interested in Asian security.
• Here's a recent CNAS report from Ely Ratner on the Asian Pivot and U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. I'd like to take very small credit for suggesting a few ideas to Ely in the early phase of this project.

South Korean Politics

• The ROK government is seeking a ban on the United Progressive Party (UPP), South Korea's far left party for being pro-North Korea. I've had some interaction with UPP party members since they've been a key supporter of anti-U.S. base protests. Anyway, the article falls in line with a recent paper I read by UCSD professor's Steph Haggard and Jong-Sung You about a decline (or at least lower levels relative to other OECD countries) in civil liberties in South Korea. This is supported by several indexes which measure civil liberties, media openness, and democracy (i.e. Freedom House scores). It also falls in line with my argument about a strong security consensus held by foreign policy and security elites in South Korea.

Kony 2013

• I assigned this piece for my undergrads: a follow-up to the viral Kony 2012 video. The article highlights the unique and unusual interesection of interests between civil society/human rights activists and the U.S. military. As the article states, Invisible Children and other young activists were instrumental in pushing the U.S. government to take action against Kony. This comes despite the fact that Kony “is not targeting U.S. citizens. He’s not targeting U.S. embassies. He’s not al-Qaeda.” Despite the lack of threat to the US, the U.S. military may find other reasons for getting involved in the Kony hunt: 1) it gives them a reason for military presence in sub-Sahara Africa; 2) strengthens relations between U.S. and African countries; 3) allows the US to train African militaries.  So a win-win situation for activists and the U.S. miltiary. Would love to see a research article about the rise of Kony 2012, the convergence of political interests, and perhaps long term consequences of such action beyond Kony's future capture. 

Base Politics

• One of the anti-base protest cases I examined in my book was the protest against base expansion in Vicenza, Italy. The U.S. Army wanted to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, split between Germany and Italy, to northern Italy. Base construction is now complete, but David Vine just emailed me asking if I knew why the U.S. decided to keep two brigades in Germany. This was news to me so didn't have a clear answer.  But here was my educated guess: 

"The military states strategic reasons for keeping a batallion in Germany. Recent departures at Grafenwoehr have left more space with better training facilities for the 173rd. Of course, this defeats the earlier idea of consolidating the 173rd in one location.  This is purely speculation on my part, but is it possible that the Germans wanted to retain some US presence? When the DoD (and CBO) made its early recommendations for base realignment, Germany faced the largest reductions and closures. Not that there's much love for Washington these days from Berlin, but among foreign policy circles, I thought I read or heard somewhere that a few Germans believed the reductions were too much and too fast.

The question which I'm afraid I don't have an answer to, is how the US and Germany decided to retain some of the 173rd in Germany. Did the US ask Germany (likely with Germany willing to oblige); did Germany ask the US (less likely, but possible as a way of reinvigorating strategic ties); and finally, our milliion dollar question, if the  US asked Germany was it b/c of the newfound opportunity to use a large training facilitiy (although hard to believe the US wouldn't have thought of this earlier) or b/c of political opposition either in Vicenza locally, or from Rome, which left the US seeking some last minute basing solution." 

On this last point, if anti-base movements were a part of the decision to keep parts of the 173rd in Germany, I'm curious to know if Vicenza activists celebrated this announcement as a  a partial victory in blocking some US troops.

Government Shutdown and the Asia Pivot

Stymied by tea party Republican efforts to block the Affordable Health Care Act (aka Obamacare) and the decision of Democrats to stand firm against further delay of the new health care law, the federal government shut-down last week. I try to stay out of politics on this blog, but my own take (along with the majority of the country) is that a group of minority Republicans have forced the Party establishment to make unreasonable demands on a policy which has legitimately passed through several hurdles in our democratic system. A Post op-ed makes this very point. Jon Stewart does it with less grace but way more humor here.

Moving beyond this domestic debacle, others have pontificated on the repercussions of the government shutdown on foreign policy. Josh Busby writes that lawmakers have weakened America’s ability to serve as a force for attraction around the world. Anne Applebaum states that the shutdown has not only damaged U.S. credibility abroad, but democracy itself. The Post argues national security faces greater risks with intelligence and security forces not operating at full capacity. And Ralph Cossa at CSIS, Pacific Forum had a tongue-in-cheek memo for Republicans and the President:

Memo to Congressional Republicans: Remember Ronald Reagan's "shining city on a hill"? You just turned the lights off.

Memo to President Obama: remember your "pivot" to Asia? Its credibility is fading even faster than Congressional approval ratings.

One major foreign policy casualty of the government shutdown last week was Obama's cancellation of his Asia trip - specifically his attendance at the APEC and ASEAN summit meetings in Indonesia and Brunei, as well as stops to Malaysia and the Philippines. Now most Americans will agree that the President has no business flying off to Asia given the political mess back at home. But considering the pivot to Asia as one of the most touted foreign policy initiatives of the Administration, it sends mixed signals when the President bails on a trip to the region, even if he does send Secretary of State John Kerry as a stand in. Beyond missed opportunities to reassure partners in Asia and hold discussion with leaders from China and Russia, several critics have argued that Washington's absence opens the door for China to exert greater influence in the region. An article in the Global Post goes further by contrasting Washington's uneven attention towards Asia while Beijing's strengthened diplomatic, military, and economic influence in the region.

I'm not a China alarmist by any means, and we shouldn't read too much into Obama's absence in Asia. Also, in the past few weeks, Sec Def Chuck Hagel spent an unprecedented four days in South Korea reaffirming the U.S.-ROK alliance while both he and Sec State John Kerry traveled to Tokyo for the 2+2 meetings to strengthen U.S.-Japan ties (including permission from Japan to house U.S. drones on Japanese soil). Still,  lingering concerns remain about U.S. commitment to the region from our allies. Mike Green and Matt Goodman at CSIS address this point and suggest how Washington might rectify the situation: 1) reschedule a visit to the region early next year; 2) provide greater clarity and Congressional support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade negotiations; 3) protect the U.S. defense budget from making deep cuts on Asia.

I do think the Obama Administration recognizes the long-term strategic value of engaging Asia. But there have been too many fires to put out (i.e. Arab Spring, Libya, Syria, and now the federal shutdown) which pull us away from our longer term strategic goals whether on foreign or domestic policy. We can rebound from temporary setbacks, but we shouldn't lose our eye on the ball. While we fix our gaze on China wondering whether the U.S. is in relative decline, the rest of the world will closely follow the U.S. and our increasing polarization and gridlock in Washington for signs of American decline. Why? Because the decline of great powers often begins at home, not abroad.
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Update: The Washington Post published an article with the headline "China's Xi takes advantage of Obama absence." Yes, this is an opportunity for China to exercise its charm, but I wonder if the media is overplaying this tune. I'm sure Xi's trip to parts of Indonesia and Malaysia were already planned. Another article suggests that U.S. and China are "grappling for influence" in Southeast Asia. Yes, but this competition is not new. The question is whether it's a benign, competitive (for lack of a distinct adjective), or hostile form of competition.

Finally, Elina Noor argues that Obama missed a chance to promote the TPP and gave up some ground to China to elevate ties with countries such as Malaysia. However, an Obama trip would have been more symbol than substance and in the long run does not affect US-Malaysia ties. Citing Malaysia's relationship with Beijing and Washington, she writes "To view them in mutually exclusive terms would be a simplistic reduction of what in reality are rich, cross-cutting, and commonly reinforcing interests between and among all three in a messy noodle bowl of regional economic and security frameworks."

Closure of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti

Source: Department of the Navy; CIA World Factbook. Image source: 

GeoEye via Google Earth. Printed in The Washington Post Sept. 24, 2013. 

Last month, Djibouti requested that a fleet of U.S. drones relocate from Camp Lemonnier following several crashes. Although we don't know the details, Washington and Djibouti seemed to have reached this agreement amicably. For the most part, Djibouti, officials have been satisfied with the arrangement ($37 million yearly rent), and from the standpoint of base politics, relocating now rather than after some catastrophic accident seems like the wiser option.

North Korea Collapse Scenarios

Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute published a critical assessment of a new RAND study, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. In skimming Hayes critique, two points come to the forefront. First, the study is unclear about the probability of whether collapse is imminent: when vs. if North Korea will collapse. Bruce Bennett, the author of the study, is more nuanced in his report even if RAND's publication division plays up the "imminent" card. For instance, the first key finding listed in RAND's executive summary is that "There Is a Reasonable Probability That North Korean Totalitarianism Will End in the Foreseeable Future." As such, the report may not provide the best basis for policy. As Hayes writes, "The problem with Bennett’s report is that it quickly moved from the purely 'conceptual space' into the media space,  and is fast headed for the policy-political space." Given the probability of competing non-collapse scenarios, Hayes cautions hastily drawing immediate policy conclusions out of the study.

Second, the collapse argument has been around for two decades now.  Take just one scenario for instance: David Collins' collapse scenario in 1995 in the wake of the famine:

Phase One:resource depletion
Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion
Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government
Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough
Phase Five: active resistance against the central government
Phase Six: the fracture of the regime
Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.

As we all know, collapse has yet to happen, and has forced some analysts such as Aidan Foster-Carter and David Maxwell to backtrack on their earlier predictions with Maxwell writing a piece about why North Koreans don't rebel.

For someone like me who wants to know whether pockets of civil society exist in North Korea, the study is a must read because any collapse scenario will implicate or have implications for ordinary North Koreans. North Koreans may mobilize to hasten or complicate a devolving North Korean state in a hard collapse scenario. And in a soft-landing scenario, civil society (or its development) will be instrumental in bringing about a less chaotic transition.

Teaching About China's Maritime Dispute

CFR unveiled a snazzy new interactive tool to study China's maritimes disputes. This is a great educational tool for students, complete with discussion and essay questions, and something I'll try to incorporate next semester in my U.S., China, and International Relations of East Asia course. Ironically, however, using such a tool will probably require more, not less time for prep since the instructor has to preview all the material beforehand. Anyway, kudos to CFR.

Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space

Anti-War Protests, Pacificism, and Syria

I've avoided discussion on Syria since there are a million other outlets pontificating on this issue already. However, two articles appeared on my radar, both in reaction to the recent surge in activity from anti-war groups so I'll comment on anti-war protests. Liberal anti-war groups largely supported Obama'd bid for election in 2008. However, Syria provides the first major break between the administration and demonstraters. It's no suprise that activists, who we often assume are principled actors, can too play politics, forming coalitions with lawmakers, disparate groups, and whoever will help them push their short term agenda. Who would have thought conservative libertarians and left-wing pacificists jumping in bed! But this also shows that coalitions are fluid, and their relationship with formal political parties are complex as argued by Michael Heaney and Fabio Rojas here. More related to my own (not-yet-off-the-ground) research is a confirmation about the worldviews and constraints of policymakers and activists. They are socialized into two completely different worldviews such that no permanent coalition could be ever formed in finding a solution to peace.

Source: Nikki Kahn/Washington Post

The second article is an op-ed from documentary filmaker Sebastian Junger titled " When the best chance for peace means war." It's essentially a rebuke of pacifism in the wake of humanitarian disaster as Junger writes, "At some point, pacifism becomes part of the machinery of death." Evoking just means for the use of force, he adds, "Every war I have ever covered — Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Liberia — withstood all diplomatic efforts to end it until Western military action finally forced a resolution." This last point is the tough question for pacfisits. The pacifist reponse is to always look for diplomatic solutions, even when such solutions have been exhausted. At times coercion, or the threat of coercion, are needed to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough.

A Caring Society

Anne Marie-Slaughter has written an inspiring piece about what at first sounded like another call  for bridging the policy-accademic divide, but instead turned into an appeal for greater investment in producing an ethos of "care" in our society and abroad. She writes, "Common purpose creates the trust and empathy that reveal us as individual human beings, not as statistics and stereotypes." Of course, she leaves it up to academics to come up with the great ideas to institute a policy of care and compassion. :)

Social Movements and the Politics of Markets

A compadre of mine in the social movements and IR field, Joshua Busby, has come out with a new book co-authored with Ethan Kapstein on social movements and the politics of markets.  Most of my work linking IR with social movements deals with security issues. But Josh's work reminds us that there's a host of social movement issues related to IPE as well: globalization, global financial institutions, labor markets, development, global inequality and so forth.  I've cross-posted Joshua's entry about his book from the Duck of Minerva blog here.

Civil Society, Civil Nuclear Cooperation, and Nuclear Disarmament

Back in June during the Mansfield Foundation's U.S.-Korea Scholar-Policy program, Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists and Mary Beth Niikitin led an interesting discussion about the 123 Agreement and US-ROK civilian nuclear energy cooperation. I expected a boring talk, but it turned out to be one of the most interesting panels. Civilian nuclear diplomacy seemed to touch on every aspect of IR theory relevant to me: international security, two-level games, foreign policy, transnational activism, civil
society etc..

In a nutshell, Korea wants to expand its civilian nuclear energy capabilities and become a global supplier. However, Korea is prohibited from taking these steps under the U.S.-ROK "123" Agreement (following section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act agreement). As Mark Holt argues, U.S. consent is required for any reprocessing or enrichment activities related to U.S.-supplied materials and technology. Unable to come to an agreement, the U.S. and Korea decided to extend the current terms of the 123 Agreement and return to negotiations in 2014. The issue is complicated because

1. South Korea has growing energy demands and as their deal with the UAE suggests, a lot of money can be made from exporting the technological know-how. 
2. At the international level, the U.S.has to consider non-proliferation norms without appearing as if it carries double-standards. If  Korea is granted permission to expand its civilian nuclear program, why not North Korea? Why not Iran? These were some of the criticisms faced by the Bush Administration over the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement in 2005. South Korea must also consider global non-proliferation norms, as well as its alliance partnership with the U.S.
3. At the domestic level, we might see three reactions: a) From the right: This is a matter of national sovereignty, Korea has the right to develop its nukes; b) From the left: nuclear energy is a dangerous option; c) From businesses: nuclear energy export leads to profit.

The issue of civilian nuclear cooperation can get technical very quickly, but it does seem like a great case for political scientists to explore, especially those who are into two-level games type research.

And although not related to civil nuclear cooperation, the role of civil society and nuclear disarmament has again come to my attention. The research conducted by the Nautilus Institute reminds me that it is not just left-wing peace activists who support disarmament, but those in the policy world as well. Another link on transnational civil society and disarmament is here.

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Mobile Phones, Collective Action, and Social Capital

In my last post, I mentioned ownership and use of cell phones as a means for examining social capital. According to the World Bank study I cited, the idea was that rural areas with high cell phone ownership would produce a type of social network facilitating communication. I thought of tagging a study in the APSR which also used mobile phone onto the previous post, but decided it was worth creating a new post.
In the May 2013 issue of APSR, Jan Pierskalla and Florian Hollenbach find that:

The availability of cell phones as a communication technology allows political groups to overcome collective action problems more easily and improve in-group cooperation, and coordination. Utilizing novel, spatially disaggregated data on cell phone coverage and the location of organized violent events in Africa, we are able to show that the availability of cell phone coverage significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict.

The authors argue that cell phones helps facilitate in-group organization and the coordination of insurgent attacks. Hence cell phone coverage should be correlated with increased political violence. I haven't read the entire article, but their insights provide a counterpoint to many of the positive stories attached to technology, social media, and mobilization (i.e. Arab Spring, Occupy Movements, Candlelight Vigils in South Korea). It also takes us back to basic questions about social capital and what it's used for. Does social capital have to promote larger social (and not just private) benefits? The classic example are mafia groups and organized crime. Lots of social capital in those organizations. But towards what purpose?

Studying Civil Society in North Korea

CFR recently published my report on South Korean civil society and the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Civil Society North Korean-style :)

But my attention this week has turned to civil society in North Korea. Civil society in North Korea?!? Well no, its probably non-existent. But  a map of DPRK which locates where market activity is taking place and where humanitarian organizations operate exists. I wonder if the map might help researchers a) locate where one could go to look for potential early signs of things like trust, social capital, or civil society at the local level and b) compare this to other comparable regions in DPRK without the presence of market activity, aid agencies, etc..... it would be a natural or field experiment of sorts to see whether market activity or foreign presence has helped create social networks outside of government control. One could test basic concepts such as the relationship between market activity and social capital (i.e. whether market exchanges facilitate social capital and trust). My wife tells me economists think the relationship is reverse: social capital helps facilitate market exchanges. The larger point, however, is whether market activity or long term foreign presence helps create pockets of civil society in North Korea. Such a study might also lead us to examine the degree of  internal support for the regime as well as issues related to governance in a post-unification, post-transition scenario. 

Obviously the obstacles to such a study are enormous without real access into North Korea. It's not like I could handout survey questions. But there might be other ways of studying social capital. The World Bank has some practical suggestions. And there seem to be plenty of books and articles on measuring and finding social capital. For instance, one study linked cell phone ownership and social capital in Africa...something which might be plausible to examine in North Korea's future with two million cell phone subscribers (mostly in Pyongyang) through Koryolink - an Egyptian venture into the DPRK telecom industry. Rumors have it that there might be a second company entering the market. According to a Nautilus Report, DPRK's IT sector is growing with the mobile industry having "crossed the Rubicon."

One thought was the idea of using market activity as a proxy for civil society. It may be possible that in the unofficial markets, trust between the sellers and customers is the core of what enables market to run. It's hard to make transactions that could potentially throw you in jail if you don't trust your counterpart who might report you to authorities for engaging in illicit trade. On the other hand, I've heard some horror stories about market activity promoting rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and greed in DPRK and in pockets of China (the exact opposite of social capital!).

Finally, it's possible that social capital may take on an entirely (North Korean) bent which may not be easily observed. Would the concept of social capital in North Korea exist in the same way it does in other parts of the world? My discussions with defectors and NGO workers is that North Koreans have a hard time trusting anyone after having lived under a watchful regime where even family members become informants. Marc Howard's Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe raises some of these challenges for Eastern Europe (the article length version in Journal of Democracy is here). But living under decades of juche (self-reliant) ideology may present a whole different set of challenges for the growth of civil society in North Korea.

Recent Protests in Turkey and Brazil

For a blog on social movements, I haven't done much tracking of the two recent major protests in Turkey and now Brazil. This AP article provides a basic comparison of the two protests. David Meyer has a better comparison here. In trying to understand protests, everyone looks for parallels: Student rebellions of 1968, Occupy Wall Street, Iranian Green Revolution of 2009, the Arab Spring?

Source: Reuters

Mass protests at the outset appear random and chaotic. The spark which triggers mobilization is rarely predictable. Yet, once a protests gets underway, for those well-versed in social movement theory, mobilization patterns and behavior all seem fairly predictable. At a broad level, there is nothing particularly unique about either protest. As Christian Davenport argues, however, the media would have you think otherwise.

Let's start with Turkey. Few people realize that the protests over Gezi Park had actually been ongoing for a couple of years on a very small scale by one main group (Taksim Solidarity). Only when the government began the process of razing the park did protests escalate, triggering mass protests. The police overreacted and cracked down on protesters. Images of violent clashes circulated in the media fueling more attention, resources, and warm bodies for the movement. At this point, the protests became less about saving Gezi Park, and more about grievances against the Erodgan government. This opened the door for a wide variety of groups to join the fray. It's unclear whether any formal coalition has organized. Soli Ozel believes that the protests are rooted in political dissatisfaction with Erdogan and his authoritarian handling of social and economic issues. This suggests that protests will continue to reemerge, even if this current protest cycle dies down. But on the other hand, without the right political timing or without additional resources and leadership, the movement risks losing momentum and becoming co-opted by the state.  Of course, the local-cultural nuances at the micro-level are always unique.But the broader dynamics of movement escalation and state-societal interaction spelled out here are almost identical to what I witnessed regarding anti-base movements on Jeju Island a couple years ago. They also follow patterns similar to protests during the Arab Spring or the Occupy movements.

Moving onto Brazil, we see a similar chain of events. Long standing grievances about poor public services relative to Brazil's high tax rate have irked Brazilians. But only with the announced fare hike did a political opportunity for larger scale protests exist. Civil societal pressure led to modest concessions from the government in hopes that part o the movement might seek asylum. What next? This excellent article in the Post raises that very question and highlights a key dilemma: "If protests focus too narrowly on single issues such as bus fares, they risk losing steam when the issue is addressed. And if they embrace too many issues, they risk spreading themselves too thin to achieve any of their goals."

Source: Tasso Marcelo - AFP/Getty Images

The concessions intended to ease and co-opt protests seems to have failed in the short-run. But where is this all heading? The motive and grievances of protesters go well beyond fare hikes at this point. Contrary to this interview on NPR where a young activist states, "We don't believe in organiz[ing] ourselves in leadership, and someone just following orders. And I think that leadership is not something that would help us. On the opposite, I think we should all be organizing as equals,"  Contrary to the preceding quote, I'm certain there is some form of organization and leadership being assembled as we speak. But still, protesters (as in Turkey) have yet to form a list of specific demands or form any clear leadership. In that sense, the comments of the young protester seem a little naive. But who am I to judge. It is after all their movement. For protesters in Turkey and Brazil, simply being able to vent and letting their government and the entire world know that they are fed up with government restrictions or poor government service may be the ultimate goal. Maybe politicians and policymakers will listen and make changes. Maybe they won't.

Going back to my original point, the recent protests in Turkey and Brazil follow broad patterns outlined by social scientists. This increases my confidence in academic theory and that theory can actually be useful.

Update: A similar sort of argument from Anne Applebaum looking at Brazil, Turkey, Egypt.

The Laotian Nine: Escaping or Trafficked out of North Korea?

A North Korean human rights issue which has captured much attention recently is the return of the Laotian Nine: last month, nine North Korean defectors (all reportedly orphans) caught in Laos were detained by the Laotian government before being repatriated back to North Korea. The nine, with the aid of an activist/pastor, had navigated the underground railroad out of North Korea through China and into Laos over the past two years in hopes of seeking asylum in South Korea. Laotian actions potentially violated international law which prevents countries from repatriating refugees if their lives are endangered. Because of the media spotlight, there's some hope that the nine orphans, mostly children, will avoid being sent to the gulags, but there fate now is unknown.The case has received attention not only because of the number of children involved, but because Laos had been seen as a relative safe haven for defectors.

It's clear that Pyongyang has been cracking down on the number of defectors the past few years. There's speculation that the North Koreans (and perhaps the Chinese) may have pressured the Laotian government this time to repatriate the nine young defectors. The Laotian (and North Korean) government claimed that the nine were "trafficked"  out of North Korea by a Christian activist/pastor.

Here lies the moral and legal dilemma faced by third party countries like Laos or China and the importance of labels. In China, those who escape North Korea are labeled as "economic migrants" rather than refugees. As economic migrants, they are not protected under international law and therefore sent back to North Korea. In the Laotian nine case, Vientiane claimed the nine were "trafficked", an action which paradoxically makes the children victims of human rights abuse. Morally, we know it's wrong to send defectors back to North Korea if the chance of torture, hard labor, or death for defectors are high (which they are according to human rights reports). But legally, what do you do if providing safe haven or aiding defectors violates the sovereignty of another country (in this case North Korea). To put this in perspective, if a U.S. citizen breaks the law and flees another country, the US would certainly not want other countries giving safe haven to defectors and insist they be repatriated back to the U.S. (i.e. draft dodgers during the Vietnam era, or more recently, Edward Snowden). And yes, I'm aware the U.S. is no North Korea.

Of course, we tend to treat North Korea as a country which has given up its right to be judged as a sovereign state since North Korea repeatedly violates international law (or norms, natural law etc...) and apply domestic laws arbitrarily and unevenly (North Korea laws are interpreted and applied at the discretion of the regime. But here's a somewhat alternative view). Most human rights advocates, including myself, are appalled at the decision to repatriate the nine defectors, mostly children. Yet from the perspective of Vientiane, Beijing, or Pyeongyang which also consider national interests, diplomatic relations, and economic costs and not just moral reputation and international codes of ethics, the decision is surely a complicated one. Activists and states which adhere closely to the UN conventions must continue to persuade - through instrumental means or moral suasion - why a blanket policy of repatriation is wrong (i.e. there must be a way to distinguish between refugees, economic migrants, and trafficked persons). They must also press countries which have some diplomatic purchase over North Korea (i.e. China) to push Pyeongyang to address issues which are at the root cause of defection: food shortages, abject poverty, and human rights abuses.

RAND Study: Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Force

RAND recently published a massive study titled Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces. Commissioned by the Pentagon, it's probably the most comprehensive study on overseas bases since the Overseas Basing Commission Report released for the U.S. Congress in 2005.

I'm waiting to receive a hard copy of the report so I don't destroy my printer cartridge printing out the free pdf version online. In the meantime, you can get few snippets of the report from Michah Zenko at CFR. For a more Asia-oriented assessment of the report's findings, see this Indian Times article. Apparently, the report suggests using Port Blair in India as a site for a drone base.

Given the publication of this report, there does seem to be renewed interest on the topic of overseas bases. Stacie Pettyjohn, one of the RAND co-authors of the overseas basing study also has a concise new RAND monograph outlining the history of U.S. overseas military presence. A colleague in my department alerted me to a graduate student presenting a paper on "quasi-U.S bases" in Latin America. And of course, there's lots of interest about drone bases, particularly in the Middle East North Africa and Sub-Saharan regions.

I've moved on from base politics research but I suppose one can never fully escape one's past work, especially if they now exist as publications in the public domain. Once I get around to reading the report, I'll update this post with some insights into the RAND study.

Social Justice and the Common Good

Several months ago I posted a blog about the Justice Conference in light of a recent talk I had given on social justice. Social justice is an issue of personal faith for me rather than a topic for research, but I'm beginning to find ways to bring the two together.

 Although its less not at all obvious at my overtly Catholic institution, I do get the sense that academics have a harder time taking evangelical Christians as a group seriously. It doesn't help that the Evangelicals get a bad rap from secular liberals. 

What's sometimes lost or forgotten in the vitrol aimed at Evangelicals and Catholics is that many of these religious folks actually do care about others including the poor. I cut and taped this article by Donald Wuerl, currently the Archbishop of Washington DC, on my office door in January. His piece was in response to a petition identifying the Catholic Church as a hate group due to its position on homosexuality. In the article, he reminds us that the Archidiocese of Washington  functions as the largest non-governmental provider of social services in the DC area. I see several trucks giving out free meals to homeless outside the World Bank every evening - and I'm sure they are part of some faith-based ministry. Archbishop Wuerl writes: 

The church does not do these things for money or profit or because they’re nice to do. When the church treats the sick and injured, or feeds the hungry, or teaches, or provides assistance to those in need, it does so as an answer to the call made by Jesus Christ. We are obligated to do these and other works of mercy and to give voice to moral truth because He asks us to.

I remembered the piece by Fr. Wuerl after reading an op-ed from Michael Gerson who also linked Christian teaching with social justice. In searching for the common good, we pursue social justice (something I hear often at my Catholic-affiliated university, although clearly not practiced by all). The op-ed is premised with the idea/hope that American politics would look towards the common good.  Searching for the common good may be one way of bridging the divide and mitigating the dangers of extreme polarization in domestic politics and foreign policy.

So why am I writing about all this on my research blog?  A recurring theme in my research is how/why people come to draw different assumptions and conclusions about the world. In other words, how are beliefs, ideas, and worldviews shaped and how does politics and contention stem from these different beliefs and assumptions?  Take for instance these peace activist recently arrested for breaking into a nuclear facility. Why are they opposed to nukes? What motivated them to break the law? How does their understanding of security differ from that of the government's (and also the looney prosecutors who claim that these activists comprised American national security)?

One thing my social science training has taught me is that categories like activists or Evangelicals are rarely homogeneous, as much as we would like them to be. Christian tradition can produce contrasting conclusions as I found in my short research on North Korean human rights. Here's a comment from Gerson which particularly rang true in my findings on Evangelicals and human rights. Can you guess which group adhere to naming-and-shaming strategies and which ones focus on humanitarian assistance/engagement? 

"Nearly every Christian tradition of social ethics encompasses two sorts of justice. The first is procedural justice: giving people what they deserve under contracts and the law. The second is distributive justice: meeting some needs just because human beings are human beings. This is not the same thing as egalitarianism; confiscation is not compassion. But distributive justice requires a decent provision for the vulnerable and destitute. And this is not just a matter of personal charity. Social justice is more than crumbs from the table; it depends on the existence of social and economic conditions that allow people to live, work and thrive."

The Movement for Gun Control

I was travelling a few weeks ago and emailed this article to myself about gun-control legislation getting shot down (sorry, bad pun) in the Senate. The defeat did come as a surprise given the growing momentum for tighter gun restriction among the American public, the bipartisan nature of a somewhat watered down and thus non-controversial idea to expand background checks (which 9 in 10 American support), and the moving appeal of parents of Newtown victims in Washington.

The blog post I drafted  in my head is now lost, but re-reading this piece, it was interesting to note how gun-control advocates are relying on a healthy mix of both formal and informal politics to challenge the pro-gun lobby and their supporters: 1) Shaming opposing Senators in their own state to force them to switch positions; 2) Helping put gun-control candidates in office to replace pro-gun politicians; 3) raise awareness and public consciousness through rallies, demonstrations, vigil, advertising, public forums etc...

Following the defeat, rormer Rep. Gabrielle Giffords wrote a scathing op-ed against the Senate. Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) who voted against the expansion of the national gun ­background-check program has become one of the first targets of the movement. And potentially two Republicans may reconsider their vote following some changes to the current bill.  Some form of gun control will likely pass. Whether the measures are merely token offerings or substantively meaningful remains to be seen. 

NRA and Right-Wing Social Movements

I'm the last person to get excited about constitutional rights, law, and the 2nd Amendment. But this was just hands-down one of the most fascinating articles I've read about the making (or re-making) of gun rights in America.

The 2nd Amendment states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." As with the Supreme Court 30 years ago, I take this to mean that individuals have the right to carry guns only to the extent that the state needs citizens to have guns to maintain a militia. Hence the right to bear arms is a collective right of the state rather than an individual right

Yet as this article states, the NRA started supporting research, scholarships, and seminars beginning in the 1970s. After a few years, the number of academic articles interpreting the 2nd Amendment in favor of individual rights began to increase. Over time, the number of publications favoring individual gun rights began outnumbering those interpreting the amendment as one about state needs to maintain a militia. In a 30 year span, then, the NRA helped reshape the interpretation of the 2nd Amendment, culminating in District of Columbia v. Heller in which the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of individual having the right to bear arms (the case was directed against the DC ban on guns). Here's a CRS overview of gun ownership and the Supreme Court.

Clifford Bob may have already raised this issue in his book The Global Right and the Clash of World Politics, but this is a fascinating case study of framing and norms construction. How activists (or in this case a powerful lobby) quietly work to reinterpret laws which wind up having huge implications for politics. The irony in all this is that no one even cared about the 2nd Amendment prior to the NRA's advocacy.

An excellent counterpoint to this study is what is currently happening to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Here the shift is even more astounding. The figure below tracks attitudes towards gay marriage in a span of 20 years.


From Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Clint Eastwood, Robert Porter, to President Obama, Hillary Clinton, and a slew of other recent converts, it seems like support for gay marriage is spreading fast. Obama himself saw that the fight for gay marriage would take place at the state level producing a cascade-effect which would shore up a case for federal support for gay marriage in the future. Here's a PBS News Hour transcript outlining this trend. I am not a supporter of gay marriage (my reason is simple, but the rationale is complicated) but in thinking about other rights movements (civil rights in particular) we do seem to have reached some type of tipping point.

Amanda Murdie on Human Rights Treaties and Virginity Pledges

Amanda Murdie had a terrific post titled Human Rights Treaties Are Like Virginity Pledges. The basic gist is that states signing human rights treaties has little effect in improving human rights practices because 1) Enforcement mechanisms are weak; 2) States sign for reasons that have nothing to do with commitment to change behavior (i.e. don't want to be stigmatized for not signing; signing gets you some immediate benefit in return with no cost to comply). The debates outlined here raises excellent issues about compliance in international politics. It also challenges constructivist notions of human rights change (i.e. Risse, Ropp, Sikkinnk) which sees treaties as an early stage of normative change.

I posted the blog entry though, mainly for it's teaching value. Can't wait to hear how my Intro to IR students respond next fall.

North Korean Human Rights II: UN Human Rights Inquiry

Calling for an "international inquiry" into North Korean human rights abuses, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stepped up pressure on the international community to address deplorable conditions and practices in North Korea. For years, the UN Human Rights Council has assigned a special rapporteur to North Korea, but Navi Pillay, the High Commissioner seems to be ramping up efforts herself. Here's a post from HRNK on how the UN has dealt with NK human rights the past few years and why the inquiry is significant.

The U.S. has already expressed support for the inquiry. However, there was much more suspense to whether South Korea would agree to the inquiry given that the new president had pledged to improve North-South relations. Addressing human rights  at the start of her tenure would surely not be well-received by Pyeongyang, jeopardizing the opportunity to improve relations. However, not supporting the investigation would weaken the legitimacy and credibility of the UN investigation.

However, South Korea decided to support the inquiry yesterday. This is a good decision. Why turn a blind eye to North Korean human rights abuses when it clearly exists? There's no guarantee that the North will follow-up on negotiations even if Seoul defers its support.  Also, there's no reason to write off the possibility of engaging the North, even as Seoul acknowledges human rights abuses. At least Seoul would be on higher moral ground if the Park government makes an initial gesture to provide aid and the North rejected it because of South Korea's support for the UN inquiry.

Update #1: Roberta Cohen weighs in on events leading to the adoption resolution to hold a  UN commission of inquiry into abuses in North Korea.

Update #2: Steph Haggard also discusses the UN Commission of Inquiry and tags documentation. He notes  four advantages of moving ahead with the inquiry.

First, we found it interesting that the North Koreans felt compelled to respond, even if they claimed that the resolution was not worthy of response. Somewhere, someone in North Korea is reading a statement by the Foreign Ministry saying that North Korea does not have a human rights problem. As cynicism rises, such statements are rightly interpreted as implying the opposite. .

Second, the commission will galvanize organizations working on the issue, and give their activities a boost, including with respect to refugees.

Third, the action has diplomatic effect. Its hard for the DPRK to say that a resolution passed with Venezuelan support is a cabal of the imperialists; North Korea is increasingly identified with other states and conflicts with commissions of inquiry, such as Syria or Darfur.

Finally, if we are going to have international crimes as we now do under the Rome Statute it is important that allegations of them be investigated and treated with the seriousness they deserve. Building international law is a function of practice, and commissions of inquiry can contribute to that practice.

In other news: Dennis Rodman meets Kim Jong-Un on basketball diplomacy. Crazy PR stunt or an updated version of ping-pong diplomacy? NPR has a good story on this.

North Korean Human Rights: Naming and Shaming

A while back, there was an exchange between John Feffer and Roberta Cohen on North Korean human rights. John argued that naming-and-shaming are ineffective, if not counter-productive and instead argued for a human security approach to human rights (i.e. provide aid and development assistance). I later weighed in on the politics between these two camps.

I thought about John's point again on whether naming-and-shaming actually works on North Korea. Roberta mentioned that they did sign the UN Treaty on Human Rights as a sign of progress; this might be stage two of Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink's five-stage spiral model on human rights change. I was reminded though, thanks to a post on the Duck, that there actually is academic literature on the effectiveness of naming-and-shaming strategies. Amanda Murdie and Dylan Davis ran a quantitative analysis on this using some creative (in a good way) methods to measure shaming and human rights change. Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong also have a forthcoming article in BJPS.

The verdict: Yes, naming-and-shaming do have a qualified/conditional impact. Translation: naming-shaming has to be done under certain conditions (i.e. they're effective on autocratic but not democratic regimes) and in conjunction with some other factors (i.e. when domestic NGOs are present are INGOs are also weighing in). For North Korea then, human rights activism may have at least a weak effect on the regime: there are no domestic NGOs or civil society to support transnational activists, but there is pressure from the UN and North Korea is autocratic.

The Justice Conference

I gave a talk at my alma mater last fall titled, "Rights, Mercy, and Social Justice for the Oppressed: Reflections on Faith and Politics." I'm not particularly an expert on said topic and for full disclosure I relied quite a bit on Tim Keller's Generous Justice to help me organize my thoughts. The basis for the talk, however, was really just my reflections on justice through some of my research on North Korean human rights and humanitarian aid. I wasn't aware of this until just now, but there's actually a whole conference dedicated to faith and justice which will take place in a few days. The Justice Conference. Definitely a lot more material to rely on next time I give such a talk.

Drones and Bases

Back in 2008 when I was rewriting the conclusion to my book on anti-base protests, there was a lot of discussion about AFRICOM and the possibility of building new bases in sub-Sahara Africa. As the Post reports, this is now becoming reality with the expansion of drone technology. Meanwhile, drone use is likely to expand in the Middle East Here's a brief about UAE purchasing surveillance drones from the U.S. Will we see protests against U.S. bases in Africa soon?

Update (2/28/13)

• Niger base confirmed. Media reported last week that about 100 troops are now in Niger. 
• Also, a symposium on the drone debate

Drone Policy Scrutinized

The media and blogosphere are abuzz these days on drone policy as Obama nominee for CIA director John Brennan, a strong supporter of ongoing drone strikes, undergoes his hearing.  The Diane Rehm Show on NPR hosted an interesting conversation on the subject yesterday. A colleague of mine at CUA also wrote a piece on the ethics of drone strikes while reflecting on just war tradition (this became an issue b/c a leaked Justice Department memo used just war theory as part of its legal basis for drone strikes.

The Administration touts the drone program as a success based on the number of kills and the assumed reduction in insurgent attacks which would have taken innocent lives. The truth is, counterfactuals are difficult to measure, and it's difficult to verify the effectiveness of a program when its mostly run under the radar. At the same time, the very success of the drone program may be related to its clandestine nature.

Activists, reporters, and human rights groups have been arguing that drone strikes, or more accurately civilian casualties associated with drone strikes, are creating more enemies (Brennan disputes this argument).  More awareness = more backlash = more legal, diplomatic, and PR obstacles for the CIA and military to clear. While the intelligence community might believe that such obstacles would hinder the effectiveness of drones there might be some argument for claiming that it could improve the program in the long run by a) developing strategy, technology, and operational doctrine which aim to further reduce collateral damage; b) providing greater clarity on rules which may protect our interests as other actors begin to acquire drone capabilities; c) give drone attacks greater public legitimacy here and abroad - it remains high among the U.S. public, but may drop with more attention.

Now that the "cat's out of the bag" meaning increased scrutiny domestically by Congress and public,  and more countries will acquiring or expanding use of drone technology internationally, it will be interesting to see how drone surveillance/strikes and its legal framework unfolds. Will other countries build their legal basis for strikes based on precedence set by the U.S. actions? Imagine a scenario where Mexico kills suspected drug lords in Tijuana; China conducts surveillance on Tibetans; or Iran attacks suspected U.S. military facilities in Iraq.

Some other interesting tidbits I learned from this week's burst of news: U.S., Great Britain, and Israel are the only three countries with armed drones. China is probably next. Also, Pakistan, which in the past publicly condemned but privately condoned drone attacks may be shifting its position. To date, the U.S. has conducted more strikes (347) in Pakistan than any other place. Washington post has a nifty tracker for this data along with data for Yemen and Somalia, the two other countries where drone strikes have been a regular occurrence.

Update #1: Washington post reports Obama Administration still has not revealed how drone policy would become more transparent.  As Karen DeYoung argues, "The question now is how much more the administration can say without violating secrecy restrictions on its own covert actions [or I might add compromising the security of missions involving drones]".