Civil Society, Civil Nuclear Cooperation, and Nuclear Disarmament

Back in June during the Mansfield Foundation's U.S.-Korea Scholar-Policy program, Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists and Mary Beth Niikitin led an interesting discussion about the 123 Agreement and US-ROK civilian nuclear energy cooperation. I expected a boring talk, but it turned out to be one of the most interesting panels. Civilian nuclear diplomacy seemed to touch on every aspect of IR theory relevant to me: international security, two-level games, foreign policy, transnational activism, civil
society etc..

In a nutshell, Korea wants to expand its civilian nuclear energy capabilities and become a global supplier. However, Korea is prohibited from taking these steps under the U.S.-ROK "123" Agreement (following section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act agreement). As Mark Holt argues, U.S. consent is required for any reprocessing or enrichment activities related to U.S.-supplied materials and technology. Unable to come to an agreement, the U.S. and Korea decided to extend the current terms of the 123 Agreement and return to negotiations in 2014. The issue is complicated because

1. South Korea has growing energy demands and as their deal with the UAE suggests, a lot of money can be made from exporting the technological know-how. 
2. At the international level, the U.S.has to consider non-proliferation norms without appearing as if it carries double-standards. If  Korea is granted permission to expand its civilian nuclear program, why not North Korea? Why not Iran? These were some of the criticisms faced by the Bush Administration over the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement in 2005. South Korea must also consider global non-proliferation norms, as well as its alliance partnership with the U.S.
3. At the domestic level, we might see three reactions: a) From the right: This is a matter of national sovereignty, Korea has the right to develop its nukes; b) From the left: nuclear energy is a dangerous option; c) From businesses: nuclear energy export leads to profit.

The issue of civilian nuclear cooperation can get technical very quickly, but it does seem like a great case for political scientists to explore, especially those who are into two-level games type research.

And although not related to civil nuclear cooperation, the role of civil society and nuclear disarmament has again come to my attention. The research conducted by the Nautilus Institute reminds me that it is not just left-wing peace activists who support disarmament, but those in the policy world as well. Another link on transnational civil society and disarmament is here.

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Hard and Human Security: North Korea and Iran?

I met my former dissertation adviser at a conference in Baltimore earlier this month, and shared with him my research ideas related to North Korea. He was OK about the use of network analysis, but troubled by a study focusing on just one country. He sees a fixation on one country as a bad career move. Instead, I should make NK one case of a larger theoretical problem. Iran immediately popped to mind.

Iran and NK are both nuclear proliferaters with dubious human rights practices where the US focuses almost exclusively on the former and treads lightly on the latter. However, Nobel Peace laureate Shirin Ebadi has made a pointed case that supporting democracy (i.e. the opposition) and human rights (those arrested or beaten after the June election unrest) can result in both moral and tactical benefits.

But paying so much more attention to Iran's nuclear ambitions than to its trampling of democracy and freedom is a mistake both tactical and moral. The Post writes:

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad "is at the lowest level of popularity one can imagine," Ms. Ebadi said. "If the West focuses exclusively on the nuclear issue, Ahmadinejad can tell his people that the West is against Iran's national interest and rally people to his cause. But if the West presses also on its human rights record, he will find himself in a position where his popular base is getting weaker and weaker by the day."

Ms. Ebadi suggested that the nature of Iran's regime is more crucial to U.S. security than any specific deals on nuclear energy. Iran's people are not as wedded to the nuclear program as the regime wants outsiders to believe. A democratic government would be unlikely to build a nuclear bomb, she said, and even if it did, the weapon would not be a threat in the hands of a government that would not view America or Israel as enemies. By contrast, she argued, even a seemingly ironclad nuclear agreement with Mr. Ahmadinejad might be of little value: "Imagine if the government actually promised to stop its nuclear program tomorrow. Would you trust this government not to start another secret nuclear program somewhere else?"

Hmmm...we could ask this same question about trust in signing an agreement w/Kim Jong Il. Unfortunately, in NK there is no visible opposition to work with. We only have the regime to work with. However, as with all governments, hard-liners and moderates do exist within the regime. If there's a way to identify and sway moderates, and perhaps open the country to the outside, could a more credible nuclear deal be struck?