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Source: Department of the Navy; CIA World Factbook. Image source:
GeoEye via Google Earth. Printed in The Washington Post Sept. 24, 2013.
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Making sense of movements, rebellions, and revolutions (with occasional comments on East Asia, North Korea, and military bases!)
Friday, September 27, 2013
Closure of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti
Tuesday, September 24, 2013
North Korea Collapse Scenarios
Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute published a critical assessment of a new RAND study, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. In skimming Hayes critique, two points come to the forefront. First, the study is unclear about the probability of whether collapse is imminent: when vs. if North Korea will collapse. Bruce Bennett, the author of the study, is more nuanced in his report even if RAND's publication division plays up the "imminent" card. For instance, the first key finding listed in RAND's executive summary is that "There Is a Reasonable Probability That North Korean Totalitarianism Will End in the Foreseeable Future." As such, the report may not provide the best basis for policy. As Hayes writes, "The problem with Bennett’s report is that it quickly moved from the purely 'conceptual space' into the media space, and is fast headed for the policy-political space." Given the probability of competing non-collapse scenarios, Hayes cautions hastily drawing immediate policy conclusions out of the study.
Second, the collapse argument has been around for two decades now. Take just one scenario for instance: David Collins' collapse scenario in 1995 in the wake of the famine:
As we all know, collapse has yet to happen, and has forced some analysts such as Aidan Foster-Carter and David Maxwell to backtrack on their earlier predictions with Maxwell writing a piece about why North Koreans don't rebel.
For someone like me who wants to know whether pockets of civil society exist in North Korea, the study is a must read because any collapse scenario will implicate or have implications for ordinary North Koreans. North Koreans may mobilize to hasten or complicate a devolving North Korean state in a hard collapse scenario. And in a soft-landing scenario, civil society (or its development) will be instrumental in bringing about a less chaotic transition.
Second, the collapse argument has been around for two decades now. Take just one scenario for instance: David Collins' collapse scenario in 1995 in the wake of the famine:
Phase One:resource depletion
Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion
Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government
Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough
Phase Five: active resistance against the central government
Phase Six: the fracture of the regime
Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.
Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion
Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government
Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough
Phase Five: active resistance against the central government
Phase Six: the fracture of the regime
Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.
As we all know, collapse has yet to happen, and has forced some analysts such as Aidan Foster-Carter and David Maxwell to backtrack on their earlier predictions with Maxwell writing a piece about why North Koreans don't rebel.
For someone like me who wants to know whether pockets of civil society exist in North Korea, the study is a must read because any collapse scenario will implicate or have implications for ordinary North Koreans. North Koreans may mobilize to hasten or complicate a devolving North Korean state in a hard collapse scenario. And in a soft-landing scenario, civil society (or its development) will be instrumental in bringing about a less chaotic transition.
Teaching About China's Maritime Dispute
CFR unveiled a snazzy new interactive tool to study China's maritimes disputes. This is a great educational tool for students, complete with discussion and essay questions, and
something I'll try to incorporate next semester in my U.S., China, and
International Relations of East Asia course. Ironically, however, using
such a tool will probably require more, not less time for prep since the
instructor has to preview all the material beforehand. Anyway, kudos to
CFR.
Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space
Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space
Sunday, September 15, 2013
Anti-War Protests, Pacificism, and Syria
I've avoided discussion on Syria since there are a million other outlets pontificating on this issue already. However, two articles appeared on my radar, both in reaction to the recent surge in activity from anti-war groups so I'll comment on anti-war protests. Liberal anti-war groups largely supported Obama'd bid for election in 2008. However, Syria provides the first major break between the administration and demonstraters. It's no suprise that activists, who we often assume are principled actors, can too play politics, forming coalitions with lawmakers, disparate groups, and whoever will help them push their short term agenda. Who would have thought conservative libertarians and left-wing pacificists jumping in bed! But this also shows that coalitions are fluid, and their relationship with formal political parties are complex as argued by Michael Heaney and Fabio Rojas here. More related to my own (not-yet-off-the-ground) research is a confirmation about the worldviews and constraints of policymakers and activists. They are socialized into two completely different worldviews such that no permanent coalition could be ever formed in finding a solution to peace.
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| Source: Nikki Kahn/Washington Post |
The second article is an op-ed from documentary filmaker Sebastian Junger titled " When the best chance for peace means war." It's essentially a rebuke of pacifism in the wake of humanitarian disaster as Junger writes, "At some point, pacifism becomes part of the machinery of death." Evoking just means for the use of force, he adds, "Every war I have ever covered — Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Liberia — withstood all diplomatic efforts to end it until Western military action finally forced a resolution." This last point is the tough question for pacfisits. The pacifist reponse is to always look for diplomatic solutions, even when such solutions have been exhausted. At times coercion, or the threat of coercion, are needed to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough.
Monday, September 9, 2013
A Caring Society
Anne Marie-Slaughter has written an inspiring piece about what at first sounded like another call for bridging the policy-accademic divide, but instead turned into an appeal for greater investment in producing an ethos of "care" in our society and abroad. She writes, "Common purpose creates the trust and empathy that reveal us as individual human beings, not as statistics and stereotypes." Of course, she leaves it up to academics to come up with the great ideas to institute a policy of care and compassion. :)
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