North Korea Collapse Scenarios

Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute published a critical assessment of a new RAND study, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. In skimming Hayes critique, two points come to the forefront. First, the study is unclear about the probability of whether collapse is imminent: when vs. if North Korea will collapse. Bruce Bennett, the author of the study, is more nuanced in his report even if RAND's publication division plays up the "imminent" card. For instance, the first key finding listed in RAND's executive summary is that "There Is a Reasonable Probability That North Korean Totalitarianism Will End in the Foreseeable Future." As such, the report may not provide the best basis for policy. As Hayes writes, "The problem with Bennett’s report is that it quickly moved from the purely 'conceptual space' into the media space,  and is fast headed for the policy-political space." Given the probability of competing non-collapse scenarios, Hayes cautions hastily drawing immediate policy conclusions out of the study.

Second, the collapse argument has been around for two decades now.  Take just one scenario for instance: David Collins' collapse scenario in 1995 in the wake of the famine:

Phase One:resource depletion
Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion
Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government
Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough
Phase Five: active resistance against the central government
Phase Six: the fracture of the regime
Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.

As we all know, collapse has yet to happen, and has forced some analysts such as Aidan Foster-Carter and David Maxwell to backtrack on their earlier predictions with Maxwell writing a piece about why North Koreans don't rebel.

For someone like me who wants to know whether pockets of civil society exist in North Korea, the study is a must read because any collapse scenario will implicate or have implications for ordinary North Koreans. North Koreans may mobilize to hasten or complicate a devolving North Korean state in a hard collapse scenario. And in a soft-landing scenario, civil society (or its development) will be instrumental in bringing about a less chaotic transition.