Wednesday, January 26, 2011
A Tea Party Activist and Cycles of Protest
This was the first article I read this year from the Lorian Hotel & Spa in Alexandria. It's a good example of a social movement at a crossroads between informal (i.e. popular) and institutional politics. Or in Tilly's vocabulary, the line between transgressive and contained politics. Here we see the evolution of the tea party movement: informal discussions at the gym to nascent organization to national movement. But how will the movement evolve as power holders (i.e. the state) respond and tea party activists acheive their own goals. What effect did the 2011 midterm elections have on the future direction of the Tea Party?
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
Debate on Aid to DPRK
38 North, a relatively new website related to North Korea sponsored by the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (Johns Hopkins), posted a debate on human rights in North Korea between John Feffer and Roberta Cohen.
Feffer argues for a human security approach to North Korea. While the "name and shame" approach has helped identify HR problems in DPRK, name-and-shame has not changed regime behavior. Feffer states, "The name-and-shame approach starts not where North Korea is but where it should be. Since North Korea doesn’t share the same perspective about where it should be in the future, little has been accomplished in terms of productive discussion or movement forward." In contrast, a human security approach begins where North Korea is. "In order to work inside North Korea, an organization must start where the government is" by supplying:
1) What the government wants at some level.
2) Meeting the survival needs (food, shelter, medical care) of "the greatest number of people who lie between the elite (who don’t need help) and the inmates of the labor camps (to whom we have no access)," with the hope of creating greater "voice" among these North Koreans.
Two practical areas to implement the human securtiy approach are 1) economic development and 2) educational exchanges. The principle behind this approach is to focus on "strengthening economic and social rights rather than political and civil rights".
Cohen's summary of Feffer is below
Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Feffer's position is based on the assumption "that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal." Unfortunately, North Korea’s "rigid political and ideological controls (which regularly get in the way of economic reform" suggest the contrary.
Moreover, Cohen counters Feffers arguing "that North Korea is entirely impervious to international human rights norms and structures is another mistaken assumption." The naming-shaming strategy has produced some limited results with the DPRK signing on to UN conventions, which have also increased some North Korea people's awareness of how far the regime has fallen short of universal commitments.
Finally, exceptions should not be made for North Korea. "Making North Korea into a human rights exception will create the patronizing relationship that Feffer, with his social work sensitivities, so deplores, and undermine the goals of the international human rights system."
Feffer tries to bridge the divide in a final response.
Feffer argues for a human security approach to North Korea. While the "name and shame" approach has helped identify HR problems in DPRK, name-and-shame has not changed regime behavior. Feffer states, "The name-and-shame approach starts not where North Korea is but where it should be. Since North Korea doesn’t share the same perspective about where it should be in the future, little has been accomplished in terms of productive discussion or movement forward." In contrast, a human security approach begins where North Korea is. "In order to work inside North Korea, an organization must start where the government is" by supplying:
1) What the government wants at some level.
2) Meeting the survival needs (food, shelter, medical care) of "the greatest number of people who lie between the elite (who don’t need help) and the inmates of the labor camps (to whom we have no access)," with the hope of creating greater "voice" among these North Koreans.
Two practical areas to implement the human securtiy approach are 1) economic development and 2) educational exchanges. The principle behind this approach is to focus on "strengthening economic and social rights rather than political and civil rights".
Cohen's summary of Feffer is below
He proposes instead a “human security” approach built on an “empathetic” relationship with North Korea that focuses on the “economic betterment” of its people through “development assistance,” “educational exchanges” and joint economic projects. Such an approach will further economic and social rights without being weighed down by concerns about “the inmates of the labor camps” (to whom there is “no access”) or wishful thinking about the desire of civil society for political freedoms. It will help North Korea evolve into a country that can meet the needs of its citizens and eventually lead to civil and political freedoms.
Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Feffer's position is based on the assumption "that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal." Unfortunately, North Korea’s "rigid political and ideological controls (which regularly get in the way of economic reform" suggest the contrary.
Moreover, Cohen counters Feffers arguing "that North Korea is entirely impervious to international human rights norms and structures is another mistaken assumption." The naming-shaming strategy has produced some limited results with the DPRK signing on to UN conventions, which have also increased some North Korea people's awareness of how far the regime has fallen short of universal commitments.
Finally, exceptions should not be made for North Korea. "Making North Korea into a human rights exception will create the patronizing relationship that Feffer, with his social work sensitivities, so deplores, and undermine the goals of the international human rights system."
Feffer tries to bridge the divide in a final response.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
North Korea and Israel
Dan Drezner's blog got a lot of comments about his comparison of N.Korea and Israel. I don't know why everyone got so worked up...it didn't seem like Drezner was implying that Israel's regime is like N.Korea. Drezner writes
I thought the focus was more on the response at the UN Security Council. For N.Korea, China is witholding judgment until more information is available. Ditto for the US on Israel, even as much of the rest of the world condemns Israel's actions.
By the way, here's a good overview by Nicole Finnemann of KEI of different countries' reactions to the Cheonan sinking.
The Obama administration has reacted to this incident in remarkably similar ways to China's reaction to the Cheonan incident -- with a call for more information.
I thought the focus was more on the response at the UN Security Council. For N.Korea, China is witholding judgment until more information is available. Ditto for the US on Israel, even as much of the rest of the world condemns Israel's actions.
By the way, here's a good overview by Nicole Finnemann of KEI of different countries' reactions to the Cheonan sinking.
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt
Just read Michael Barnett's article "Evolution without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt." Here are few reactions, and some insights for my own research.
Barnett’s theoretical claim is the adaptation of evolutionary theory to social science (in this case the evolution of ethics and humanitarian organizations). Institutions and humanitarian groups have evolved over time – taking on larger roles and responsibilities, becoming more relevant in IR. Evolution, however, may not have actually led to progress. The political environment forced agencies to adapt. “The combination of environmental mechanisms and organizational culture led many humanitarian agencies to adapt to their environment in ways that incorporated politics…Actors respond to a world of change…there are strong pressures to conform to their environment” (624). Barnett goes on to conclude “There are many examples of the possibility of the practical ethics of aid agencies becoming politicized, mainstreamed, and tamed as a consequence of external pressures” (656). However, there is the fear that these NGOs may actually be reproducing and expanding the very world order (one dominated by politics, directed by powerful states) that they claim to resist. The environment “can have a pronounced impact on the principles of principled actors and enmesh them into the very world orders that they want to resist and transform” (626).
What’s striking here is the overwhelming emphasis of structure in Barnett’s argument. Barnett admits that the environment does not determine everything, and that actors have choices. But the choices are bounded within the limitations of the environment. Should there be more room for agency. I found his overviews for CARE and World Vision more plausible than MSF and UNHCR (i'm still puzzled why he uses an IGO for the "accomodationist" category).
Barnett’s piece in IO has given me different ideas about my (failed) grant proposal on “The Politicization of North Korea.” Empirically, he raises many of the same issues and questions that I do regarding human rights and humanitarian aid agencies. How do altruistic groups become wrapped in politics? Barnett provides a theoretical hook grounded in evolutionary theory to answer this question. Due to the nature of the grant proposal, I wrote a very policy-specific to North Korea. To turn it into a working paper, I could, however, follow Barnett’s example and formulate a general theory explaining/describing how human rights rights and humanitarian aid organizations operate within a given political environment, using North Korea as one case (Burma, Congo, Iran are other possible examples).
Barnett’s theoretical claim is the adaptation of evolutionary theory to social science (in this case the evolution of ethics and humanitarian organizations). Institutions and humanitarian groups have evolved over time – taking on larger roles and responsibilities, becoming more relevant in IR. Evolution, however, may not have actually led to progress. The political environment forced agencies to adapt. “The combination of environmental mechanisms and organizational culture led many humanitarian agencies to adapt to their environment in ways that incorporated politics…Actors respond to a world of change…there are strong pressures to conform to their environment” (624). Barnett goes on to conclude “There are many examples of the possibility of the practical ethics of aid agencies becoming politicized, mainstreamed, and tamed as a consequence of external pressures” (656). However, there is the fear that these NGOs may actually be reproducing and expanding the very world order (one dominated by politics, directed by powerful states) that they claim to resist. The environment “can have a pronounced impact on the principles of principled actors and enmesh them into the very world orders that they want to resist and transform” (626).
What’s striking here is the overwhelming emphasis of structure in Barnett’s argument. Barnett admits that the environment does not determine everything, and that actors have choices. But the choices are bounded within the limitations of the environment. Should there be more room for agency. I found his overviews for CARE and World Vision more plausible than MSF and UNHCR (i'm still puzzled why he uses an IGO for the "accomodationist" category).
Barnett’s piece in IO has given me different ideas about my (failed) grant proposal on “The Politicization of North Korea.” Empirically, he raises many of the same issues and questions that I do regarding human rights and humanitarian aid agencies. How do altruistic groups become wrapped in politics? Barnett provides a theoretical hook grounded in evolutionary theory to answer this question. Due to the nature of the grant proposal, I wrote a very policy-specific to North Korea. To turn it into a working paper, I could, however, follow Barnett’s example and formulate a general theory explaining/describing how human rights rights and humanitarian aid organizations operate within a given political environment, using North Korea as one case (Burma, Congo, Iran are other possible examples).
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Regime Change as a Non-Proliferation Strategy
Robert Kagan argues, "Regime change in Tehran is the best nonproliferation policy." Supporting an opposition more open to the West, and seeking to reintegrate into the global economy and internatonial order (a big assumption here) could help reverse, or at least slow Iran's march down the nuclear path. Is regime change the safer than the status quo (doing nothing). Kagan believes regime change is safer than waiting for Iran to build the bomb, or having Israel pre-empt Iranian nuclear facilities which could escalate to a regional conflict. But the "do-nothing" option would in my mind be the more conservative/safer strategy. I should qualify that "do-nothing" also includes passing UN sanctions/resolutions and providing public moral support with more quiet political/economic aid. "Do-nothing" is acutally a safe form of attacking the regime's moral legitimacy. This strategy is the better (or at least more legitimate) strategy in ensuring a safer world than regime change IF Iranians can vote out of power (or topple over) the current government before the regime acquires nuclear weapons.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
New Research
After rejections from fellowships this year, I'm back to the drawing board regarding research topics. Hopefully I can turn the "Politicization of North Korea" topic into at least a paper.
Peter Katzenstein's address at the Rising Powers Initiative project launch was the first time in a while I felt my intellectual brain ticking. Anyway, here are 2 possible topics I might explore:
1) Social Movements in International Relations: this would extend out of my first book project on anti-base movements. Lately, we've seen protests/riots/social mvts around: Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, Iran just to name a few. Do these movements have any implications for international relations? If so, it's not apparent. I'd like to come up with a theory which helps us evaluate the impact of social movements in IR. A domestic-int'l linkage type argument if you well. One think PK argued was that revolutions don't come from below, but are top-down. The storming of the Bastille and people power come to mind when we hear revolution. But by then, it's too late.
2) Let's Talk (International conferences and forums). We've seen a proliferation of global summits (the nuclear summit, Copenhagen, etc...). Are they effective, or a waste of time? Have western diplomats adopted eastern practices of talking about talks. Has process become valued as much as outcomes for Western diplomats - an adoption of the ASEAN way?
Peter Katzenstein's address at the Rising Powers Initiative project launch was the first time in a while I felt my intellectual brain ticking. Anyway, here are 2 possible topics I might explore:
1) Social Movements in International Relations: this would extend out of my first book project on anti-base movements. Lately, we've seen protests/riots/social mvts around: Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, Iran just to name a few. Do these movements have any implications for international relations? If so, it's not apparent. I'd like to come up with a theory which helps us evaluate the impact of social movements in IR. A domestic-int'l linkage type argument if you well. One think PK argued was that revolutions don't come from below, but are top-down. The storming of the Bastille and people power come to mind when we hear revolution. But by then, it's too late.
2) Let's Talk (International conferences and forums). We've seen a proliferation of global summits (the nuclear summit, Copenhagen, etc...). Are they effective, or a waste of time? Have western diplomats adopted eastern practices of talking about talks. Has process become valued as much as outcomes for Western diplomats - an adoption of the ASEAN way?
Monday, April 12, 2010
The State and Global Governance
I assigned 3 articles related to global governance. Two are related to the nuclear security, and one on Europe’s loan package to Greece. Hopefully, students are beginning to pick up on some of the key questions of our times in international relations: cooperation under anarchy (to steal from Kenneth Oye's title). States remain the central actors in international politics. However, world leaders continue to increasingly rely on international institutions, supranational organizations, or world forums and conferences to tackle global issues. Does this suggest a) the decline of states in international politics b) a revamping of state power filtered through international institutions c) or a new form of global politics defined by international institutions and forums? I like answer “b” – but I won’t elaborate here.
On the point about forums, is it just me, or do we see more and more of these loose international forums on the rise. Recently, we have forums on climate change, financial regulation, and nuclear proliferation. Is this a sign that process is just as important as outcomes when devising solutions to world problems?
On the point about forums, is it just me, or do we see more and more of these loose international forums on the rise. Recently, we have forums on climate change, financial regulation, and nuclear proliferation. Is this a sign that process is just as important as outcomes when devising solutions to world problems?
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