I've neglected the blog again. I was going to give my two cents worth, but more senior experts have chimed in. Sid Tarrow argues that Occupy DC is not a follow-up to the tea party. David Meyer talks about the need for an exit strategy.
Sid was one of my mentors at Cornell, and I'll have to say that I respectfully disagree with him. Yes, there are no stated policy goals. But just as the Tea Party began with ordinary people fed up with government excess, Occupy Wall St. (OWS) is about ordinary people fed up with corporate greed and growing inequities in a period of economic uncertainty. OWS is not necessarily a left version of the Tea Party, but they may have been inspired by the Tea Party's ability to mobilize and eventually put people into power. It remains to be seen whether the energies of the OWS can move towards this direction.
Making sense of movements, rebellions, and revolutions (with occasional comments on East Asia, North Korea, and military bases!)
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
Saturday, September 3, 2011
Jeju Protestors Arrested
I predicted this about a month ago, but the ROK government has steadily increased the level of coercion the past two months to end protests against the construction of the ROK naval facility in Jeju.
NY Times reports 25 activists were detained today. Activists and residents have a valid point about environmental consequences. Who wants a giant military base on a beautiful island known best for honeymooning? On the other hand, the ROK government's heightened sensitivy to security threats following a turn of events the past couple of years (read Chinese assertiveness and DPRK aggression) have made them adamant about this base. One way or another, the ROK government will have its base.
NY Times reports 25 activists were detained today. Activists and residents have a valid point about environmental consequences. Who wants a giant military base on a beautiful island known best for honeymooning? On the other hand, the ROK government's heightened sensitivy to security threats following a turn of events the past couple of years (read Chinese assertiveness and DPRK aggression) have made them adamant about this base. One way or another, the ROK government will have its base.
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
The Libya Model?
With "victory" in Libya, we were bound to hear about the new "Libya" model. I don't have anything against the Libya model other than the cautionary comment that Libya will be unique from conditions in Syria, Libya, North Korea, or whatever regime we think we ought to oust.http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif
I'm more interested, however, in what protesters in Syria will do now that the verdict is out with Libya. Protests in Hom and elsewhere in Syria were relatively peaceful. Assad's government resorted to brutal force a la Tiananmen to quash resistance. Will protests embrace the type of armed resistance as taken up by the Libyan rebels? This leads to an interesting policy and academic question.
1) When do protests resort to armed resistance? I mean, when do they decide that nonviolence won't work and they ante up to meet force with force? Obviously a movement will have numerous factions so it probably depends on whether a "militant" wing rises to take leadership in the resistance movement.
2)How do we distinguish protests from rebellions to revolutions to civil war? If someone knows a really good article which spells this out, let me know. B/c I still have a hard time explaining this to students. To me, these concepts fall along a violent/non-violent spectrum of contention. Protests are non-violent and are a base form of contention. Revolutions offer a specific category of contention which call for the overthrow of the government in power. They may be violent or non-violent. Not all protests are revolutions - often the goals of protestors are less far-reaching. Ditto for rebellion.
I'm more interested, however, in what protesters in Syria will do now that the verdict is out with Libya. Protests in Hom and elsewhere in Syria were relatively peaceful. Assad's government resorted to brutal force a la Tiananmen to quash resistance. Will protests embrace the type of armed resistance as taken up by the Libyan rebels? This leads to an interesting policy and academic question.
1) When do protests resort to armed resistance? I mean, when do they decide that nonviolence won't work and they ante up to meet force with force? Obviously a movement will have numerous factions so it probably depends on whether a "militant" wing rises to take leadership in the resistance movement.
2)How do we distinguish protests from rebellions to revolutions to civil war? If someone knows a really good article which spells this out, let me know. B/c I still have a hard time explaining this to students. To me, these concepts fall along a violent/non-violent spectrum of contention. Protests are non-violent and are a base form of contention. Revolutions offer a specific category of contention which call for the overthrow of the government in power. They may be violent or non-violent. Not all protests are revolutions - often the goals of protestors are less far-reaching. Ditto for rebellion.
Sunday, August 28, 2011
Protests in India and America
India made headlines through Anna Hazare's high profile hunger-strike against government corruption. The movement is pushing the Indian government to implement greater transparency and accountability measures, such as the establishment of an ombudsman to investigate corruption charges over bureaucrats and the prime minister.
Such movements are a sign of participatory democracy. But do these protests undermine democratic institutions and processes? Can the people dictate Parliament's actions. Or, as the Post article above notes, is the brinkmanship of a hunger strike a form of blackmail that undermines democracy?
The second article is a good overview of contentious politics in American and abroad. Why don't we see more people taking it to the streets in the US? Of course, protests begin with anger and grievances. But these aren't sufficient conditions for protests. Meyer's puts a lot of weight on the role of organizers in channeling this anger. But I would also add that there has to be a psychological component. At the microlevel, individuals are either a) calculating the costs/risks of protesting based on the action of others and/or b) swept up in the moment. Either way, there's a cascading logic behind large street protests. At the macro-level, you also have to look at open political opportunities. There are key moments in history and politics - upcoming elections, the death of a leader, etc...which make moments ripe for protest.
So why aren't we seeing more protests in the US? As Meyers notes, the tea party is probably the closest thing to a social movement in our country. But b/c we live in a relatively open, democratic society, the tea party chooses to also work through formal political channels and institutions (i.e. vote or help get their preferred candidates elected) so it may not be necessary to take grievances to the public square 24-7. . Protesters in Syria or Egypt may have felt that they had no access to formal channels of politics, giving them no other choice but to take it to the streets. In London, many of the protesters were minorities on the fringe of society. Looters joining the foray probably sprung out of "mob mentality." It's more of a psychological rather than political argument. But hey, we should embrace multi-disciplinary accounts!
Such movements are a sign of participatory democracy. But do these protests undermine democratic institutions and processes? Can the people dictate Parliament's actions. Or, as the Post article above notes, is the brinkmanship of a hunger strike a form of blackmail that undermines democracy?
The second article is a good overview of contentious politics in American and abroad. Why don't we see more people taking it to the streets in the US? Of course, protests begin with anger and grievances. But these aren't sufficient conditions for protests. Meyer's puts a lot of weight on the role of organizers in channeling this anger. But I would also add that there has to be a psychological component. At the microlevel, individuals are either a) calculating the costs/risks of protesting based on the action of others and/or b) swept up in the moment. Either way, there's a cascading logic behind large street protests. At the macro-level, you also have to look at open political opportunities. There are key moments in history and politics - upcoming elections, the death of a leader, etc...which make moments ripe for protest.
So why aren't we seeing more protests in the US? As Meyers notes, the tea party is probably the closest thing to a social movement in our country. But b/c we live in a relatively open, democratic society, the tea party chooses to also work through formal political channels and institutions (i.e. vote or help get their preferred candidates elected) so it may not be necessary to take grievances to the public square 24-7. . Protesters in Syria or Egypt may have felt that they had no access to formal channels of politics, giving them no other choice but to take it to the streets. In London, many of the protesters were minorities on the fringe of society. Looters joining the foray probably sprung out of "mob mentality." It's more of a psychological rather than political argument. But hey, we should embrace multi-disciplinary accounts!
New Direction in Blog: Social Movements
After dwelling for days about the purpose and intent of my sporadic blogging, I've decided to narrow the focus of my blog to themes specific to my research. This blog is not intended for mass consumption. Rather, I intend to use it to help me think about research on social movements and perhaps occassionally reflect on issues related to East Asia, anti-base movements, or North Korea. But I'll try to stick mainly to the theme of social movements in IR.
Why social movements? These days we're being bombarded with news about social protets everywhere: the Arab Spring in the Middle East, London riots, in Europe in reaction to austerity measures, in India. Hardly a day goes by without a major protest. Are we seeing the diffusion of power from states to society? How does contentious politics affect international relations and the study of IR? These are some of the questions I'll try to address in future blog entries.
Why social movements? These days we're being bombarded with news about social protets everywhere: the Arab Spring in the Middle East, London riots, in Europe in reaction to austerity measures, in India. Hardly a day goes by without a major protest. Are we seeing the diffusion of power from states to society? How does contentious politics affect international relations and the study of IR? These are some of the questions I'll try to address in future blog entries.
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Update on Base Politics in Okinawa and Jeju Island
Looks like there's some demand for a strategic review of the current Futenma relocation plan led by Senate Armed Service committee members Carl Levin, John McCain and Jim Webb. I'm guessing Tokyo is too preoccupied with the Fukushima aftermath to really deal with base issues, much less pay for expensive relocation costs to Guam. Of course, the US is looking to cut costs in defense spending.
Meanwhile the anti-base network has been spreading the word about the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island. My understanding is that it's a South Korean naval base. Activists claim that the base is intended to serve U.S. military purposes. The base would allow U.S. carriers and ships to port, and possibly house Aegis destroyers which would obviously support joint command operatives but to say it's a U.S. base is incorrect (although it's useful to frame it as such).
Meanwhile the anti-base network has been spreading the word about the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island. My understanding is that it's a South Korean naval base. Activists claim that the base is intended to serve U.S. military purposes. The base would allow U.S. carriers and ships to port, and possibly house Aegis destroyers which would obviously support joint command operatives but to say it's a U.S. base is incorrect (although it's useful to frame it as such).
Friday, April 1, 2011
Military Means to Political Ends: Memories of Clausewitz
Two articles in last Sunday's Post shed light on the problems facing the Obama Adminstration's stated political end in Libya - the departure of Moammar Gaddafi. I hadn't seen Carl von Clausewitz's (the famous 19th century German military strategist) name evoked in a long time, but Gideon Rose raises the key message of Clausewitz: The central strategic challenge of any war is how to use military means to achieve political ends. Rose gets bonus points for also throwing in "the fog of war."
Many commentators have pointed out the mismatch between Obama's military strategy to enforce a no fly-zone and his ultimate desire to see Gaddaffi go. The result will likely be mission creep - even if NATO rather than the U.S. ends up leading this campaign. As Rose quotes, "By intervening to help one side in a civil war, it is now embroiled in Libya’s political future to a vastly greater extent than it was two weeks ago." Moreover, Dan Byman questions the efficacy of the no fly zone, using Iraq in the 1990s as an apt analogy.
This is the sentiment of other commentators such as Fareed Zakaria. You can throw me in with the skeptics about the efficacy of the current policy towards Libya. The best outcome is perhaps putting enough pressure on Gaddaffi to agree to a cease fire and negotiate some poltiical settlement for transition before NATO has to rely on ground troops or supply the rebels with arms.
For international (and perhaps domestic) reputational reasons, there was probably no way Obama could have not responded. So a middle ground approach may have been the best poltical solution on Obama's part.
On a side note, I wonder how a pacifist would respond to the humanitarian crisis in Libya?
Many commentators have pointed out the mismatch between Obama's military strategy to enforce a no fly-zone and his ultimate desire to see Gaddaffi go. The result will likely be mission creep - even if NATO rather than the U.S. ends up leading this campaign. As Rose quotes, "By intervening to help one side in a civil war, it is now embroiled in Libya’s political future to a vastly greater extent than it was two weeks ago." Moreover, Dan Byman questions the efficacy of the no fly zone, using Iraq in the 1990s as an apt analogy.
This is the sentiment of other commentators such as Fareed Zakaria. You can throw me in with the skeptics about the efficacy of the current policy towards Libya. The best outcome is perhaps putting enough pressure on Gaddaffi to agree to a cease fire and negotiate some poltiical settlement for transition before NATO has to rely on ground troops or supply the rebels with arms.
For international (and perhaps domestic) reputational reasons, there was probably no way Obama could have not responded. So a middle ground approach may have been the best poltical solution on Obama's part.
On a side note, I wonder how a pacifist would respond to the humanitarian crisis in Libya?
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