Social Movements and North Korea

Not possible. End of post.

Well, yes...but that doesn't mean we can't think about possibilities. Occasionally when I mention to other North Korean watchers that I do research on social movements, I get asked about the (lack of) prospects for a social movement in NK.

Here was an email I sent in response to a comment about social capital and civil society in North Korea

As for social movements, yes, most people discount an Arab Spring for NK b/c it lacks civil society. But in the study of revolutions (not that i'm advocating a revolution in NK) there is something known as preference falsification where people convey their preference for social conformity in public while holding different thoughts privately. So N.Koreans praise the regime in public while holding genuine thoughts to themselves. A side effect of preference falsification is the dampening of knowledge and information and an inability to gauge true level of discontent. So no one complains despite hardship. Under certain conditions though, private thoughts may emerge in public which may embolden others to convey their true preferences and demand for change. One of those conditions is probably the existence of information networks (or social capital if you want to call it that) so underground churches could play that role. In places like E. Germany where this theory was applied (by an economist, Timur Kuran), a network of both underground activists and some associational life (workers unions) brought safety in numbers once grievances were expressed out into the open forced regimes to make concessions.

One research I'd be curious to explore is whether development projects or something like the Kaesong Industrial Complex foster trust networks and social capital among North Koreans. Likewise, I wonder if there are there trust networks built among migrants who cross borders between NK and China as the come into contact with one another.

Perhaps we need a network

Scaling Down U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa

The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military is likely to "scale back plans to build key bases in Japan and Guam because of political obstacles and budget pressures." An earlier Stars and Stripes report (citing Bloomberg) stated that the 8,000 U.S. marines slated for relocation from Okinawa to Guam would instead be rotated through Australia and the Philippines. Additionally, the relocation of the 8,000 Marines wouldn't be contingent on the relocation of Futenma Air Station to northern Okinawa. The Pentagon hasn't released any details when the marines would leave or to what extent it would scale back its base ambitions in Okinawa or Guam.

Given U.S. defense spending cuts, I'm not entirely surprised about the U.S. and Japan backing away from the 2006 Guam Accord. Delinking the Futenma issue from the Guam relocation plan takes a lot of pressure off Tokyo from both Washington and Okinawan anti-base protestors. It's unclear whether Tokyo can now give the green light on base expansion in northern Okinawa (assuming that the U.S. still want a heliport in Okinawa) due to ongoing anti-base opposition in Okinawa. My hunch is if the U.S. really wants a heliport and have the budget for it, they'll push Japan harder for Futenma's relocation and Tokyo will probably comply.

The scenario Okinawans hope for are deeper budget cuts which lead to the closure of Futenma. Such a scenario would represent a big victory for anti-base movements. But can we claim that social movements were effective? Is the real explanation U.S. budget cuts? If one examines movements from a long time horizon one could argue that movements helped stave off immediate base expansion/relocation/opening maintaining at least the status quo until the rise of some fortunate turn of events (i.e. budget cuts, changed strategic environment etc...) leading to base closure. In this case, Futenma's relocation would count as a partial victory with anti-base pressure leading to delays and some concessions in reducing Okinawa's base burden.

But in the grand scheme of things, Okinawans would be hard-pressed to challenge the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As I argue in my book, Tokyo is constantly playing a balancing act between pressure from Washington and Okinawan demands but more often falls on the side of its security patron.

How Korean-Pop Conquered Japan....and Then the World

My TA informed me about the article on John Mearsheimer published in this month's Atlantic since my students recently read his take on realism and liberalism. However, my eyes wandered over to a photo and an article about K-pop breaking into the U.S. market. Apparently the group Girl's Generation (SNSD) is getting a gig on Letterman tomorrow night



From that article, I spotted another link to a related headline in the Atlantic: How Korean-Pop Conquered Japan. The headline is catchy because it a) it speaks of all sorts of ironies about Japan's colonial (or Korea's colonized) past; b) it takes the idea of Japan and "network power" - particularly in the domain of pop culture - and turns it on its head; c) it means the indignation I've felt about all the media hype in Korea about K-pop spreading globally (France and UK most recently) has been misplaced.

What's really interesting is how K-pop has "innovated" much faster than J-pop, and in doing so, has built its own latitude of soft power in Asia. Korea may actually be beating out Japan in its own game. Is the future with Samsung, Hyundai, LG rather than Sony, Toyota, and Panasonic? And will the transmission of Asian pop-culture outside its own region diffuse out of Seoul rather than Tokyo, Beijing, Hong Kong, or Shanghai?

The Brits and Transnational Activism on North Korean Human Rights

One of my activist friends posted a set of articles this morning (as he does every morning) on North Korean human rights (NKHR). I've been focusing primarily on U.S. or South Korean activism and NKHR but it's good to be reminded that the push for NKHR is a transnational phenomena. Raising awareness in the UK, British Parliamentarians have spoken out against human rights abuses in North Korea. Interestingly, it appears that conservative members take the lead in NKHR like their counterparts in the US Congress.

To what extent is human rights and humanitarian aid politicized under the backdrop of ongoing security problems. This is a question a former student and I are currently investigating in North Korea and Iran. Leaders are driven by principled beliefs - but how do they interact with strategic beliefs and how does this lead to politicization?

Are Protests Contagious?

I stole the title from David Meyer's blog entry where he explores the spread of protests. With protests popping up all across the globe and in the U.S. the past year, I've been asking myself the very same questions about "contagion" and movements. I won't rehash all of David's remarks on how/why protests are contagious. But I'll try to summarize his points, mixing his layman's description with more precise SM jargon.

1) Initial protests create a bandwagon or cascading effect. More people join protests as the perceived "costs" of protesting are lowered. Costs are lowered since the initial collective action problem has already been solved by others and one only need to show up without investing in "organizing" - and b) individuals usually find safety in numbers. Others may join b/c a a protest may look "fun", "trendy", or get swept up in the euphoria (or rage).

2) The (positive) effects of protest movements begets what Meyers calls a demonstration effect. In SM, we refer to this as movement diffusion most likely through a process of "emulation." Protest tactics, or repertoires of contention are mimicked: i.e. tents in Zuccotti Park and tents in MacPherson Square.

3) Other smaller movements with similar grievances may learn from existing larger, more successful movements and follow suit. They may see a window of opportunity for protests and "adapt their demands and their tactics to their own situation." Here we may see processes of emulation and brokerage (linking two previously unrelated movements). We should also see the adoption/diffusion of movement frames - how activists pitch and sell their argument to the public. i.e. college campuses beginning their own Occupy movement aimed at tuition hikes.

4) As protests are met with success, money, attention, and more people, protests become more organized. This helps sustain and prolong movements. Of course, formalization of a movement may place movements at a cross-roads with some factions desiring to work through more formal political channels rather than protests.

5) The success of movements may trigger counter-movements. For instance, anti-Occupy protests, pro-regime protests etc...

Observing, learning, imitation, emulation occurs across movements. This is easy to trace in something like the Occupy type movements in the US or Iraq War protests globally when the issue or geographic span is narrow. Sarah Soule's article on the diffusion of Shantytown protests across college campuses is an example of good empirical work on diffusion. But it's much more difficult to empirically prove that one movement influenced another when the movements appear unrelated (i.e. different issues) or across borders. To what extent are the protests of 2011 coordinated or coincidental? Are we trying to draw lines where dots can't really be connected?

North Korea Subversion and Protests (or lack of)

Today I get to combine social movements with North Korea - two concepts rarely put together in the same sentence.

I attended Andrei Lankov's CFR presentation, "How to Make Subversive Engagement with North Korea Work." Examples of subversive engagement include the following: expose DPRK to the outside world, promote the flow of Western goods ideas, products, broadcast radio programs, support projects which enable interaction between North Koreans and outsiders), how do we enable outside forces to intersect with insiders who are trying to promote regime change. Access is difficult

My question for Andrei was how one translates discontent with the regime (which Andrei insists there is plenty of) into political action in the absence of any true civil society, associational life, or organizations such as independent labor unions. Subversive engagement succeeded in Eastern Europe during the Cold War thanks to the existence of civil society and mobilizing structures such as the Catholic Church. However, in the DPRK, we will not likely see an Arab Spring-like unrest because of1) closed political opportunities; 2) no mobilizing structures; 3) no apparent leadership

Since North Koreans can't be mobilized yet, the best hope is to continue flooding NK with information and perhaps take advantage of the expertise of defectors/refugees who may be able to help organize political protests inside the DPRK. The problem with this plan is that its more of a long term strategy. In the meantime, thousands more may die out of hunger or abuse.

The Future of Iraq

“The image of the American soldier is as a killer, not a defender. And how can you give a killer immunity?” Did civilian killings in Haditha and elsewhere turn the tide against long-term US military presence? Washington had hoped to keep Iraq as a staging ground for U.S. presence in the region.

Is this a sign of anti-base victory? Sovereignty was certainly the dominant motif (i.e. master frame) when giving the Americans the boot. It was clear that the majority of Iraqis - at least the ones who had decision power in charting the future of Iraq - did not want an extension of U.S. military. While there was no anti-base movement per se, then anti-base sentiment I imagine was still fairly widespread in Baghdad. But here, base politics also played out on the US side. Insiders claim Obama did not try to oversell the ideas of US troop presence. After all, he too had a campaign pledge to end the war in Iraq.

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki still visited Washington this week to mark the beginning of a new strategic course for US-Iraqi relations, sans US troops. Whether he caved to domestic nationalist pressure or believed that the Iraqis were ready to take responsibility of their own security (likely the former), US troops will exit on Dec. 31 (update, two weeks before deadline so troops can enjoy Christmas at home). Questions will continue to loom, however, whether this was the right decision.