Jeju Naval Base Protests in Seoul

I've given several talks about the Jeju anti-base protests the past few months, the latest one at Stanford's  FSI/Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The Jeju anti-base movement has survived longer than I (and probably activists themselves) anticipated. Here's a good overview from a Hawaii activist...although I remind readers that the article tends to embellish if not overexaggerate the "threat" of U.S. military presence. 

Not having heard much about Jeju Island, several researchers at FSI took interest in Jeju Island. They'll probably be hearing more about Jeju now that a major film about the Jeju 4.3 Uprising took the top prize at Sundance. It'll be interesting to see if activists capitalize on this Sundance victory to rejuvenate protests. The obvious frame extension is that war and suffering must not be repeated again on Jeju Island.

U.S. Base Reduction in the Azores

The U.S. is downsizing its presence at Lajes Field, an air base in the Azores. While some (i.e. activists) may welcome this news, the community on the Azores will feel the effects. A reminder that there are always pockets of supporters for U.S. military presence - even if only for economic reasons. Mid-air refueling and the longer range of planes has made the Air Field obsolete. But the downsizing is also a part of further U.S. troop reductions in Europe.

U.S. Drone Policy: Establishing a Legal Framework

Rep. Keith Ellison on drone policy in the Post. He writes, "The heart of the problem is that our technological capability has far surpassed our policy." He argues that the executive branch exercises too much authority over drone strikes with not enough Congressional oversight. Like many others, Ellison is calling for a stronger legal framework guiding who we target and when we decide to pursue strikes.

In the U.S. drone strikes are perceived as effective, winning wide public support as the graphic to the right suggests. Two social scientists have also examined the impact of drone strikes and find merit in the program (although the authors caution against an expanded campaign). Can strikes be equally as effective with the type of oversight Ellison recommends: independent judicial review over "kill lists"; collaborate with other countries in developing legal standards for strikes? Nevertheless, an international legal framework for such drone strikes will have to be implemented in the near future for self-interested (if not moral) reasons as other countries begin to acquire drone technology. Given the unpopularity of drone strikes in other parts of the world, the U.S. might incur reputation costs. More importantly, U.S. citizens will not want to to be on the other end of another countries' kill list.

Peace Activists, Realism, and the Asian Pivot

Peace activists concerned about Washington’s strategic re-balance towards Asia organized the Working Group for Peace & Demilitarization in Asia and the Pacific. I hadn’t received their e-newsletter in a while but I received one today. Their opinions tend to veer to the left, but they do a great job (and service) presenting news and updates. For instance, I learned about the upcoming meeting between Washington and Tokyo next week where the two sides will discuss revisions to the defense cooperation guidelines. The last review was in 1997. Both sides will likely strengthen relations which have flat-lined a bit under the DPJ. Two issues to watch are cooperation in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and the possibility of Japan expanding the role of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a move more plausible under the newly elected LDP.

The newsletter also alerted the group to the impending “boom” in arms sales to Asia as a result of the strategic re-balance. I was aware that the U.S. had approved sales of the Global Hawk to South Korea (the post didn't mention though that the Koreans intended to play hard-ball). But other allies also have their wish lists: Japan selected the F-35 to replace its fleet of F-4s; Singapore and South Korea are also eyeing this plane; Taiwan is upgrading its existing fleet of F-16A/B fighters.

I'm interested in how these news and facts are interpreted. Activists are informing their network about the impending danger and perils heading towards Asia as the region further militarizes. Many policymakers probably take these facts as a positive sign that Washington is playing an active role in supporting our allies and keeping the peace in the region. Who is right in this debate? It's a bit ironic that both sides resort to realist arguments to stake their claim. It's the security dilemma for peace activists and the balance of power for policymakers.

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe

I finally had a chance to read Daniel Nexon’s The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe. It’s not a quick read (not the first half at least). But the book is refreshingly different from standard IR fare making it worth reading. Although not his main argument, Dan makes a compelling case why realism as an analytic paradigm doesn’t travel as well as we believe across space/time. He does this though in a manner which doesn’t completely dismiss or ignore the “states-under-anarchy” framework.  

Dan’s work provides fuel for not one, but two of my research agendas so my mind was in overdrive trying to figure out how to apply/incorporate his work with my own. I’m not going to review the book but instead I’ll glean a few useful insights from it for my own work on a) social movements and world politics and b) East Asian international relations.

Social Movements and World Politics

Yes, it’s the title of my blog.  As you recall, the blog was created as a space for me to write up thoughts about my research on said topic.  As I wrote in my research statement, “I attempt to craft a coherent theory synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations (IR) theory …To do this, I unpack various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences (and vice-versa).”

Dan’s book falls squarely into this research agenda.  At the most obvious level, he shows how mobilization against dynastic rulers and the rise of religious movements (the Protestant Reformation) triggered a set of processes which exposed, exploited, and eroded the weak political structures inherent in “composite states” (or dynastic agglomerates) characteristic of early modern Europe. As Dan argues, transnational religious movements “altered the structural opportunities and constraints of power-competition” (4).  These movements played a significant (although by no means sufficient) role in the development of the modern nation-state system.

A broader contribution is his linking of collective action problems and mobilization at the domestic and international level through the concept of nested relational networks.  Dan writes, “Treating structure of international interaction in terms of nested relational configurations allows us to link variation in the structure of polities (i.e. states) – and other corporate actors (i.e. social movements) – to international structures. Not only does this analytic move capture the co-constituted relationship between agents and structures at different levels of analysis, but it provides a way to think about how transactional patterns give rise to opportunity structures for collective action in world politics” (51). In particular, the density of network relations and degree of identity cohesion between actors at the domestic and international level shapes the opportunity structure of actors for mobilization and cooperation. 

So Dan addresses two of my proposed research goals a) synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations and b) unpacking various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences   

East Asian International Relations

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe is as far as one can get from contemporary Asia. Yet I found Dan’s relational institutionalism applicable to the persistence of U.S. bilateral alliances and  the structure of post-Cold War Asia.  Although I take an ideational-institutional approach in explaining alliance resilience, the inertia of patron-client relations also helps explain the continuation of bilateralism in Asia.  Affective and material ties between the U.S. its Asian alliance partners (i.e. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) encourages cooperation.  Ikenberry (2011) describes the type of order produced by patron-client relations as “rule by relations.” Rule by relations may move from a strong to weak form of patronage (colonial rule à neocolonial ruleà client-state relationship à special relationship), but such shifts don’t necessarily reduce the affective and material ties present in bilateral alliances. “Clients” in special relationships may still act out of loyalty to the patron or out of material interests in the form of prestige, security, or wealth. 

Finally, Dan’s clarification of relational structures helps me think about my own relational approach to East Asian security. I’ve been working forever on a paper which criticizes traditional structural approaches (i.e. polarity) applied to Asian security and instead advocate a relational view of East Asian order. The ties generated by East Asian international relations suggests a bifurcated network with China and the U.S. centered as hubs. Reviewers have uniformly agreed that the first half reads much better than the second half so hopefully insights from Ch. 2 of The Struggle for Power in will help improve the second half of the paper. 

Afghanistan Basing Strategy

Will the U.S continue counterterrorism operations in Pakistan? Kim and Fred Kagan believe the answer to this is tantamount to whether the U.S. can retain U.S. bases and maintain current force levels in Afghanistan.  I hate math, but here’s an application of the transitive axiom:

No bases = no ability to strike terrorist cells in Afghanistan/Pakistan. 

No large troop presence = no bases.

Therefore, no large troop presence = no ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia.

My focus here is less on counterinsurgency operations and more about the need and purpose of overseas bases. To strike terrorist cells without the presence of ground troops, the U.S. will have to rely on a) Predator drones; b) special mission units c) precision guided missiles. The Kagans think options A and B are not possible without bases.

Policymakers for the past decade have argued for a smaller footprint regarding U.S. overseas bases – a shift away from large permanent structures to “lighter” facilities. Post-reconstruction Iraq and Afghanistan were supposed to be the two exceptions. The Iraqis gave us the boot so we’ll have little “permanent” presence in that country. But the Kagans demonstrate why bases – physical structures, not merely access agreements or basing rights to host nation bases – still matter. Whether we get bases in Afghanistan will largely be determined by the Afghanis and to a lesser extent U.S. negotiating skills.  Like many policymakers, the Kagans omit the fact that the fate of our policy often rests with the host nation and base politics. We can’t just retain bases and 68,000 troops simply because it makes strategic sense (or not). 

Garment Factory Ablaze in Bangladesh: The Conundrum of Improving Workers' Rights

This story on the garment factory fire in Bangladesh is just terrible and tragic. I’m usually ambivalent when it comes to labor activism and unions. But this story screams out the need for greater accountability and better protection for workers. The young man who desperately called his mother from a 5^th floor bathroom to tell her he was about to die as the building burned was particularly heart-wrenching. In many ways, it echoes the travesty in Chinese factories producing Apple ipads reported earlier this year.  

As in the Apple case though, improving labor standards is not so easy when existing economic structures and business pressures pose obstacles for reform. Consumers want lower prices. Suppliers must offer competitive bids. Factories must yield high output.  Laborers are desperate for work. Companies must meet consumer demand. 

Boycotting Sears and Wal-mart is probably not the way to go (see this link for reasons why). But like the case between Apple and Foxcon, exposing labor human rights violations in factories and linking them back to retailers may put pressure on firms, suppliers, and factories to address labor rights. Garment workers have also taken matters into their own hands and mobilized protests in Bangladesh 

The real challenge is altering the behavior incentives of consumers and producers. Many consumers in the developed world might be willing to pay a few dollars if they knew it translated into saved lives in Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, or Honduras. But the garment (electronics, toy...take your pick) industry would have to collude with one another and self-reinforce labor standards to prevent any one firm from producing goods at a significantly lower cost.  I’m not sure how many Americans are more likely to buy things labeled as “fair-trade” or “sweatshop-free” if they can find similar products at lower cost.

It’s easy to see why Karl Marx inspired generations of revolutionaries and activists. But it’s just as easy to see why he was wrong about overthrowing the structure we curse and embrace and call capitalism.

Update #1: Following the collapse of factory killing hundreds of workers, an activist from Bangladesh calls on Americans to press companies to improve standards, but does NOT endorse a boycott.

Update #2 (5/12/13): Looks like retailers like H&M (my wife's latest go to store) have decided to sign an accord which adheres to safety measures. As this article states," The move comes just days shy of a deadline imposed by workers’ rights groups that said they would hold street protests and otherwise increase pressure on clothing brands that did not sign the agreement by Wednesday." So were retailers pressured into signing? Is this a logic of consequence or appropriateness, or does that even matter?

Wal-Mart, however, has opted out of the safety plan and instead announced it would conduct their own set of inspections in factories. Perhaps Wal-Mart found the plan too restrictive??

Here's an op-ed from the Post's Harold Meyerson with more on this issue.

Update #3 (7/13/13): The spate of tragedies has led North American retailers to launch there own worker safety initiative in Bangladesh. Are such measures of corporate social responsibility really a sign of changing norms and practices, or is it a way to deflect outside criticism that American retailers are part of the problem and not the solution. As the Post points out, one weakness is the self-regulatory nature of this initiative. The Economist has a more skeptical take.

Update #4 (12/28/15): Two years after the Rana Plaza incident, slow progress on labor reforms and politics between European and N. American corporate alliances in establishing mechanisms for inspections and monitoring of factory conditions as reported by the Post.