Ethics and Global Governance

Two stories this weekend related to global governance which made me think about ethical issues and global politics. The first is an interview with World Bank president Jim Yong Kim. The second is a feature in the Washington Post Magazine about U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power.

President Kim was asked why the Bank withheld aid towards a health project in Uganda following passage of anti-gay legislation in that country. After all, the Bank's approach to aid is supposed to be apolitical. In response, Kim mentioned that the Bank has a commitment to non-discrimination. In this particular project geared towards human health, it was unclear whether the Ugandan government could ensure non-discriminatory practices in its health clinics. The decision to withhold aid was a management rather than a political-based decision. As such, the Bank can continue supporting other projects in Uganda such as those related to infrastructure which has little to do with discriminating against gay people. Likewise, the Bank will continue to support projects in Russia, despite Russia behaving badly in the Crimea. From the Bank's perspective, their programs in Russia are intended to protect the poor, improve business climate, and support growth. Apolitical development still raises a few ethical issues, however. For instance, should IGOs provide government assistance to regimes with poor human rights records (Kim cites N.Korea becoming a potential recepient country if it opens up) which might legitimate such regimes? Or if the goal is to improve the lives of people, can politics be cast aside so long as the Bank or IMF can ensure that governments will not misuse funds? The Bank adopts the latter position. But how can one credibly trust regimes if corruption, nepotism, and instability are the norm in a given polity? The Bank has their own mechanism to investigate whether and how governments are properly implementing projects and can always threaten to pull the plug. I supposed the Bank's approach to development is one of ethical pragmatism.

The second story is more pertinent to my research on ideas and foreign policy. Based on Samantha Power's pre-government opining, we now she's a passionate adovcate of human rights and humanitarian assistance. However, Power admits that once inside government the issues appear much more complex. Take for instance US refusal to sign the Convention to Ban Landmines in light of the need for such weapons in the DMZ between North and South Korea. As one official recalls Power stating, ‘I didn’t have any idea how complicated these things become once you’re in government . . . This is as far from a no-brainer as I’ve ever seen.” A study of Samantha Power shows how elite views become moderated once in government, something I argued in my book about the formation of an elite security consensus. Political constraints prevent leaders from implementing their own policy preferences. Also, through socialization processes, the views of elites within the foreign policy and security establishment begin to  converge. Real differences continue to exist (particularly within Congress), but in the bureacracies, positions move towards the middle making bipartisanship in foreign policy/security a bit easier.

North Korea New Round-up: Comission of Inquiry on Human Rights; NK Photos; Cell Phones

The UNHRC's Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released its report a couple weeks ago. An excerpt from the report is here.  One of the more interesting highlights is committee's suggestion that NK leaders might face charges at the International Criminal Court.

More details about North Korean cell phones appeared on 38 North by Yonho Kim, a corresonpdant for Voice of America. Earlier, on 38 North, Ruediger Frank presented a somewhat comical analysis of tablets in North Korea.

Some truths about photos from North Korea.

Hagel Announces Pentagon Budget Cuts...and Peace Activists are Unhappy?!

I was almost certain the peace activist community would rejoice at Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's announced budget cuts, much in the same way that I'd expect conservatives such as Dick Cheney to argue that cuts would be "absolutely devastating."  Other news outlets  such as NPR and  NYTimes also predicted a backlash from Army proponents, defense contractors, Congressmen etc... Thus, I was surprised to see Hagel's announcement drawing flak from activists like Bruce Gagnon who wrote, "Despite mandates for cuts in military spending after agreements with Congress under sequestration, Hagel actually calls for an increase of more than $115 billion for war making." Gagnon's focus is more about where the budget is being reallocated (i.e. what the Pentagon is buying) rather than cuts to troops, housing, and military pensions. As Gagnon writes, "The writing on the wall is clear - cuts in troop levels and increase in high-tech space directed war-making capability." Anyone want to fact-check this?

Update: David Edelstein at Georgetown suggests that military cuts functions as a signal from Washington to our allies and adversaries that the U.S. is "tying its hands." That is we're letting adversaries (i.e. Iran) know that we really do have no intentions of attacking by decreasing are capabilities. And we're telling allies (i.e. Japan, Korea) that they will need to contribute more for their own defense. Over at the Duck, Musgrave and Ward have their own take on the tying hands logic...that this will prevent future administrations from taking on costly, unilateral actions.  Of course, this assumes that the Obama Administration made the decision based on a long term horizon  - why would he care how future administrations address security crises which may require having all options on the table. It also doesn't preclude the possibility that given the United States' tremendous military edge, the U.S. could still engage in some misguided adventure. 

No wonder why peace activists don't see this announcement as relief. Joe Gerson at AFSC announced that "the reduction of the size of the U.S. Army grows in large measure from its new Air-Sea Battle doctrine for possible future wars in Asia and the Pacific."

Social Movements and World Politics: Ukraine and Venezuela

Ukraine and Venezuela are the two latest countries where massive protests have erupted. CFR compiled some background articles to the Ukraine protests as did Josh Busby at the Duck. I'm also posting a couple CNN and NY Times.

RIA Novosti/Andrey Stenin)

articles on Venezuela from

I'm less interested in examining how or why protests erupted in these two places than in understanding what implications the dyamics of protest in Ukraine, Venezuela, and other countries have on world politics. Thinking back to a paper I wrote outlining different mechanisms in which social movements, the protests in the Ukraine do suggest some relationship between social movements and international relations with the Ukrainian state playing an intermediary role. In particular, Ukrainian protests have clearly signalled to the outside world strong dissatification with President Yanukovych's earlier decision to break-off a potential deal with the EU. How else might social movements relate to world politics in this case? Movements may...

1. Signal to outsiders the level of domestic support for either the EU or Russia
2. Reify lines between East and West as the EU and Russia propose diverging policy positions to address the Ukrainian crisis.
3. Potentially force the Yanokovych government to reverse course on international policy.
4. Draw in outside powers to respond and intervene in a domestic crisis.
5. Produce demonstration effects in other countries

The above arguments indicate a signalling and bargaining effect generated by social movements. Domestic regimes must bargain with opposition movements to meet specific political demands (i.e. government transition, new international deals etc...). Meanwhile, protest movements signal to outsiders the size, power, and degree of resolve the opposition has in challenging the regime. This may help determine to what extent outside actors (states, NGOs, IGOs etc...) might intervene on behalf of either the opposition or incumbent regime.

News Roundup: Latin America, Gun Control, Asia Historical Memory, ISA blog policy snafu

Have not been able to blog since the birth of our daughter last Nov. Basically, it's a trade-off between extra sleep or blogging (or doing actual work and blogging). I've been wanting to write on a variety of topics, so as a happy-medium, here's news round-up to ease my way back into the blog.

The left turn in Latin America: My Latin Americanist colleague says he's had enough of the "left turn" in Latin American politics when I mentioned this overview provided by the Washington Post. I was still curious to know how much of the turn was driven by social movements (since we hear about populist policies from the likes of the late Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales) or whether the turn to the left can be explained within the confides of institutional and electoral politics. Some answers might be found in Steve Levitsky and Ken Robert's book, Resurgence of the Latin American Left, and also in Max Cameron and Eric Hershberg's Latin America's Left Turn. There's also an emerging cleavage which actually cuts across the left-right divide: nationalist vs internationalist (or protectionism vs. free trade as outlined in the article). 

Gun control: The shooting in the Columbia, MD mall was only twenty miles from my home. In the aftermath, Dana Miibank asks if we've become numb to mass shootings. Despite numerous attempts to address gun violence after each tragedy (i.e. Tucson, AZ; Aurora, CO; Newtown, CT; Navy Yard in Washington DC), and with each mass shooting claimed as a "critical juncture" for gun control advocates, the ball has not moved forward all that much. Aside from the power of the NRA (or in large part b/c of their advocacy) my own research suggests that powerful ideational (which translate to political) barriers exist which gun control advocates have not been able to penetrate in spite of the powerful emotional claims/frames they've created.  An interesting research question is to explore whether public opinion functions independent of this ideational barrier (i.e. if public opinion now strongly favors gun control measure, why have we not seen greater shifts in policy on this issue).

Korea-Japan, historical memory: For my students taking East Asian IR with me this semester, I shared how historical issues have managed to find their way into local politics in the DMV area. Korean-Americans actually lobbied and received a commitment from new VA governor Terry McAuliffe to include "East Sea" in any VA state issued textbook which also states the body of water between Korea and Japan as the "Sea of Japan."  McAuliffe now has four lobbyists and the Japanese Ambassador on his arse. Ddoh! It's a choice between votes (many more voting Koreans than Japanese in VA) or economic largesse (Japan reportedly invested $1 billion in the state of VA). And from a couple years ago in DC, there was the sale and return of  the Phelps House to the Korean government. The Phelps House was the first Korean embassy in the U.S. located on Logan Circle, to be sold for $5 by the Japanese after Korea became its colony. Fred Hiatt takes a broader look at some of these historical issues and wonders if we really have/are pivoting to Asia (and implies we should).

ISA blog snafu: Of all the comments about ISA governing council's proposal on blog policy, Amanda Murdie provided a response which resonated closely with my own reactions.

Closure of Manas Air Base

I was contacted a few weeks ago by Stars and Stripes, the U.S. military's news organization to comment on the closure of Manas Air Base in Kyrgzstan and base relocation to Romania. Despite the time I put in researching and answering questions, my comments were never used. So I've put up my responses to the questions below. Here's additional commentary from Alex Cooley, a true expert on this subject.

1. What are your general thoughts on the Manas Base?

Political instability and conflict in the Middle East have been ongoing if not rising the past few years. Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan is winding down. Therefore, it makes a lot of strategic sense for the U.S. to shift air transit operations from Kyrgyzstan to Romania which is much closer to current global hot spots along the Mediterranean and the Middle East .

2. Do you think they (the Kyrgz) actually wanted the U.S. operations to leave, or were they hoping for better terms and the U.S. called their bluff?

The Kyrgyzstan government has played base politics with the United States before, ratcheting upward the "rent" for Manas during negotiations in 2006. More importantly, in 2009, the Kyrgyz president announced his decision to terminate the base agreement, only to have the U.S. triple its offer to keep U.S. flights operating.  I'm not aware if the U.S. and Kyrgyz government attempted to negotiate a deal again, but it should have been obvious to the Kyrgyz that their bargaining power had been significantly reduced with the war in Afghanistan drawing to a close. So it does not seem likely that the Kyrgz were expecting to extract better terms from the U.S. 

3. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Russia has its own base in Kyrgyzstan and is a major economic benefactor so the Kyrgyz may have felt some pressure from Moscow, if not directly at least indirectly, to support its patron. But the decision was most likely one emanating from the Kyrgz themselves given the declining utility of the base for the U.S. and demonstrated by the overwhelming support in Parliament to not renew the base agreement.  

4. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Romania is a much more reliable partner than Kyrgyzstan.  Romania is a member of NATO and has a proven track record of defense cooperation with the U.S. The presence of U.S. bases in Romania should therefore be more stable and less politicized. We are also less likely to see economic opportunism from the Romanian government. 

News Roundup: Asia Pivot; Philippine Disaster; Kony 2013; Korean Politics and More...

There's so much news and so little time to post these days that I've decided to adopt something similar to the Duck's "Morning Linkage" news updates. These are basically news, academic research, and reports which revolve around my research & teaching interests.

Disaster and Relief Effort in the Philippines

• Typhoon Haiyan  has crippled the middle islands of the Philippines. The U.S. military is once again playing a leading role in disaster relief efforts in Asia. Foreign Policy published this article interestingly titled, "Everyone Hate U.S. Bases in Asia - Until Disaster Strikes." Goodwill efforts go far for the military as was the case in Indonesia in 2004 and Japan in 2011. This is in comparison to China's alleged $100,000 pledge (yes, that's correct, 100K). Diplomatic reasons for the paltry sum are given here. Reuters may be exaggerating to make the Chinese look really bad, but the general point about aid and goodwill still stands.
• I'm sure it's been done already, but it might be interesting to conduct a study on the role of the U.S. military and overseas U.S. military presence following foreign disasters? How does U.S. military participation in relief efforts affect local and regional opinion of the U.S. and U.S. military? Does "goodwill" have longer term regional effects? Does disaster relief draw the U.S. military far from its traditional mandate/mission and to what extent can/should the U.S. military be involved in providing humanitarian assistance.
•  Josh Busby had a good  post on thinking about natural disasters and insecurity. We often lump such studies under the rubric of "human security," but Busby, reflecting on his own work on climate change and security in Africa, suggests ways to think about natural hazards and "harder" security issues (i.e. bringing back guns, bombs, bullets). One interesting aspect noted by Busby (via Max Fisher) is the importance of governance and its relationship to disaster response. Looting, violence, and a general breakdown in order is very well a function of governance, state capacity, and perhaps civil-military relations.Jennifer Keister makes excellent points on governance and disaster response here.  The aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan certainly brings interesting comparisons to disaster response in Japan after the 2011 tsunami or the United States after Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Asia pivot related content

• Bob Kelly at the Duck had a long, but insightful piece on ROK-Japan relations, an issue I've also blogged about in the past. What was more interesting was his sweeping overview of East Asian security, the Asia Pivot, and US-Sino relations and where ROK and Japan fit in the broader strategic landscape. This makes a good read for undergrads interested in Asian security.
• Here's a recent CNAS report from Ely Ratner on the Asian Pivot and U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. I'd like to take very small credit for suggesting a few ideas to Ely in the early phase of this project.

South Korean Politics

• The ROK government is seeking a ban on the United Progressive Party (UPP), South Korea's far left party for being pro-North Korea. I've had some interaction with UPP party members since they've been a key supporter of anti-U.S. base protests. Anyway, the article falls in line with a recent paper I read by UCSD professor's Steph Haggard and Jong-Sung You about a decline (or at least lower levels relative to other OECD countries) in civil liberties in South Korea. This is supported by several indexes which measure civil liberties, media openness, and democracy (i.e. Freedom House scores). It also falls in line with my argument about a strong security consensus held by foreign policy and security elites in South Korea.

Kony 2013

• I assigned this piece for my undergrads: a follow-up to the viral Kony 2012 video. The article highlights the unique and unusual interesection of interests between civil society/human rights activists and the U.S. military. As the article states, Invisible Children and other young activists were instrumental in pushing the U.S. government to take action against Kony. This comes despite the fact that Kony “is not targeting U.S. citizens. He’s not targeting U.S. embassies. He’s not al-Qaeda.” Despite the lack of threat to the US, the U.S. military may find other reasons for getting involved in the Kony hunt: 1) it gives them a reason for military presence in sub-Sahara Africa; 2) strengthens relations between U.S. and African countries; 3) allows the US to train African militaries.  So a win-win situation for activists and the U.S. miltiary. Would love to see a research article about the rise of Kony 2012, the convergence of political interests, and perhaps long term consequences of such action beyond Kony's future capture. 

Base Politics

• One of the anti-base protest cases I examined in my book was the protest against base expansion in Vicenza, Italy. The U.S. Army wanted to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, split between Germany and Italy, to northern Italy. Base construction is now complete, but David Vine just emailed me asking if I knew why the U.S. decided to keep two brigades in Germany. This was news to me so didn't have a clear answer.  But here was my educated guess: 

"The military states strategic reasons for keeping a batallion in Germany. Recent departures at Grafenwoehr have left more space with better training facilities for the 173rd. Of course, this defeats the earlier idea of consolidating the 173rd in one location.  This is purely speculation on my part, but is it possible that the Germans wanted to retain some US presence? When the DoD (and CBO) made its early recommendations for base realignment, Germany faced the largest reductions and closures. Not that there's much love for Washington these days from Berlin, but among foreign policy circles, I thought I read or heard somewhere that a few Germans believed the reductions were too much and too fast.

The question which I'm afraid I don't have an answer to, is how the US and Germany decided to retain some of the 173rd in Germany. Did the US ask Germany (likely with Germany willing to oblige); did Germany ask the US (less likely, but possible as a way of reinvigorating strategic ties); and finally, our milliion dollar question, if the  US asked Germany was it b/c of the newfound opportunity to use a large training facilitiy (although hard to believe the US wouldn't have thought of this earlier) or b/c of political opposition either in Vicenza locally, or from Rome, which left the US seeking some last minute basing solution." 

On this last point, if anti-base movements were a part of the decision to keep parts of the 173rd in Germany, I'm curious to know if Vicenza activists celebrated this announcement as a  a partial victory in blocking some US troops.