Revisiting Jeju Anti-Base Protests

I'm making a return to my blog after a long absence...

Exactly 3 years ago I was on Jeju Island doing research on anti-base protests against the construction of the South Korean naval base. The paper I’ve written has gone through the grinder at several journals. I agree with much of what critics have to say, and most reviews do mention that I do have a potential argument worth making. I just haven’t figured out a good way to deliver it in 10,000 words or less. I’m using this blog post as a warm-up exercise to retool the article for a non-IR/poli-sci journal.

It’s no surprise that peace activists and national security/foreign policy government officials often clash on a number of issues. But little understood is how or why such differences occur – especially when both sides profess to make claims advancing peace and security. Usually differences are attributed to different political ideologies wrapped around labels such as progressive and conservative.  

Moving beyond such obvious labels, I examine discourse and text to help us understand why activists and policymakers in South Korea came to major blows (literally) regarding the construction of a naval base designed to protect South Koreans. While many reasons exist in favor of or against the naval base – the claims made by local and transnational activists on one hand and ROK government and military officials on the other align fairly neatly along two dimensions. The first is based purely on arguments based on the logic of “realism.”  Bases (as an element of power) are either a source of security or insecurity depending on whether one sees bases as defending the national interest or provoking China and other countries in the region. The government claims the former, activists claim the latter logic. The second dimension focuses on the primary referent of security: states or people. Government focus on the state; activists focus on individual lives at the very local level.

Activists and government officials tend to carry different assumptions regarding international politics. Based on these two dimensions, we can see how far they might diverge on their views about Jeju naval base construction. The figures below (click to enlarge) are ideal types, but you get the picture how, why, peace activists and government diverge sharply in their views about peace and security.

Figure 1: Coding scheme mapping realist and critical worldviews

Japan-South Korea Relations and Geopolitical Implications

EAI and Genron NPO hosted a workshop in Seoul a couple months ago and released results of a survey which provide interesting insights into the recent deterioration of bilateral relations. Stephan Haggard takes an early crack at interpreting the data. Although the overwhelming majority of Koreans and Japans still believe in the importance of ROK-Japan relations (well above 50%), only roughly 15% of the population in both countries believe relations will improve. Now that's depressing.

Also interesting are the geopolitical implications of the survey related to relations with China. Take a look at the graphs below:

Clearly the Koreans see the Chinese taking on a global leadership role, whereas the Japanese do not. Also, Koreans see relations with China as important  than relation with Japan. What does this mean for U.S. bilateral alliances? Public opinion is fickle and can shift overnight, but if these results mean anything, one might conclude that Japan will remain faithful to the alliance. South Korea may not: Seoul may hedge, or the voice of China supporters may grow stronger.

Interestingly, more Japanesefeel greater affinity towards Korea than China. We might say this affinity is unrequited since the Koreans feel more affinity towards China than Japan. Again, we can't put much weight on a single public opinion poll, but this does suggest that Seoul may face more domestic constraints on US-Japan-Korea trilateralism than Tokyo.

The complete report, including the figures which I copied on this post, can be found here.

Autocrats Unite...and the Deep Divide to Global Peace

Saw this op-ed by David Sanger from someone's Facebook post about the rise of autocrats and the threat of U.S. global under-reach (i.e. how the world might face doom if no leader is willing to tend to the international garden "so that small problems didn’t turn into big ones." Sanger cites Bob Kagan's piece which places this argument in historical context. The arguments are all reasonable, but his conclusion that the U.S. at times must act as an enforcer and be a forceful menace is sure to raise eyebrows. Take for instance, this quote from an activist in Hawaii I know commenting on Obama's recent West Point speech:

What makes us "exceptional" is the fact that WE LIVE IN THE MOST HATED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND ARE CONSIDERED THE NUMBER ONE OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING WORLD PEACE. And that is NOTHING to be proud of. And about "America must always lead on the world stage..." Too easily said when America builds the stage wherever it wants, imposes the props, writes the script, and dupes the American audience (that would be the taxpayers whose money funds American terrorism) into swallowing the idea it was an honorable, must-do, performance.

Again, struck by the vast chasm in thought about achieving global peace and stability between (conservative) policymakers and (liberal) activists.

Update: I cited Kagan's piece, not b/c I necessarily support the argument, but b/c it seemed central to part of Sanger's op-ed. Here's Dan Nexon shredding Kagan to pieces.

Ethics and Global Governance

Two stories this weekend related to global governance which made me think about ethical issues and global politics. The first is an interview with World Bank president Jim Yong Kim. The second is a feature in the Washington Post Magazine about U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power.

President Kim was asked why the Bank withheld aid towards a health project in Uganda following passage of anti-gay legislation in that country. After all, the Bank's approach to aid is supposed to be apolitical. In response, Kim mentioned that the Bank has a commitment to non-discrimination. In this particular project geared towards human health, it was unclear whether the Ugandan government could ensure non-discriminatory practices in its health clinics. The decision to withhold aid was a management rather than a political-based decision. As such, the Bank can continue supporting other projects in Uganda such as those related to infrastructure which has little to do with discriminating against gay people. Likewise, the Bank will continue to support projects in Russia, despite Russia behaving badly in the Crimea. From the Bank's perspective, their programs in Russia are intended to protect the poor, improve business climate, and support growth. Apolitical development still raises a few ethical issues, however. For instance, should IGOs provide government assistance to regimes with poor human rights records (Kim cites N.Korea becoming a potential recepient country if it opens up) which might legitimate such regimes? Or if the goal is to improve the lives of people, can politics be cast aside so long as the Bank or IMF can ensure that governments will not misuse funds? The Bank adopts the latter position. But how can one credibly trust regimes if corruption, nepotism, and instability are the norm in a given polity? The Bank has their own mechanism to investigate whether and how governments are properly implementing projects and can always threaten to pull the plug. I supposed the Bank's approach to development is one of ethical pragmatism.

The second story is more pertinent to my research on ideas and foreign policy. Based on Samantha Power's pre-government opining, we now she's a passionate adovcate of human rights and humanitarian assistance. However, Power admits that once inside government the issues appear much more complex. Take for instance US refusal to sign the Convention to Ban Landmines in light of the need for such weapons in the DMZ between North and South Korea. As one official recalls Power stating, ‘I didn’t have any idea how complicated these things become once you’re in government . . . This is as far from a no-brainer as I’ve ever seen.” A study of Samantha Power shows how elite views become moderated once in government, something I argued in my book about the formation of an elite security consensus. Political constraints prevent leaders from implementing their own policy preferences. Also, through socialization processes, the views of elites within the foreign policy and security establishment begin to  converge. Real differences continue to exist (particularly within Congress), but in the bureacracies, positions move towards the middle making bipartisanship in foreign policy/security a bit easier.

North Korea New Round-up: Comission of Inquiry on Human Rights; NK Photos; Cell Phones

The UNHRC's Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released its report a couple weeks ago. An excerpt from the report is here.  One of the more interesting highlights is committee's suggestion that NK leaders might face charges at the International Criminal Court.

More details about North Korean cell phones appeared on 38 North by Yonho Kim, a corresonpdant for Voice of America. Earlier, on 38 North, Ruediger Frank presented a somewhat comical analysis of tablets in North Korea.

Some truths about photos from North Korea.

Hagel Announces Pentagon Budget Cuts...and Peace Activists are Unhappy?!

I was almost certain the peace activist community would rejoice at Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's announced budget cuts, much in the same way that I'd expect conservatives such as Dick Cheney to argue that cuts would be "absolutely devastating."  Other news outlets  such as NPR and  NYTimes also predicted a backlash from Army proponents, defense contractors, Congressmen etc... Thus, I was surprised to see Hagel's announcement drawing flak from activists like Bruce Gagnon who wrote, "Despite mandates for cuts in military spending after agreements with Congress under sequestration, Hagel actually calls for an increase of more than $115 billion for war making." Gagnon's focus is more about where the budget is being reallocated (i.e. what the Pentagon is buying) rather than cuts to troops, housing, and military pensions. As Gagnon writes, "The writing on the wall is clear - cuts in troop levels and increase in high-tech space directed war-making capability." Anyone want to fact-check this?

Update: David Edelstein at Georgetown suggests that military cuts functions as a signal from Washington to our allies and adversaries that the U.S. is "tying its hands." That is we're letting adversaries (i.e. Iran) know that we really do have no intentions of attacking by decreasing are capabilities. And we're telling allies (i.e. Japan, Korea) that they will need to contribute more for their own defense. Over at the Duck, Musgrave and Ward have their own take on the tying hands logic...that this will prevent future administrations from taking on costly, unilateral actions.  Of course, this assumes that the Obama Administration made the decision based on a long term horizon  - why would he care how future administrations address security crises which may require having all options on the table. It also doesn't preclude the possibility that given the United States' tremendous military edge, the U.S. could still engage in some misguided adventure. 

No wonder why peace activists don't see this announcement as relief. Joe Gerson at AFSC announced that "the reduction of the size of the U.S. Army grows in large measure from its new Air-Sea Battle doctrine for possible future wars in Asia and the Pacific."

Social Movements and World Politics: Ukraine and Venezuela

Ukraine and Venezuela are the two latest countries where massive protests have erupted. CFR compiled some background articles to the Ukraine protests as did Josh Busby at the Duck. I'm also posting a couple CNN and NY Times.

RIA Novosti/Andrey Stenin)

articles on Venezuela from

I'm less interested in examining how or why protests erupted in these two places than in understanding what implications the dyamics of protest in Ukraine, Venezuela, and other countries have on world politics. Thinking back to a paper I wrote outlining different mechanisms in which social movements, the protests in the Ukraine do suggest some relationship between social movements and international relations with the Ukrainian state playing an intermediary role. In particular, Ukrainian protests have clearly signalled to the outside world strong dissatification with President Yanukovych's earlier decision to break-off a potential deal with the EU. How else might social movements relate to world politics in this case? Movements may...

1. Signal to outsiders the level of domestic support for either the EU or Russia
2. Reify lines between East and West as the EU and Russia propose diverging policy positions to address the Ukrainian crisis.
3. Potentially force the Yanokovych government to reverse course on international policy.
4. Draw in outside powers to respond and intervene in a domestic crisis.
5. Produce demonstration effects in other countries

The above arguments indicate a signalling and bargaining effect generated by social movements. Domestic regimes must bargain with opposition movements to meet specific political demands (i.e. government transition, new international deals etc...). Meanwhile, protest movements signal to outsiders the size, power, and degree of resolve the opposition has in challenging the regime. This may help determine to what extent outside actors (states, NGOs, IGOs etc...) might intervene on behalf of either the opposition or incumbent regime.