IPR Conference on Declining Trust in Social and Political Life

National Catholic Reporter finally came out with an article featuring a conference I organized on rebuilding (or really declining) trust. This was something I started two years ago as I felt like I was being bombarded by news stories screaming mistrust, declining trust etc...in our political system, among ethnic and racial minorities, between police and black youth, and in our institutions. To help me make sense of all this, I started a series of informal brownbag lunches which eventually led to the conference. To find out why trust is broken and how we get it back, watch our conference!

Worldviews, Beliefs, and Psychology

So apparently, neither Trump nor Clinton supporters will change their minds according to this study. More relevant to my research is the reasoning outlined below:

As much as we like to think that we use reason to evaluate evidence and come to conclusions, “It really goes back assward, a lot of times,” said Peter Ditto, a psychologist at University of California, Irvine. “People already have a firm opinion, and that shapes the way they process information.” We hold beliefs about how the world works and tend to force new information to fit within these pre-existing narratives. Psychologists call this motivated reasoning, and it means that once people have thrown their support behind Trump or Clinton, they will tend to downplay or ignore things that paint their candidate in a bad light.

In a similar vein, once activists (i.e. anti-war groups) adopt a particular position about nukes, drones, bases etc....they rarely change minds and adopt the alternative view often represented by government officials.

Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Views

I almost never sign on-line petitions, but recently put my name on an open letter penned by Ali Wyn. I rest my case with this recent interview between Donald Trump and the New York Times.

I've pasted part of the transcript below, and two things strike me which are worth bringing up the next time I teach Intro to Int'l Relations, and also for research on the politics of peace. First, Trump fails to realize that maintaining alliances and troops abroad are in our own interest, not just that of allies. Even if allies aren't paying their full share in dollar terms, by hosting U.S. troops, they are contributing to the liberal international order advanced by all previous U.S. administrations since WWII. It's the free-rider problem that Trump is concerned with, but even then, we permit a degree of free-riding b/c to not supply military power in certain parts of the world would in the long-run hurt our interests.

Second, his comments on Korea evokes arguments raised by the political left: reunification may have happened without U.S. presence. He also questions notions of peace. For instance, we claim that U.S. presence brought about peace, yet we see a hostile, nuclear North. Maybe Trump is right. But this is all counterfactual thinking, and we could equally plausibly argue that the absence of U.S. forces may have resulted in a second Korean War (started by either the North or South), or have led to greater provocations from North Korea.

Here's a portion of the transcript with relevant parts highlights.

SANGER: So what we want to do is pick up where we left off in March

. We were listening to Speaker Ryan last night, and he presented a much more traditional Republican, engaged internationalist view of the world. One in which he said that the United States would never lead from behind. In our conversation a few months ago, you were discussing pulling back from commitments we can no longer afford unless others pay for them. You were discussing a set of alliances that you were happy to participate in.

TRUMP:

And I think, by the way, David, I think they will be able to afford them.

SANGER:

They may be.

TRUMP:

We can't.

SANGER: But I guess the question is, If we can't, do you think that your presidency, let's assume for a moment that they contribute what they are contributing today, or what they have contributed historically, your presidency would be one of pulling back and saying, "You know, we're not going to invest in these alliances with NATO

, we are not going to invest as much as we have in Asia since the end of the Korean War because we can't afford it and it's really not in our interest to do so."

TRUMP:

If we cannot be properly reimbursed for the tremendous cost of our military protecting other countries, and in many cases the countries I'm talking about are extremely rich. Then if we cannot make a deal, which I believe we will be able to, and which I would prefer being able to, but if we cannot make a deal, I would like you to say, I would prefer being able to, some people, the one thing they took out of your last story, you know, some people, the fools and the haters, they said, "Oh, Trump doesn't want to protect you." I would prefer that we be able to continue, but if we are not going to be reasonably reimbursed for the tremendous cost of protecting these massive nations with tremendous wealth - you have the tape going on?

SANGER:

We do.

HABERMAN:

We both do.

TRUMP:

With massive wealth. Massive wealth. We're talking about countries that are doing very well. Then yes, I would be absolutely prepared to tell those countries, "Congratulations, you will be defending yourself."

SANGER:

That suggests that our forward deployments around the world are based on their interests - they're not really based on our interests. And yet I think many in your party would say that the reason that we have troops in Europe, the reason that we keep 60,000 troops in Asia, is that it's in our interest to keep open trading lines, it's in our interest to keep the North Koreans in check, you do that much better out away from the United States.

TRUMP:

I think it's a mutual interest, but we're being reimbursed like it's only in our interest. I think it's a mutual interest. ...

SANGER:

We were talking about alliances, and the fundamental problem that you hear many Republicans, traditional Republicans, have with the statement that you've made is that it would seem to them that you would believe that the interests of the United States being out with both our troops and our diplomacy abroad is less than our economic interests in having somebody else support that. In other words, even if they didn't pay a cent toward it, many have believed that the way we've kept our postwar leadership since World War II has been our ability to project power around the world. That's why we got this many diplomats --

TRUMP:

How is it helping us? How has it helped us? We have massive trade deficits. I could see that, if instead of having a trade deficit worldwide of $800 billion, we had a trade positive of $100 billion, $200 billion, $800 billion. So how has it helped us?

SANGER:

Well, keeping the peace. We didn't have a presence in places like Korea in 1950, or not as great a presence, and you saw what happened.

TRUMP:

There's no guarantee that we'll have peace in Korea.

SANGER:

Even with our troops, no, there's no guarantee.

TRUMP:

No, there's no guarantee. We have 28,000 soldiers on the line.

SANGER:

But we've had them there since 1953 and --

TRUMP:

Sure, but that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be something going on right now. Maybe you would have had a unified Korea. Who knows what would have happened? In the meantime, what have we done? So we've kept peace, but in the meantime we've let North Korea get stronger and stronger and more nuclear and more nuclear, and you are really saying, "Well, how is that a good thing?" You understand? North Korea now is almost like a boiler. You say we've had peace, but that part of Korea, North Korea, is getting more and more crazy. And more and more nuclear. And they are testing missiles all the time.

SANGER:

They are.

TRUMP:

And we've got our soldiers sitting there watching missiles go up. And you say to yourself, "Oh, that's interesting." Now we're protecting Japan because Japan is a natural location for North Korea. So we are protecting them, and you say to yourself, "Well, what are we getting out of this?"

SANGER:

Well, we keep our missile defenses out there. And those missile defenses help prevent the day when North Korea can reach the United States with one of its missiles. It's a lot easier to shoot down from there --

TRUMP:

We've had them there for a long time, and now they're practically obsolete, in all fairness.

SANGER:

Relatively new missile defenses would allow us --

Politics of Peace and Nuclear Weapons

As a reminder for what to read for research on the politics of peace and nuclear weapons, I've added a a couple books to my reading list. The first is Dan Zak's Almighty: Courage, Resistance, and Existential Peril in the Nuclear Age. The book opens with the story of three activists - a nun, Vietnam vet, and housepainter - breaking  into a nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge, TN as a launching point for investigating America's history, horror, and fascination with nuclear weapons. Richard Rhodes who penned a four volume set on nuclear history, including The Making of the Atomic Bomb provided a good review in the WaPo.  Rhodes highlights an important passage from the book detailing the hypocrisy of non-proliferation from the nuclear five. Excerpted from the review:

 The most important single idea in “Almighty” emerges in the assertion of an exasperated South African ambassador to the United Nations, Abdul Samad Minty: “If for security reasons the [five original nuclear powers] feel that they must be armed with nuclear weapons, what about other countries in similar situations? Do we think that the global situation is such that no other country would ever aspire to nuclear weapons . . . when the five tell us that it is absolutely correct to possess nuclear weapons for their security?”

The second book I learned about at a book launch event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for Brad Roberts's  The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. As the title suggests, Roberts cautions against our haste in promulgating (unilateral) nuclear disarmament. Existing international realities (particularly in relation to China and Russia) make it very difficult for the U.S. to give up its nuclear weapons. Roberts told me after the event that there's a fairly wide consensus among U.S. policymakers on nuclear policy - which I assume to believe that maintaining a limited supply of nukes is still in our national interest. How do policymakers and the activists highlighted by Zak come to different logical conclusions about nuclear policy and the utility of nuclear weapons.

An Early Indication of China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The AIIB, China's new multilateral development bank, held its first annual meeting over the weekend. As is well known, last spring, the Obama Administration received flak for opting out of the AIIB and pressuring its allies also not to join. As explained in the Diplomat, two concerns prompted the U.S. to remain leery of the AIIB:

 "1) Its voting structure gives China a disproportionate voting share, which means it can effectively manipulate the bank to further its own economic and strategic goals in the region; 2) The AIIB will not follow the same high standards as existing financial institutions when deciding which projects to fund, forgoing important criteria like environmental protection, human rights, and anti-corruption."

Source: Xinhua/Li Xin

Moreover, there were concerns that the AIIB would become yet another regional institution (along with the One Belt One Road and the Maritime Silk Road initiatives) used to strengthen China's influence in Asia, undermining the work of existing multilateral banks, if not the broader liberal international order. Such concerns continue to linger as the AIIB sets its sights on bringing in new members and financing projects outside of Asia (i.e. Latin America and Africa).

An early look at the AIIB following its first annual meeting suggests that some of the concerns, at least regarding the AIIB's institutional design, may be unfounded. An article published last weekend in the Washington Post headlined, "Asia’s new infrastructure bank is out to prove it’s not China’s pawn." reports that the AIIB is actually co-financing 3 of its 4 initial projects with other multilateral banks, including the World Bank. According to a British VP at the AIIB, this collaboration is only possible if the AIIB meets standards adopted by other multilateral banks. In terms of voting power, China is the largest shareholder at 26%, but it does not give China an outright majority to impose its preferences.

What does this mean for Asia' growing institutional architecture? Contrary to notions of "rival regionalism" or "institutional balancing," institutional overlap may actually foster positive global goods for the region. Despite the potential redundancies of overlapping institutions, they can facilitate greater interaction among states and help fill in governance gaps. Perhaps the AIIB can complement existing institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank. I wouldn't be surprised to see if the U.S. comes around to the AIIB in the near future if it can find some face saving way to do it.

Revisiting the Rebalance to Asia

Joshua Kurlantzick of CFR posted an interesting graphic of US security assistance to Southeast Asia, indicating a net decrease in resources to Southeast Asia between 2010 and 2015 by $34.5 million. Meanwhile assistance to the Middle East and North Africa rose by about $1.3 billion during the same period. The statistics imply that the rebalance to Asia is more rhetoric than actual policy.

However, security assistance and military aid is only one aspect of the rebalance. And it certainly does not factor economic (i.e. TPP) and diplomatic initiatives in the region promoted by the U.S. Aside from security assistance, the rebalance also calls for strengthening bilateral partnerships, both old and new; encouraging the growth of intra-network alliances, and actively participating in multilateral regional forums and dialouges.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter gave his own remarks at CFR on the rebalance. Three things stood out about his remarks. First, India, often seen on the periphery of U.S. Asia policy, is factored more significantly in Washington's conception of Asia's regional architecture. Second, Asia is fine, and perhaps better off, without a formal alliance structure like NATO. Third, the U.S. envisions the regional architecture less as a formal structure, and more as a network.

On this last point, Carter made the following remarks:

America’s bilateral relationships remain the bedrock of our presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific. But in a large and interconnected region, especially one with so many strong, capable, and dedicated players, it makes sense to network and link relationships and produce gains for all....  

Regional security, stability, and prosperity have required nations working together less formally. And the United States has been an important builder, cement, and participant in this arrangement. Today, as the region changes, the United States is augmenting our bilateral relationships and alliance with trilateral and multilateral arrangements. We’re weaving these partnerships together to more effectively bolster American and regional security. This network, with its shared values, habits of cooperation, and compatible and complementary capabilities, will expand the reach of all, responsibly share the security burden, and help ensure peace and stability in the region for years to come. 

This burgeoning networks builds in three ways. First, the Department of Defense is strongly emphasizing trilateral mechanisms to bring together like-minded allies and partners to maximize individual contributions to regional peace and security, and link together nations that previously worked with us mostly separately. .. Second, to improve regional security, we’re encouraging our allies and partners to actively develop their own interconnected security relationships...Third, we’re helping create an interconnected regional architecture, from one end of the region to another, through engagement and activities in multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting ...It’s important to remember that our bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relationships, and the developing network they comprise, is not aimed at any particular country. Rather, it demonstrates that the region wants cooperation, not coercion; and a continuation, not an end, of decades of stability, peace, and progress. The network’s not closed. It excludes no one. We want cooperation and shared leadership so that other nations who want to contribute to regional stability and security, they can work with the other nations of the region to do so... By operationalizing the rebalance, by transforming old alliances and new partnerships, and by networking security, we can . . . promote and defend the principles that have allowed so many in the region to rise and prosper for so long.

Given constant crises unfolding in the Middle East and Europe, the rebalance to Asia may seem like an after thought to the White House. Of even if one accepts the rebalance at face value, the graphics above may suggest that the U.S. is conducting Asia policy on the cheap. That's a fair assessment in a period of tightened budgets. But that should not mean that the rebalance itself is not built on "smart power" principles in which military, economic, and diplomatic elements are channeled to address long term regional goals.

Japan-Korea Relations and Comfort Women

(Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images)

I have an unfinished blog post discussing Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder's recent book, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash. Unfortunately, I can't resurrect it at the moment because its on my old laptop.

Anyway, in light of last month's comfort women "resolution" I'm putting links to two good articles assessing where things stand at the moment. The first appears in CFR's Asia Unbound blog where Scott Snyder commends President Park and Prime Minister Abe's "act of political leadership and statesmanship" but then lays out challenges for both governments in maintaining forward momentum. The biggest and most immediate challenge related to satisfying the comfort women themselves, who were shut-out of the process (for not entirely bad reasons contrary to what activists might claim) and the removal of the comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The second is from Celeste Arrington who highlights the perspective of the comfort women and their advocacy movement since the 1990s, shedding additional insight on the challenge in satisfying victims' grievances.