North Korea and Israel

Dan Drezner's blog got a lot of comments about his comparison of N.Korea and Israel. I don't know why everyone got so worked up...it didn't seem like Drezner was implying that Israel's regime is like N.Korea. Drezner writes

The Obama administration has reacted to this incident in remarkably similar ways to China's reaction to the Cheonan incident -- with a call for more information.

I thought the focus was more on the response at the UN Security Council. For N.Korea, China is witholding judgment until more information is available. Ditto for the US on Israel, even as much of the rest of the world condemns Israel's actions.

By the way, here's a good overview by Nicole Finnemann of KEI of different countries' reactions to the Cheonan sinking.

Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt

Just read Michael Barnett's article "Evolution without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt." Here are few reactions, and some insights for my own research.

Barnett’s theoretical claim is the adaptation of evolutionary theory to social science (in this case the evolution of ethics and humanitarian organizations). Institutions and humanitarian groups have evolved over time – taking on larger roles and responsibilities, becoming more relevant in IR. Evolution, however, may not have actually led to progress. The political environment forced agencies to adapt. “The combination of environmental mechanisms and organizational culture led many humanitarian agencies to adapt to their environment in ways that incorporated politics…Actors respond to a world of change…there are strong pressures to conform to their environment” (624). Barnett goes on to conclude “There are many examples of the possibility of the practical ethics of aid agencies becoming politicized, mainstreamed, and tamed as a consequence of external pressures” (656). However, there is the fear that these NGOs may actually be reproducing and expanding the very world order (one dominated by politics, directed by powerful states) that they claim to resist. The environment “can have a pronounced impact on the principles of principled actors and enmesh them into the very world orders that they want to resist and transform” (626).

What’s striking here is the overwhelming emphasis of structure in Barnett’s argument. Barnett admits that the environment does not determine everything, and that actors have choices. But the choices are bounded within the limitations of the environment. Should there be more room for agency. I found his overviews for CARE and World Vision more plausible than MSF and UNHCR (i'm still puzzled why he uses an IGO for the "accomodationist" category).

Barnett’s piece in IO has given me different ideas about my (failed) grant proposal on “The Politicization of North Korea.” Empirically, he raises many of the same issues and questions that I do regarding human rights and humanitarian aid agencies. How do altruistic groups become wrapped in politics? Barnett provides a theoretical hook grounded in evolutionary theory to answer this question. Due to the nature of the grant proposal, I wrote a very policy-specific to North Korea. To turn it into a working paper, I could, however, follow Barnett’s example and formulate a general theory explaining/describing how human rights rights and humanitarian aid organizations operate within a given political environment, using North Korea as one case (Burma, Congo, Iran are other possible examples).

Regime Change as a Non-Proliferation Strategy

Robert Kagan argues, "Regime change in Tehran is the best nonproliferation policy." Supporting an opposition more open to the West, and seeking to reintegrate into the global economy and internatonial order (a big assumption here) could help reverse, or at least slow Iran's march down the nuclear path. Is regime change the safer than the status quo (doing nothing). Kagan believes regime change is safer than waiting for Iran to build the bomb, or having Israel pre-empt Iranian nuclear facilities which could escalate to a regional conflict. But the "do-nothing" option would in my mind be the more conservative/safer strategy. I should qualify that "do-nothing" also includes passing UN sanctions/resolutions and providing public moral support with more quiet political/economic aid. "Do-nothing" is acutally a safe form of attacking the regime's moral legitimacy. This strategy is the better (or at least more legitimate) strategy in ensuring a safer world than regime change IF Iranians can vote out of power (or topple over) the current government before the regime acquires nuclear weapons.

New Research

After rejections from fellowships this year, I'm back to the drawing board regarding research topics. Hopefully I can turn the "Politicization of North Korea" topic into at least a paper.

Peter Katzenstein's address at the Rising Powers Initiative project launch was the first time in a while I felt my intellectual brain ticking. Anyway, here are 2 possible topics I might explore:

1) Social Movements in International Relations: this would extend out of my first book project on anti-base movements. Lately, we've seen protests/riots/social mvts around: Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, Iran just to name a few. Do these movements have any implications for international relations? If so, it's not apparent. I'd like to come up with a theory which helps us evaluate the impact of social movements in IR. A domestic-int'l linkage type argument if you well. One think PK argued was that revolutions don't come from below, but are top-down. The storming of the Bastille and people power come to mind when we hear revolution. But by then, it's too late.

2) Let's Talk (International conferences and forums). We've seen a proliferation of global summits (the nuclear summit, Copenhagen, etc...). Are they effective, or a waste of time? Have western diplomats adopted eastern practices of talking about talks. Has process become valued as much as outcomes for Western diplomats - an adoption of the ASEAN way?

The State and Global Governance

I assigned 3 articles related to global governance. Two are related to the nuclear security, and one on Europe’s loan package to Greece. Hopefully, students are beginning to pick up on some of the key questions of our times in international relations: cooperation under anarchy (to steal from Kenneth Oye's title). States remain the central actors in international politics. However, world leaders continue to increasingly rely on international institutions, supranational organizations, or world forums and conferences to tackle global issues. Does this suggest a) the decline of states in international politics b) a revamping of state power filtered through international institutions c) or a new form of global politics defined by international institutions and forums? I like answer “b” – but I won’t elaborate here.

On the point about forums, is it just me, or do we see more and more of these loose international forums on the rise. Recently, we have forums on climate change, financial regulation, and nuclear proliferation. Is this a sign that process is just as important as outcomes when devising solutions to world problems?

Civil Society in Iran and Eastern Europe - A Good Analogy for U.S. Foreign Policy?

Apparently Charles Krauthammer assesses Obama's Iranian foreign policy as an abject failure - or perhaps more accurately a missed opportunity - from both a strategic and moral perspective by not supporting Iran's opposition. Krauthammer goes one step further, evoking eveb regime change

"What should we do? Pressure from without -- cutting off gasoline supplies, for example -- to complement and reinforce pressure from within. The pressure should be aimed not at changing the current regime's nuclear policy -- that will never happen -- but at helping change the regime itself"

The analogy here is Reagan's public and covert support to opposition movements in Eastern Europe (i.e Solidarity in Poland), which provided hope to dissidents and helped sustain momentum for regime change and democratization with civil society playing a major role. I'm not sure if this is really analogus to Iran, however. It was more likely Gorbachev's reforms, and the signal (or lack of credibility) that he would use military force to keep communist parties in power, which provided civil society in E. Europe much of their momentum. This is the argument I made in the following article (see abstract). Of course, if we push the causal chain further back, we could attribute Gorby's reforms to Reagan's tough stand against the Soviets, kicked off with the "evil empire" speech.

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Under Obama

A couple articles in the post related to a possible shift in the Administrationa's position on human rights. The first article by Joshua Kurlantzick of CFR is somewhat critical, arguing that in his desire to distance himself from the Bush Administration, Obama has downgraded the role of democracy and human rights.

The second is a speech by Hillary Clinton at Georgetown, which seems to suggest the Administration's giving democracy and human rights more attention.

Perhaps Obama feels he's created enough distance and legitimacy to now comfortably address the topic of human rights and democracy.