Yes, I'll eventually get to writing about all the protests in the Middle East but I wanted to write a post on this piece from Foreign Affairs on the political power of social media.
As Clay Shirky notes, much hype has been made about the potential power of twitter, facebook, and other social media outlets to topple regimes. Shirky believes the U.S. government's support of internet freedom is misguided. Currently, the U.S. takes an "instrumental approach" to internet freedom: preventing states from blocking access to sites like google or twitter or promoting internet freedom in support of immediate causes.
Rather than looking at social media from a myopic, short-term, country specific point of view, we need to understand that the "potential of social media lies mainly in their support of civil society and the public sphere." At this point, I was pleasantly surprised to find a reference to Jurgen Habermas on the pages of what is otherwise known as a policy-wonkish journal. Clearly, Shirky believes any positive change (read democratization) must follow the development of a strong public sphere. This is where social media's promise lies: in its ability to shape and strengthen the public sphere and civil society. Social media provides new outlets for citizens to air new ideas, discourse, and public debate.
So here's the punch line from Shirky, "The environmental view (as opposed to the instrumental view) assumes that little political change happens without the dissemination and adoption of ideas and opinions in the public sphere. Access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation...Social media increases shared awareness (the ability of each member of a group to not only understand the situation at hand but also understand that everyone else does, too) by propagating messages through social networks."
I agree that the effects of social media are more significant in the long-term. But just like the printing press, newspaper, telephone, and radio, activists have seized on new technology to expand mobilization resources and develop new repetoires of contention. And perhaps most importantly, social media faciliates in real-time the transnational diffusion of protests. Twitter and cell phones will never bring down a regime. But it can certainly facilitate the coordination of activists during mobilization and help rally international support.
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Revolution, Revolts, and US Foreign Policy
Do protests send signals to Washington policymakers, shaping US foreign policy. What are the int'l effects of protests? A theme which I'll certainly revisit since I'm teaching a course on this topic now.
A Tea Party Activist and Cycles of Protest
This was the first article I read this year from the Lorian Hotel & Spa in Alexandria. It's a good example of a social movement at a crossroads between informal (i.e. popular) and institutional politics. Or in Tilly's vocabulary, the line between transgressive and contained politics. Here we see the evolution of the tea party movement: informal discussions at the gym to nascent organization to national movement. But how will the movement evolve as power holders (i.e. the state) respond and tea party activists acheive their own goals. What effect did the 2011 midterm elections have on the future direction of the Tea Party?
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
Debate on Aid to DPRK
38 North, a relatively new website related to North Korea sponsored by the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (Johns Hopkins), posted a debate on human rights in North Korea between John Feffer and Roberta Cohen.
Feffer argues for a human security approach to North Korea. While the "name and shame" approach has helped identify HR problems in DPRK, name-and-shame has not changed regime behavior. Feffer states, "The name-and-shame approach starts not where North Korea is but where it should be. Since North Korea doesn’t share the same perspective about where it should be in the future, little has been accomplished in terms of productive discussion or movement forward." In contrast, a human security approach begins where North Korea is. "In order to work inside North Korea, an organization must start where the government is" by supplying:
1) What the government wants at some level.
2) Meeting the survival needs (food, shelter, medical care) of "the greatest number of people who lie between the elite (who don’t need help) and the inmates of the labor camps (to whom we have no access)," with the hope of creating greater "voice" among these North Koreans.
Two practical areas to implement the human securtiy approach are 1) economic development and 2) educational exchanges. The principle behind this approach is to focus on "strengthening economic and social rights rather than political and civil rights".
Cohen's summary of Feffer is below
Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Feffer's position is based on the assumption "that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal." Unfortunately, North Korea’s "rigid political and ideological controls (which regularly get in the way of economic reform" suggest the contrary.
Moreover, Cohen counters Feffers arguing "that North Korea is entirely impervious to international human rights norms and structures is another mistaken assumption." The naming-shaming strategy has produced some limited results with the DPRK signing on to UN conventions, which have also increased some North Korea people's awareness of how far the regime has fallen short of universal commitments.
Finally, exceptions should not be made for North Korea. "Making North Korea into a human rights exception will create the patronizing relationship that Feffer, with his social work sensitivities, so deplores, and undermine the goals of the international human rights system."
Feffer tries to bridge the divide in a final response.
Feffer argues for a human security approach to North Korea. While the "name and shame" approach has helped identify HR problems in DPRK, name-and-shame has not changed regime behavior. Feffer states, "The name-and-shame approach starts not where North Korea is but where it should be. Since North Korea doesn’t share the same perspective about where it should be in the future, little has been accomplished in terms of productive discussion or movement forward." In contrast, a human security approach begins where North Korea is. "In order to work inside North Korea, an organization must start where the government is" by supplying:
1) What the government wants at some level.
2) Meeting the survival needs (food, shelter, medical care) of "the greatest number of people who lie between the elite (who don’t need help) and the inmates of the labor camps (to whom we have no access)," with the hope of creating greater "voice" among these North Koreans.
Two practical areas to implement the human securtiy approach are 1) economic development and 2) educational exchanges. The principle behind this approach is to focus on "strengthening economic and social rights rather than political and civil rights".
Cohen's summary of Feffer is below
He proposes instead a “human security” approach built on an “empathetic” relationship with North Korea that focuses on the “economic betterment” of its people through “development assistance,” “educational exchanges” and joint economic projects. Such an approach will further economic and social rights without being weighed down by concerns about “the inmates of the labor camps” (to whom there is “no access”) or wishful thinking about the desire of civil society for political freedoms. It will help North Korea evolve into a country that can meet the needs of its citizens and eventually lead to civil and political freedoms.
Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Feffer's position is based on the assumption "that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal." Unfortunately, North Korea’s "rigid political and ideological controls (which regularly get in the way of economic reform" suggest the contrary.
Moreover, Cohen counters Feffers arguing "that North Korea is entirely impervious to international human rights norms and structures is another mistaken assumption." The naming-shaming strategy has produced some limited results with the DPRK signing on to UN conventions, which have also increased some North Korea people's awareness of how far the regime has fallen short of universal commitments.
Finally, exceptions should not be made for North Korea. "Making North Korea into a human rights exception will create the patronizing relationship that Feffer, with his social work sensitivities, so deplores, and undermine the goals of the international human rights system."
Feffer tries to bridge the divide in a final response.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
North Korea and Israel
Dan Drezner's blog got a lot of comments about his comparison of N.Korea and Israel. I don't know why everyone got so worked up...it didn't seem like Drezner was implying that Israel's regime is like N.Korea. Drezner writes
I thought the focus was more on the response at the UN Security Council. For N.Korea, China is witholding judgment until more information is available. Ditto for the US on Israel, even as much of the rest of the world condemns Israel's actions.
By the way, here's a good overview by Nicole Finnemann of KEI of different countries' reactions to the Cheonan sinking.
The Obama administration has reacted to this incident in remarkably similar ways to China's reaction to the Cheonan incident -- with a call for more information.
I thought the focus was more on the response at the UN Security Council. For N.Korea, China is witholding judgment until more information is available. Ditto for the US on Israel, even as much of the rest of the world condemns Israel's actions.
By the way, here's a good overview by Nicole Finnemann of KEI of different countries' reactions to the Cheonan sinking.
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt
Just read Michael Barnett's article "Evolution without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt." Here are few reactions, and some insights for my own research.
Barnett’s theoretical claim is the adaptation of evolutionary theory to social science (in this case the evolution of ethics and humanitarian organizations). Institutions and humanitarian groups have evolved over time – taking on larger roles and responsibilities, becoming more relevant in IR. Evolution, however, may not have actually led to progress. The political environment forced agencies to adapt. “The combination of environmental mechanisms and organizational culture led many humanitarian agencies to adapt to their environment in ways that incorporated politics…Actors respond to a world of change…there are strong pressures to conform to their environment” (624). Barnett goes on to conclude “There are many examples of the possibility of the practical ethics of aid agencies becoming politicized, mainstreamed, and tamed as a consequence of external pressures” (656). However, there is the fear that these NGOs may actually be reproducing and expanding the very world order (one dominated by politics, directed by powerful states) that they claim to resist. The environment “can have a pronounced impact on the principles of principled actors and enmesh them into the very world orders that they want to resist and transform” (626).
What’s striking here is the overwhelming emphasis of structure in Barnett’s argument. Barnett admits that the environment does not determine everything, and that actors have choices. But the choices are bounded within the limitations of the environment. Should there be more room for agency. I found his overviews for CARE and World Vision more plausible than MSF and UNHCR (i'm still puzzled why he uses an IGO for the "accomodationist" category).
Barnett’s piece in IO has given me different ideas about my (failed) grant proposal on “The Politicization of North Korea.” Empirically, he raises many of the same issues and questions that I do regarding human rights and humanitarian aid agencies. How do altruistic groups become wrapped in politics? Barnett provides a theoretical hook grounded in evolutionary theory to answer this question. Due to the nature of the grant proposal, I wrote a very policy-specific to North Korea. To turn it into a working paper, I could, however, follow Barnett’s example and formulate a general theory explaining/describing how human rights rights and humanitarian aid organizations operate within a given political environment, using North Korea as one case (Burma, Congo, Iran are other possible examples).
Barnett’s theoretical claim is the adaptation of evolutionary theory to social science (in this case the evolution of ethics and humanitarian organizations). Institutions and humanitarian groups have evolved over time – taking on larger roles and responsibilities, becoming more relevant in IR. Evolution, however, may not have actually led to progress. The political environment forced agencies to adapt. “The combination of environmental mechanisms and organizational culture led many humanitarian agencies to adapt to their environment in ways that incorporated politics…Actors respond to a world of change…there are strong pressures to conform to their environment” (624). Barnett goes on to conclude “There are many examples of the possibility of the practical ethics of aid agencies becoming politicized, mainstreamed, and tamed as a consequence of external pressures” (656). However, there is the fear that these NGOs may actually be reproducing and expanding the very world order (one dominated by politics, directed by powerful states) that they claim to resist. The environment “can have a pronounced impact on the principles of principled actors and enmesh them into the very world orders that they want to resist and transform” (626).
What’s striking here is the overwhelming emphasis of structure in Barnett’s argument. Barnett admits that the environment does not determine everything, and that actors have choices. But the choices are bounded within the limitations of the environment. Should there be more room for agency. I found his overviews for CARE and World Vision more plausible than MSF and UNHCR (i'm still puzzled why he uses an IGO for the "accomodationist" category).
Barnett’s piece in IO has given me different ideas about my (failed) grant proposal on “The Politicization of North Korea.” Empirically, he raises many of the same issues and questions that I do regarding human rights and humanitarian aid agencies. How do altruistic groups become wrapped in politics? Barnett provides a theoretical hook grounded in evolutionary theory to answer this question. Due to the nature of the grant proposal, I wrote a very policy-specific to North Korea. To turn it into a working paper, I could, however, follow Barnett’s example and formulate a general theory explaining/describing how human rights rights and humanitarian aid organizations operate within a given political environment, using North Korea as one case (Burma, Congo, Iran are other possible examples).
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Regime Change as a Non-Proliferation Strategy
Robert Kagan argues, "Regime change in Tehran is the best nonproliferation policy." Supporting an opposition more open to the West, and seeking to reintegrate into the global economy and internatonial order (a big assumption here) could help reverse, or at least slow Iran's march down the nuclear path. Is regime change the safer than the status quo (doing nothing). Kagan believes regime change is safer than waiting for Iran to build the bomb, or having Israel pre-empt Iranian nuclear facilities which could escalate to a regional conflict. But the "do-nothing" option would in my mind be the more conservative/safer strategy. I should qualify that "do-nothing" also includes passing UN sanctions/resolutions and providing public moral support with more quiet political/economic aid. "Do-nothing" is acutally a safe form of attacking the regime's moral legitimacy. This strategy is the better (or at least more legitimate) strategy in ensuring a safer world than regime change IF Iranians can vote out of power (or topple over) the current government before the regime acquires nuclear weapons.
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