What comes next for Egypt after Mubarak? Looks like even protest movements themselves are unclear. A new constitution and reforms are in the works, but there's a lot of uncertainty about which political forces will actually lead the new Egypt.
Several news sources are doing a terrific job chronicling the unrest in the region. It's like having your own RA!
New York Times: Arab World Uprisings
Washington Post: Middle East and North Africa in turmoil
BBC: Middle East protests: Country by country
Saturday, March 26, 2011
Monday, February 21, 2011
Chinese Global Order?
I gave a talk at a panel on U.S.-China relations organized by one of our graduate students. Hats off to our graduate students for putting together an informative panel with a delicious spread. Unfortunately, attendance was low and 75% of the food remained untouched. I restrained myself from hoarding (For full disclosure, I left with an extra sandwich and cookie).
Anyway, I offered three insights in my portion of the presentation:
1) A brief overview of U.S.-China relations and the shift in U.S. rhetoric towards China acting as a "responsible player" in 2005 to an "irresponsible competitor" in 2010.
2) Reasons to be skeptical about China replacing the U.S. as a regional or global leader anytime soon.
3) U.S.-China relations and North Korea.
I'll just mention a few things about point #2. Given China's enormous size and population, it's inevitable that China will surpass the U.S. in several categories we consider as part of a nation's power portfolio (i.e. size of economy). Does this mean that China will overtake the U.S.?
It depends on what we mean by overtake. Although China may rival the U.S. in terms of capabilities, it's far less clear if China will overtake the U.S. as a global or even regional leader. The real question we should be asking ourselves is whether China has what it takes to be a global leader. Here are four questions worth raising:
Anyway, I offered three insights in my portion of the presentation:
1) A brief overview of U.S.-China relations and the shift in U.S. rhetoric towards China acting as a "responsible player" in 2005 to an "irresponsible competitor" in 2010.
2) Reasons to be skeptical about China replacing the U.S. as a regional or global leader anytime soon.
3) U.S.-China relations and North Korea.
I'll just mention a few things about point #2. Given China's enormous size and population, it's inevitable that China will surpass the U.S. in several categories we consider as part of a nation's power portfolio (i.e. size of economy). Does this mean that China will overtake the U.S.?
It depends on what we mean by overtake. Although China may rival the U.S. in terms of capabilities, it's far less clear if China will overtake the U.S. as a global or even regional leader. The real question we should be asking ourselves is whether China has what it takes to be a global leader. Here are four questions worth raising:
1. Do other nations trust China (or at least trust China more than the US)?A key issue is determining how China's rising capabilites are linked to non-material factors like status, trust, and legitimacy which say more about global leadership than a countries rising capabilities.
2. Is China willing to provide both public and private goods?
3. Do other states perceive China as a legitimate global leader?
4. Do other states aspire to follow the ideals, values, and political ideology of China?
Friday, February 11, 2011
Mubarak Steps Down
I never did post a blog about the wave of demonstrations in the Middle East as I promised. Probably for the better since I saved myself embarrassment from making wrong predictions! Last week I predicted (to myself) that the government would make several concessions to protesters. This would result in the co-optation of some elites (yes), a split between opposition radical and moderates (sort of) with a call for some gradual transition to power in preparation for the Sept. elections (yes). But I also predicted that the movement would lose steam following co-optation of movement leaders. I certainly didn't expect Mubarak to step down, especially with the backing of the military. In short, the current cycle of protest would wane with movement fatigue and perhaps resume again in time for September elections - the next opportunity for political mobilization.
Of course, I was proven wrong. Mubarak stepped down earlier today. It's unclear what will come next or how the political void will be filled. I suppose there will be some transitional coalition with the military playing a key role in the transition (should the military choose to give up power).
It really has be an amazing 18 days and a true cause for celebration for Egyptians longing for greater freedoms. However, always the skeptic that I am, I am not sure whether Egyptians can finally claim they are on a path towards true democracy. Three reasons why I cast a (small) pall over an otherwise exuberant day for many (but certainly not all) Egyptians.
Of course, I was proven wrong. Mubarak stepped down earlier today. It's unclear what will come next or how the political void will be filled. I suppose there will be some transitional coalition with the military playing a key role in the transition (should the military choose to give up power).
It really has be an amazing 18 days and a true cause for celebration for Egyptians longing for greater freedoms. However, always the skeptic that I am, I am not sure whether Egyptians can finally claim they are on a path towards true democracy. Three reasons why I cast a (small) pall over an otherwise exuberant day for many (but certainly not all) Egyptians.
1. The military could reestablish authoritarian rule in the name of stability/security.Don't get me wrong. Egypt is moving in the right direction and the protests have opened the door for political change and greater freedom. But should the door be flung wide open?
2. Something worse than the Mubarak regime could also step into power. Think back to the Wiemar Republic and the rise of the Nazi Party, or the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So who might fill this void? I'm skeptical about the Muslim Brotherhood seizing power - and political participation of the Brotherhood is not the same as...say the Taliban. But what about a group of corrupt oligarchs, or inefficient rulers taking hold of power?
Update: A department staff member with family in Egypt states the Muslim Brotherhood commands more support than officially acnknowledged. So perhaps there has been more "quiet support" for the Brotherhood all these years. Will this support now rise to the surface?
3. Who are the people occupying Tahrir Square? Media reports indicate a lot of youths, strong middle class representation, and ordinary Egyptians. But I also remember reading about Mubarak having a lot of support from the poor. And outside of Cairo, how many people support the immediate removal of Mubarak?
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Social Media
Yes, I'll eventually get to writing about all the protests in the Middle East but I wanted to write a post on this piece from Foreign Affairs on the political power of social media.
As Clay Shirky notes, much hype has been made about the potential power of twitter, facebook, and other social media outlets to topple regimes. Shirky believes the U.S. government's support of internet freedom is misguided. Currently, the U.S. takes an "instrumental approach" to internet freedom: preventing states from blocking access to sites like google or twitter or promoting internet freedom in support of immediate causes.
Rather than looking at social media from a myopic, short-term, country specific point of view, we need to understand that the "potential of social media lies mainly in their support of civil society and the public sphere." At this point, I was pleasantly surprised to find a reference to Jurgen Habermas on the pages of what is otherwise known as a policy-wonkish journal. Clearly, Shirky believes any positive change (read democratization) must follow the development of a strong public sphere. This is where social media's promise lies: in its ability to shape and strengthen the public sphere and civil society. Social media provides new outlets for citizens to air new ideas, discourse, and public debate.
So here's the punch line from Shirky, "The environmental view (as opposed to the instrumental view) assumes that little political change happens without the dissemination and adoption of ideas and opinions in the public sphere. Access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation...Social media increases shared awareness (the ability of each member of a group to not only understand the situation at hand but also understand that everyone else does, too) by propagating messages through social networks."
I agree that the effects of social media are more significant in the long-term. But just like the printing press, newspaper, telephone, and radio, activists have seized on new technology to expand mobilization resources and develop new repetoires of contention. And perhaps most importantly, social media faciliates in real-time the transnational diffusion of protests. Twitter and cell phones will never bring down a regime. But it can certainly facilitate the coordination of activists during mobilization and help rally international support.
As Clay Shirky notes, much hype has been made about the potential power of twitter, facebook, and other social media outlets to topple regimes. Shirky believes the U.S. government's support of internet freedom is misguided. Currently, the U.S. takes an "instrumental approach" to internet freedom: preventing states from blocking access to sites like google or twitter or promoting internet freedom in support of immediate causes.
Rather than looking at social media from a myopic, short-term, country specific point of view, we need to understand that the "potential of social media lies mainly in their support of civil society and the public sphere." At this point, I was pleasantly surprised to find a reference to Jurgen Habermas on the pages of what is otherwise known as a policy-wonkish journal. Clearly, Shirky believes any positive change (read democratization) must follow the development of a strong public sphere. This is where social media's promise lies: in its ability to shape and strengthen the public sphere and civil society. Social media provides new outlets for citizens to air new ideas, discourse, and public debate.
So here's the punch line from Shirky, "The environmental view (as opposed to the instrumental view) assumes that little political change happens without the dissemination and adoption of ideas and opinions in the public sphere. Access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation...Social media increases shared awareness (the ability of each member of a group to not only understand the situation at hand but also understand that everyone else does, too) by propagating messages through social networks."
I agree that the effects of social media are more significant in the long-term. But just like the printing press, newspaper, telephone, and radio, activists have seized on new technology to expand mobilization resources and develop new repetoires of contention. And perhaps most importantly, social media faciliates in real-time the transnational diffusion of protests. Twitter and cell phones will never bring down a regime. But it can certainly facilitate the coordination of activists during mobilization and help rally international support.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Revolution, Revolts, and US Foreign Policy
Do protests send signals to Washington policymakers, shaping US foreign policy. What are the int'l effects of protests? A theme which I'll certainly revisit since I'm teaching a course on this topic now.
A Tea Party Activist and Cycles of Protest
This was the first article I read this year from the Lorian Hotel & Spa in Alexandria. It's a good example of a social movement at a crossroads between informal (i.e. popular) and institutional politics. Or in Tilly's vocabulary, the line between transgressive and contained politics. Here we see the evolution of the tea party movement: informal discussions at the gym to nascent organization to national movement. But how will the movement evolve as power holders (i.e. the state) respond and tea party activists acheive their own goals. What effect did the 2011 midterm elections have on the future direction of the Tea Party?
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
Debate on Aid to DPRK
38 North, a relatively new website related to North Korea sponsored by the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (Johns Hopkins), posted a debate on human rights in North Korea between John Feffer and Roberta Cohen.
Feffer argues for a human security approach to North Korea. While the "name and shame" approach has helped identify HR problems in DPRK, name-and-shame has not changed regime behavior. Feffer states, "The name-and-shame approach starts not where North Korea is but where it should be. Since North Korea doesn’t share the same perspective about where it should be in the future, little has been accomplished in terms of productive discussion or movement forward." In contrast, a human security approach begins where North Korea is. "In order to work inside North Korea, an organization must start where the government is" by supplying:
1) What the government wants at some level.
2) Meeting the survival needs (food, shelter, medical care) of "the greatest number of people who lie between the elite (who don’t need help) and the inmates of the labor camps (to whom we have no access)," with the hope of creating greater "voice" among these North Koreans.
Two practical areas to implement the human securtiy approach are 1) economic development and 2) educational exchanges. The principle behind this approach is to focus on "strengthening economic and social rights rather than political and civil rights".
Cohen's summary of Feffer is below
Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Feffer's position is based on the assumption "that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal." Unfortunately, North Korea’s "rigid political and ideological controls (which regularly get in the way of economic reform" suggest the contrary.
Moreover, Cohen counters Feffers arguing "that North Korea is entirely impervious to international human rights norms and structures is another mistaken assumption." The naming-shaming strategy has produced some limited results with the DPRK signing on to UN conventions, which have also increased some North Korea people's awareness of how far the regime has fallen short of universal commitments.
Finally, exceptions should not be made for North Korea. "Making North Korea into a human rights exception will create the patronizing relationship that Feffer, with his social work sensitivities, so deplores, and undermine the goals of the international human rights system."
Feffer tries to bridge the divide in a final response.
Feffer argues for a human security approach to North Korea. While the "name and shame" approach has helped identify HR problems in DPRK, name-and-shame has not changed regime behavior. Feffer states, "The name-and-shame approach starts not where North Korea is but where it should be. Since North Korea doesn’t share the same perspective about where it should be in the future, little has been accomplished in terms of productive discussion or movement forward." In contrast, a human security approach begins where North Korea is. "In order to work inside North Korea, an organization must start where the government is" by supplying:
1) What the government wants at some level.
2) Meeting the survival needs (food, shelter, medical care) of "the greatest number of people who lie between the elite (who don’t need help) and the inmates of the labor camps (to whom we have no access)," with the hope of creating greater "voice" among these North Koreans.
Two practical areas to implement the human securtiy approach are 1) economic development and 2) educational exchanges. The principle behind this approach is to focus on "strengthening economic and social rights rather than political and civil rights".
Cohen's summary of Feffer is below
He proposes instead a “human security” approach built on an “empathetic” relationship with North Korea that focuses on the “economic betterment” of its people through “development assistance,” “educational exchanges” and joint economic projects. Such an approach will further economic and social rights without being weighed down by concerns about “the inmates of the labor camps” (to whom there is “no access”) or wishful thinking about the desire of civil society for political freedoms. It will help North Korea evolve into a country that can meet the needs of its citizens and eventually lead to civil and political freedoms.
Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Feffer's position is based on the assumption "that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal." Unfortunately, North Korea’s "rigid political and ideological controls (which regularly get in the way of economic reform" suggest the contrary.
Moreover, Cohen counters Feffers arguing "that North Korea is entirely impervious to international human rights norms and structures is another mistaken assumption." The naming-shaming strategy has produced some limited results with the DPRK signing on to UN conventions, which have also increased some North Korea people's awareness of how far the regime has fallen short of universal commitments.
Finally, exceptions should not be made for North Korea. "Making North Korea into a human rights exception will create the patronizing relationship that Feffer, with his social work sensitivities, so deplores, and undermine the goals of the international human rights system."
Feffer tries to bridge the divide in a final response.
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