ROK-Japan Relations: GSOMIA

Sorry, this won't be a post about social movements (but I'll put up a good post from the field next on protests, policing, and contentious performances).

A few weeks ago, the breakdown of the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) generated a political firestorm in Seoul. Coincidentally, I was in Seoul interviewing officials about China, Japan, Korea trilateral cooperation. I sheepishly admit that I was unaware about the diplomatic fallout until meeting a Chosun Ilbo journalist who kept mentioning “GSOMIA” (as I sat there nodding my head pretending that I knew what he was talking about).

Since I was in Seoul meeting Korean and Japanese diplomats I decided to find out more on this topic. I thought about posting my thoughts at the time since I had a little bit of inside information. The blog posting fell to the wayside, but I’ve been provoked to finally write in reaction to Jenny Lind’s article about GSOMIA in the Atlantic.

You can read about the GSOMIA fiasco here and here, but basically, the Japanese and South Korean government secretly negotiated an information and intelligence sharing agreement. GSOMIA was devised primarily as an intelligence sharing agreement on North Korea. But perhaps more significantly, it was meant to further strengthen ROK-Japan military ties (and by extension trilateral relations with the United States) which had already been moving forward through observations and joint training exercises the past year.

So why did GSOMIA cause such a domestic uproar in Korea? After all, as one Japanese diplomat mentioned to me, “It’s in South Korea’s own interest to have an agreement.” More broadly, why do two liberal democracies closely allied to the U.S., sharing common threats, and geographically proximate to one another fail to form an alliance? On GSOMIA specifically, several explanations are possible:

1.Domestic politics: The ROK government bungled the deal by making it secret and not revealing it to the public until days before the official signing, thus turning the issue into political fodder.

2.Historical animosity: Koreans remain sensitive about strengthening military ties with Japan given Japan’s unwillingness to own up to its past role during the colonial period.

3.China/Balance of Power: Paranoid about getting caught between great power rivalries, ROK does not want to provoke China, or at least give China the impression that U.S.-Japan-ROK relations are tightening at the expense of China.

Based on her own sources, Lind believes the answer boils down to #3. After reading her article, I was left wondering if we had met an entirely different set of ROK experts. In conversations with (mostly) people associated with the Foreign Ministry, and from mainstream Korean media reports, it sounded like #1 and #2 were the most likely candidates. My own personal view is that GSOMIA fell victim to domestic politics, which by default is linked to the history issue.

I think the China factor had some role to play here. But none of the people I talked to seemed to think the China card was a serious factor. There are other mechanisms that ROK uses to signal its willingness to cooperate with China even as it seeks to strengthen the US-Japan-ROK security ties. This includes the relatively new China-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation secretariat (TCS) which was proposed by the current ROK administration.

Although Lind states that ROK officials shied away from GSOMIA because many South Koreans fear that GSOMIA would be perceived as part of the U.S.-led security architecture positioned against China, I disagree that this was the major reason for the political fall-out at the eleventh hour. First, the fact that the ROK government was ready to sign GSOMIA until the uproar created initially by the opposition party, and subsequently lawmakers from even the ruling party, suggests that most ROK policy officials did not see the China factor as a major problem. One possible exception to this point is if the deal was so secret that the decision was implemented without the approval and knowledge of key NSC or defense officials – but I find that hard to believe. Second, implied here is the idea that the U.S. was somehow pushing ROK and Japan to make this deal (this was how far left parties interpreted GSOMIA). It’s true that Washington would like to see trilateral relations strengthened. But as one insider mentioned, the U.S. remains a constant, not a variable in promoting US-ROK-Japan relations. The U.S. position is to always encourage trilateral relations but it tends not to over push ROK-Japan, partially because it relates to historical issues.  The U.S. tries not to stick its nose in tricky historical problems (despite Hillary Clinton recently commenting on the comfort women issue). Third in the grand scheme of things, why would information sharing between Japan and Korea about North Korea overly threaten China. South Korea even signed a GSOMIA with Russia. Fourth and finally, if South Koreans were really paranoid about irking China, they wouldn't offer to strengthen trilateral relations with the U.S. two weeks later as they did at the last ASEAN Regional Forum. See Clinton's remarks here.

ROK-Japan relations presents one of the more interesting puzzles in IR. The inability to form a true alliance defies the logic of the liberal peace and realism. Victor Cha was one of the first scholars to examine ROK-Japan relations in-depth. Cha pinpoints the inability of ROK-Japan relations to develop beyond the “quasi-alliance,” somewhat paradoxically, to the U.S.: when U.S. commitment to both countries is strong, the incentive for Tokyo and Seoul to strength their own remains low.

In my view, domestic politics, should be given more credit than is often given. From a realist standpoint, ROK and Japan should want stronger ties in today’s security environment. But domestic politics makes this tricky. ROK must sell the security utility of such a pact, but they can’t do this without domestic support. ROK must have some concession from Japan which creates political space for ROK government to promote security cooperation with Japan. Thus, if Japan truly wants greater security cooperation and strengthen ROK-Japan ties, it would/should make concessions either on comfort women issue (i.e. compensation) or history textbook/Dokdo.

But the dilemma for Japan is that its own domestic constituents would be upset if government “caved” in on these demands from ROK. Capitulation would be perceived as a sign of weakness, especially when the population believes Koreans are “emotional,” making outrageous demands for issues which occurred decades ago. Japanese civilians were also victims (twice over: by the Japanese military government and U.S. air power). Japan and Korea both have their hands tied to domestic politics.

Will we see a second push for GSOMIA anytime soon? Certainly not until after the Korean presidential elections at the of the year.

CIA Bases in Africa

The Washington Post is running a series about the expansion of U.S. intelligence operations in Africa. Part I highlights the network and mission of these small bases. The bases are used to train African troops, track terrorists, chase Somali pirates, and catch rebels like Joseph Kony in Uganda. Some host drones, but interestingly, many field single-engine turboprop airplanes (PC-12)to keep operations under the radar (figuratively, not literally). Moreover, as Part II argues, "To further disguise the mission, the U.S. military has taken another unusual step: It has largely outsourced the spying operation to private contractors." Known bases exist in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles.

What's the connection to social movements? First, peace activists have been drawing attention to the secret network of bases for over a decade. This article basically supports Chalmers Johnson's claims about the existence of a vast network of secret military bases. Whether they exist to expand U.S. global domination and militarization is up for debate. U.S. and African officials obviously believe they add security and stability to the region.

Second, the Pentagon is making good on recommendations of the Overseas Basing Commission to rely more on cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, permanent bases. Basing access is perhaps more important than basing rights today. Joint access allows the CIA or Pentagon to avoid criticism that they're establishing a foreign base. Joint access adds legitimacy to U.S. presence, something the U.S. takes into greater consideration these day in an era of relative decline. There's a strategic rationale for establishing "light" rather than permanent bases in the post-Cold War era and particularly in Africa. But to what extent was this strategy a result of anti-base opposition since the late 1980s? The U.S. may also be looking to avoid the type of base politics which led to alliance tensions with the Philippines (1990-91), South Korea (2002-03), and Okinawa (1995-present).

NATO Counter-Summit

Much of downtown Chicago was shutdown last weekend due to the NATO summit. Media coverage focused largely on the summit's main agenda: ending the war in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, there wasn't a whole lot of coverage on the protests, even though a few brief moments of violence erupted. I suspect protestors did not make a huge issue out of "police brutality" since this would have undermined the credibility and distracted attention from the message of peace activists. Most activists were not looking for confrontation.

There's already been a lot of coverage about the summit. Steve Walt, who called the summit a "useless waste of time, money, and fuel" had by far the funniest comments (I don't think he intended to be funny). Anyway, what some may not have been aware about was the NATO "counter-summit" which took place at the same time in Chicago. Since the "Battle of Seattle" in 1999, parallel counter-summits have often accompanied global summits (i.e. G-8 Forum, IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, etc...). Counter-summits are organized by peace and global justice activists who use this media platform to voice their concerns and views about peace, global capitalism, the environment, human rights etc... This particular NATO counter-summit focused on ending the Afghan war; moving U.S. tax dollars from the Pentagon to meet human needs at home, and dissolving NATO. A longer list of reasons to oppose NATO (although many of the points are only marginally related to NATO if at all) and the counter-summit conference agenda and daily schedule can be found in the provided links. And here is information about the Network for a NATO-Free Future.

I'm trying to understand how and why activists and government officials come to such radically different conclusions about peace and security, and what international relations theory might tell us about these divergent worldviews. For most of the world (or at least the West), NATO is an organization which provides security, protection, peace and stability. Yet, peace activists see NATO largely as an organization that bombs, maims, and destroys. So is NATO good or bad? Or is this nothing but a contest about the meaning and interpretation of NATO? World leaders met in Chicago to work on an exit strategy so in some ways it was ironic to see protests against the Chicago summit.

Evangelicals and Politics

Evangelicals get a bad rap for their intolerance and their association with right-wing conservatism. Some of this criticism is deserved. But I've also felt that the media and broader American public lump all "religious" Christians (those actively practicing their faith) into the category of "evangelical" and "conservative."

My own research (and advocacy) on North Korean human rights and humanitarian aid suggests this is wrong. I've encountered several evangelicals working with faith-based NGOs who think outside of the conservative box, supporting a more liberal political agenda. I've also read a couple of blogs by self-proclaimed liberal evangelicals. The death of evangelical theologian heavyweight John Stott last year also prompted Nicholas Kristof to write about compassionate evangelicals fighting for social justice.

Anyway, I just read Chris Seiple's critical response to Robert Putnam's Foreign Affairs piece "God and Caesar in America" which confirmed my observations. I think the problem in identifying "liberal" evangelicals has to do with the fact that they operate relatively silently and without recognizable leaders. Sieple offers a nice description:

They want to be defined by what they are for -- an orthodox reading of scripture, the interpretation and application of which they must faithfully grapple with -- instead of what they are against... They largely hold the same values as Evangelicals, they just aren't angry about it...

They might find aspects of the Democratic Party appealing, especially its heart for the disenfranchised, and be "turned off" by the Republican religious narrative Putnam and Campbell describe. At the same time, they do not feel comfortable with a party that seemingly resists any public discussion of what it means to be pro-life and to believe that marriage should be between a man and a woman.

Adding to Seiple's response, I'd add that whether this group votes Republican or Democrat will depend on how they balance their position on social issues (poverty, education, health) versus social values (gay marriage, abortion).

So what's this have to do with social movements? Well, my impression is that you're more likely to see right-wing evangelicals take it to the street (i.e. the Tea Party, North Korean human rights) than their more progressive brethren. Which is why the media and mainstream America will continue to lump all evangelicals into the conservative, right-wing camp.

Social Movement Outcomes

I just saw this blogpost discussing social movement outcomes and the impact of the Occupy Movements. I'm largely in agreement with the author that the impact will be more indirect, having some influence on culture, than direct.




Anyway, it's made me think about my chapter on Jeju anti-base protests I'm supposed to write for an edited volume. I'm not sure if protestors will actually prevent the construction of the ROK naval base. One potential huge political opportunity for activists is if the progressive Democratic United Party (DUP) win the National Assembly elections in April. The DUP has claimed it will review (if not halt) current base construction plans. Aside from the immediate effect of halting base construction, anti-base activists are forcing at least some segments of political society to rethink the purpose of the base and what it actually means for South Korean security.

Social Movements and North Korea

Not possible. End of post.

Well, yes...but that doesn't mean we can't think about possibilities. Occasionally when I mention to other North Korean watchers that I do research on social movements, I get asked about the (lack of) prospects for a social movement in NK.

Here was an email I sent in response to a comment about social capital and civil society in North Korea

As for social movements, yes, most people discount an Arab Spring for NK b/c it lacks civil society. But in the study of revolutions (not that i'm advocating a revolution in NK) there is something known as preference falsification where people convey their preference for social conformity in public while holding different thoughts privately. So N.Koreans praise the regime in public while holding genuine thoughts to themselves. A side effect of preference falsification is the dampening of knowledge and information and an inability to gauge true level of discontent. So no one complains despite hardship. Under certain conditions though, private thoughts may emerge in public which may embolden others to convey their true preferences and demand for change. One of those conditions is probably the existence of information networks (or social capital if you want to call it that) so underground churches could play that role. In places like E. Germany where this theory was applied (by an economist, Timur Kuran), a network of both underground activists and some associational life (workers unions) brought safety in numbers once grievances were expressed out into the open forced regimes to make concessions.

One research I'd be curious to explore is whether development projects or something like the Kaesong Industrial Complex foster trust networks and social capital among North Koreans. Likewise, I wonder if there are there trust networks built among migrants who cross borders between NK and China as the come into contact with one another.

Perhaps we need a network

Scaling Down U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa

The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military is likely to "scale back plans to build key bases in Japan and Guam because of political obstacles and budget pressures." An earlier Stars and Stripes report (citing Bloomberg) stated that the 8,000 U.S. marines slated for relocation from Okinawa to Guam would instead be rotated through Australia and the Philippines. Additionally, the relocation of the 8,000 Marines wouldn't be contingent on the relocation of Futenma Air Station to northern Okinawa. The Pentagon hasn't released any details when the marines would leave or to what extent it would scale back its base ambitions in Okinawa or Guam.

Given U.S. defense spending cuts, I'm not entirely surprised about the U.S. and Japan backing away from the 2006 Guam Accord. Delinking the Futenma issue from the Guam relocation plan takes a lot of pressure off Tokyo from both Washington and Okinawan anti-base protestors. It's unclear whether Tokyo can now give the green light on base expansion in northern Okinawa (assuming that the U.S. still want a heliport in Okinawa) due to ongoing anti-base opposition in Okinawa. My hunch is if the U.S. really wants a heliport and have the budget for it, they'll push Japan harder for Futenma's relocation and Tokyo will probably comply.

The scenario Okinawans hope for are deeper budget cuts which lead to the closure of Futenma. Such a scenario would represent a big victory for anti-base movements. But can we claim that social movements were effective? Is the real explanation U.S. budget cuts? If one examines movements from a long time horizon one could argue that movements helped stave off immediate base expansion/relocation/opening maintaining at least the status quo until the rise of some fortunate turn of events (i.e. budget cuts, changed strategic environment etc...) leading to base closure. In this case, Futenma's relocation would count as a partial victory with anti-base pressure leading to delays and some concessions in reducing Okinawa's base burden.

But in the grand scheme of things, Okinawans would be hard-pressed to challenge the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As I argue in my book, Tokyo is constantly playing a balancing act between pressure from Washington and Okinawan demands but more often falls on the side of its security patron.