Code Pink and Drone Wars in Pakistan

The Post ran an interesting story about the peace march organized by populist former cricket-star turned politician Imran Khan. Apparently Khan organized thousands of protestors to join him at a rally in South Waziristan to protest the drone campaign being waged against Islamist militants in the region. Joining this effort was a small contingent from the U.S. women's peace group, Codepink.  Now that takes balls (yes, the irony) to walk into a region known best for breeding insurgents.

(Un)fortunately, the Pakistan military prevented Khan and his entourage from entering South Waziristan because it couldn't guarantee security for the peace marchers. I'm not surprised that Pakistanis would organize a rally against drone strikes in their own country. And we shouldn't be surprised that Pakistanis might be joined by other transnational peace groups also committed to ending drone strikes which carry questionable legal and moral implications. In fact, the Drone Campaign Network has declared this week "Drones Week of Action."  But the willingness of U.S. peace groups to march into region which saw fierce fighting before Pakistani forces subdued the insurgency only a year or two ago gives us reason to pause.

I was curious to see what comments readers posted on the Washington Post article. As usual, you had both supporters (of Khan's movement) and haters chiming in. What is striking here is the different assumptions and conception readers have about peace and security. Here are a few comments.

I had reactions similar to the commenter below:

“You hit people with these drones and you create instant enemies,” said JoAnne Lingle, a silver-haired Mennonite from Indianapolis. “It’s supposed to be increasing our national security and it’s doing the opposite.”"

Gee, I hope Code Pink told the Taliban, al Qaeda and their Pakistan Army masters that when you hit people with suicide bombers and IEDs you also create instant enemies. This protest is ridiculous. For the terrorist gangs like the Taliban and al Qaeda, civilians are the primary target. For the U.S., enemy insurgents are the primary target. Drones allow much tighter targeting of the enemy and greatly reduced civilian casualties. 

 Here's a comment siding with Khan and Codepink in support of world peace:

By all standards the current war in Afghanistan is quite ugly and the allied forces are in a morass; they are stuck in a quagmire and they do not see any way out. In 11-years old war the allied forces from 44 countries have failed to defeat these militants who are wearing sandals, turbans, and wielding AK-47 Rifles. Many see the use of the drones as a frustration tool as it's kill ratio is: 2% terrorists as they are called, and 98% innocent women and children. DRONES FLY CHILDREN DIE! 

As the march was taking place my mind flashed back to that brave American girl Rachel Corrie who in 2004 stood between a marching Israeli bulldozer and a Palestinian house. This innocent, angel-like girl thought that the Israeli bulldozer will stop because after all she was from a friendly brotherly country USA, but the arrogant bulldozer did not stop and crushed her to death. Later, the Israelis dubbed her as "terrorist" because she was trying to save "an enemy's house" from demolition.  

The delegation of 32 Americans headed by Mary Ann Wright had a conscience, they traveled all along from USA to Islamabad using their own funds, to stand with Imran Khan against the drone strikes because they felt that the drones are counter-productive and as a result of that the USA is facing more resistance and hatred. I think these individuals are the true Americans, they love their country, they love Pakistan, and they love the humanity. They certainly won hearts and minds of the people. And, yes, the struggle between right and wrong, between the good and the bad, between the Satan and the righteous, will go on! People were even ready to throw stones at Jesus Christ! 

Imran Khan is the leader not only for Pakistan but for the world also. With people like him there will be peace in the world. 

Let's unite to wage peace in the world!

 And here's someone calling on readers to take part in a virtual march against the drone wars:

Join the virtual march against the US drone war

Hundreds of thousands of people in my country, Pakistan, are under siege from US drones: robot weapons that indiscriminately kill children, and terrorise families every day. This weekend I am leading a peace march against this secret war, and if all of you join me virtually, we could create a public storm to stop this torment.

America’s deadly drones campaign is illegal and counterproductive -- instead of beating terrorists it is driving more people to anti-American extremism. Families across the border region in Waziristan, the flash point of this war, live in constant fear of being targeted, under the deafening buzz of these remote-controlled planes 24 hours a day. Extraordinarily, the US denies any civilian deaths, but will not reveal the names of those killed, while independent reports tell of the trauma and killing of hundreds of civilians, many of them children.

This weekend, if you join me on the march, we have the chance to bring global attention to this war zone and show the United States that people across Pakistan and the world want an end to this robot war. Sign the petition now and tell everyone. We will announce all those marching virtually to the media, we will carry a flag from every country where people have signed, and when we reach 500,000 signatures I will demand a meeting with President Obama to present the petition:

http://www.avaaz.org/en/petition/Join_the_virtual_march_against_the_US_drone_war/?tponBdb

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Update #1: So who makes up the coalition against drone strikes.  In the U.S., probably anti-war, civil liberties, and international law groups in the U.S. Internationally, you have peace groups, local indigenous populations, and anti-American elements.

North Korean Revolution, Maybe?

Andrei Lankov wrote an interesting op-ed in last week's Washington Post countering some of the optimism following reports about signs of reform taking place in North Korea under Kim Jong-Un (KJU). Signs of reform range from the serious (allowing North Koreans to retain a certain percentage of their crops) to the silly (riding roller-coasters and watching Disney characters).

It’s unclear whether these signs of reform are the beginning of a new era or whether they are temporary measures. In the past, North Korea has frequently demonstrated signs of reform only to leave its people and the rest of the world wanting. Some such as Victor Cha argue we’ve seen this behavior before and downplay prospects for reform.

Andrei’s point is not whether the reforms this time are real or not. The question is what will happen to North Korea if its tries to reform. Reforms obviously carry risks for the regime. Economic liberalization will inevitably require greater opening to the outside world creating pressure for even more reforms. What Lankov notes is the unique position of North Korea. Unlike other past authoritarian or communist regimes which faced similar risks, the North Korean regime is more susceptible to implosion. Once ordinary North Koreans begin to see how much better off Koreans south of the 38^th parallel live, the regime’s lies about the superiority of juche and the DPRK will become starkly clear. North Koreans will demand for more change, question the authority and legitimacy of the North Korean state, and possibly call for unification with the South.

I’m reminded by E.H. Carr about the power over public opinion and the role of propaganda in building state power. By walling off all outside information, the state can create it's own fantasy world. But there's the danger that the truth will out the state propaganda machine. 

Japan's Dilemma: Nuclear Energy

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has a problem. Noda faces stiff opposition not only from anti-nuclear activists and a Japanese public still grappling with the effects of the Fukushima disaster, but even leaders within his own Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

This Asahi Shimbun article captures the dilemma of adopting a nuclear zero policy. It's a tough call. Japan clearly needs energy which nuclear reactors have provided for decades. Anti-nuclear activists claim Japan can achieve these goals without nuclear power. But what are the costs (economic, environmental, and social) of using alternative energy sources? Who seeks to gain/lose from a nuclear zero policy - and I don't mean the obvious vested interests in the energy sector, but in terms of your everyday Japanese citizen.

Historical Institutionalism and International Relations

I’m swinging as far as possible from social  movements in this post, but I just re-read Dan Nexon’s article responding to Orfeo Fiortes' IO review essay on historical institutionalism (HI) in international relations (IR). Fiortes and Nexon adopt two different approaches.

 Fiortes: Microfoundations and preference formation. The sunk costs, increasing returns, and framing effects generated by institutions shape actors’ preferences.

Nexon: Dynamic processes embedded in context. Nexon sees much more variation in institutional processes. HI “develops a toolkit for grappling with the dynamic nature of causal processes and their embeddednness within specific socio-historical contexts.”  Nexon emphasizes the “contingent nature of change processes.”

Both approaches highlight the importance of sequencing, timing, and path dependency. But Fiortes’ treatment of these mechanisms don’t differ that greatly from rational institutionalism. Preferences still dictate choices leading to outcomes. Nexon, alternatively moves from microfoundations to middle-range-theory where he believes HI provides the most promise and points to the “variable nature of change processes” [emphasis mine]. Network structures of institutions, relational mechanisms, practice and habitus, norm diffusion are also processes which may take on characteristics of HI. Nexon finds the emphasis on a “specific decision-theoretic framework to institutional choice” problematic because it limits what HI has to offer about change and transformation in IR. What we wind up with are “static models offering invariant explanations across time and space.” 

My own research on the evolution of East Asia’s regional architecture closely resembles the Fiortes version of HI, but my understanding of the social world is much more in line with Nexon (note to self: revisit APSA paper through Nexon’s framework).  There are affinities between constructivism, HI, and the connection between institutions, ideas and policy preferences which may link the Fiortes with the Nexon view.

One possible critique of Nexon’s approach though is that it dilutes the theoretical precision of HI. It becomes unclear exactly what HI is or does if we take the middle-range theory approach. I suspect Nexon sees HI as a tent which encompasses a wide variety or mechanisms and processes but some may still appreciate the narrower view of HI.

Chick-Fil-A

Chick-Fil-A has been receiving a lot of attention after President Dan Cathy's public support of traditional marriage (or anti-gay marriage stance - the framing depends on which side of the debate you're on).  It's odd that big city mayors from Boston to Chicago to Washington DC got so worked up about Chick-Fil-A. It's not as if the franchise discriminates serving gay customers. Calls for boycotting/banning the franchise triggered a response from Chick-Fil-A fans (re: the conservative base) who believed local governments and same-sex marriage supporters were infringing on Mr. Cathy's right to express his own views.

Anyway, David Meyer had two excellent posts on this debating the efficacy of boycotting Chick-Fil-A and the large turnout of Chick-Fil-A supporters in response. As Meyer notes, large corporations may support a variety of causes which we may or may not support. Does that warrant a boycott? Should supporters of traditional marriage boycott Amazon because Jeff Bezos is campaigning for same-sex marriage in the state of Washington. Should progressive activists boycott Apple because they haven't pushed for improved labor standards in China?

Brad Hirschfield had an interesting comment about the whole Chick-Fil-A fiasco which he claims may actually be one of the finer moments of collective action and social movements.

Without wasting time on fights about who the “real” victims of intolerance are, we can simply point out the hysterical and instructive irony that this is where those who support Chick-fil-A and those who most oppose it are actually quite alike. In each case, a group of aggrieved people who feel their rights and dignity being infringed upon embrace the notion of political and collective social action.

ROK-Japan Relations: GSOMIA

Sorry, this won't be a post about social movements (but I'll put up a good post from the field next on protests, policing, and contentious performances).

A few weeks ago, the breakdown of the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) generated a political firestorm in Seoul. Coincidentally, I was in Seoul interviewing officials about China, Japan, Korea trilateral cooperation. I sheepishly admit that I was unaware about the diplomatic fallout until meeting a Chosun Ilbo journalist who kept mentioning “GSOMIA” (as I sat there nodding my head pretending that I knew what he was talking about).

Since I was in Seoul meeting Korean and Japanese diplomats I decided to find out more on this topic. I thought about posting my thoughts at the time since I had a little bit of inside information. The blog posting fell to the wayside, but I’ve been provoked to finally write in reaction to Jenny Lind’s article about GSOMIA in the Atlantic.

You can read about the GSOMIA fiasco here and here, but basically, the Japanese and South Korean government secretly negotiated an information and intelligence sharing agreement. GSOMIA was devised primarily as an intelligence sharing agreement on North Korea. But perhaps more significantly, it was meant to further strengthen ROK-Japan military ties (and by extension trilateral relations with the United States) which had already been moving forward through observations and joint training exercises the past year.

So why did GSOMIA cause such a domestic uproar in Korea? After all, as one Japanese diplomat mentioned to me, “It’s in South Korea’s own interest to have an agreement.” More broadly, why do two liberal democracies closely allied to the U.S., sharing common threats, and geographically proximate to one another fail to form an alliance? On GSOMIA specifically, several explanations are possible:

1.Domestic politics: The ROK government bungled the deal by making it secret and not revealing it to the public until days before the official signing, thus turning the issue into political fodder.

2.Historical animosity: Koreans remain sensitive about strengthening military ties with Japan given Japan’s unwillingness to own up to its past role during the colonial period.

3.China/Balance of Power: Paranoid about getting caught between great power rivalries, ROK does not want to provoke China, or at least give China the impression that U.S.-Japan-ROK relations are tightening at the expense of China.

Based on her own sources, Lind believes the answer boils down to #3. After reading her article, I was left wondering if we had met an entirely different set of ROK experts. In conversations with (mostly) people associated with the Foreign Ministry, and from mainstream Korean media reports, it sounded like #1 and #2 were the most likely candidates. My own personal view is that GSOMIA fell victim to domestic politics, which by default is linked to the history issue.

I think the China factor had some role to play here. But none of the people I talked to seemed to think the China card was a serious factor. There are other mechanisms that ROK uses to signal its willingness to cooperate with China even as it seeks to strengthen the US-Japan-ROK security ties. This includes the relatively new China-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation secretariat (TCS) which was proposed by the current ROK administration.

Although Lind states that ROK officials shied away from GSOMIA because many South Koreans fear that GSOMIA would be perceived as part of the U.S.-led security architecture positioned against China, I disagree that this was the major reason for the political fall-out at the eleventh hour. First, the fact that the ROK government was ready to sign GSOMIA until the uproar created initially by the opposition party, and subsequently lawmakers from even the ruling party, suggests that most ROK policy officials did not see the China factor as a major problem. One possible exception to this point is if the deal was so secret that the decision was implemented without the approval and knowledge of key NSC or defense officials – but I find that hard to believe. Second, implied here is the idea that the U.S. was somehow pushing ROK and Japan to make this deal (this was how far left parties interpreted GSOMIA). It’s true that Washington would like to see trilateral relations strengthened. But as one insider mentioned, the U.S. remains a constant, not a variable in promoting US-ROK-Japan relations. The U.S. position is to always encourage trilateral relations but it tends not to over push ROK-Japan, partially because it relates to historical issues.  The U.S. tries not to stick its nose in tricky historical problems (despite Hillary Clinton recently commenting on the comfort women issue). Third in the grand scheme of things, why would information sharing between Japan and Korea about North Korea overly threaten China. South Korea even signed a GSOMIA with Russia. Fourth and finally, if South Koreans were really paranoid about irking China, they wouldn't offer to strengthen trilateral relations with the U.S. two weeks later as they did at the last ASEAN Regional Forum. See Clinton's remarks here.

ROK-Japan relations presents one of the more interesting puzzles in IR. The inability to form a true alliance defies the logic of the liberal peace and realism. Victor Cha was one of the first scholars to examine ROK-Japan relations in-depth. Cha pinpoints the inability of ROK-Japan relations to develop beyond the “quasi-alliance,” somewhat paradoxically, to the U.S.: when U.S. commitment to both countries is strong, the incentive for Tokyo and Seoul to strength their own remains low.

In my view, domestic politics, should be given more credit than is often given. From a realist standpoint, ROK and Japan should want stronger ties in today’s security environment. But domestic politics makes this tricky. ROK must sell the security utility of such a pact, but they can’t do this without domestic support. ROK must have some concession from Japan which creates political space for ROK government to promote security cooperation with Japan. Thus, if Japan truly wants greater security cooperation and strengthen ROK-Japan ties, it would/should make concessions either on comfort women issue (i.e. compensation) or history textbook/Dokdo.

But the dilemma for Japan is that its own domestic constituents would be upset if government “caved” in on these demands from ROK. Capitulation would be perceived as a sign of weakness, especially when the population believes Koreans are “emotional,” making outrageous demands for issues which occurred decades ago. Japanese civilians were also victims (twice over: by the Japanese military government and U.S. air power). Japan and Korea both have their hands tied to domestic politics.

Will we see a second push for GSOMIA anytime soon? Certainly not until after the Korean presidential elections at the of the year.

CIA Bases in Africa

The Washington Post is running a series about the expansion of U.S. intelligence operations in Africa. Part I highlights the network and mission of these small bases. The bases are used to train African troops, track terrorists, chase Somali pirates, and catch rebels like Joseph Kony in Uganda. Some host drones, but interestingly, many field single-engine turboprop airplanes (PC-12)to keep operations under the radar (figuratively, not literally). Moreover, as Part II argues, "To further disguise the mission, the U.S. military has taken another unusual step: It has largely outsourced the spying operation to private contractors." Known bases exist in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles.

What's the connection to social movements? First, peace activists have been drawing attention to the secret network of bases for over a decade. This article basically supports Chalmers Johnson's claims about the existence of a vast network of secret military bases. Whether they exist to expand U.S. global domination and militarization is up for debate. U.S. and African officials obviously believe they add security and stability to the region.

Second, the Pentagon is making good on recommendations of the Overseas Basing Commission to rely more on cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, permanent bases. Basing access is perhaps more important than basing rights today. Joint access allows the CIA or Pentagon to avoid criticism that they're establishing a foreign base. Joint access adds legitimacy to U.S. presence, something the U.S. takes into greater consideration these day in an era of relative decline. There's a strategic rationale for establishing "light" rather than permanent bases in the post-Cold War era and particularly in Africa. But to what extent was this strategy a result of anti-base opposition since the late 1980s? The U.S. may also be looking to avoid the type of base politics which led to alliance tensions with the Philippines (1990-91), South Korea (2002-03), and Okinawa (1995-present).