Autocrats Unite...and the Deep Divide to Global Peace

Saw this op-ed by David Sanger from someone's Facebook post about the rise of autocrats and the threat of U.S. global under-reach (i.e. how the world might face doom if no leader is willing to tend to the international garden "so that small problems didn’t turn into big ones." Sanger cites Bob Kagan's piece which places this argument in historical context. The arguments are all reasonable, but his conclusion that the U.S. at times must act as an enforcer and be a forceful menace is sure to raise eyebrows. Take for instance, this quote from an activist in Hawaii I know commenting on Obama's recent West Point speech:

What makes us "exceptional" is the fact that WE LIVE IN THE MOST HATED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND ARE CONSIDERED THE NUMBER ONE OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING WORLD PEACE. And that is NOTHING to be proud of. And about "America must always lead on the world stage..." Too easily said when America builds the stage wherever it wants, imposes the props, writes the script, and dupes the American audience (that would be the taxpayers whose money funds American terrorism) into swallowing the idea it was an honorable, must-do, performance.

Again, struck by the vast chasm in thought about achieving global peace and stability between (conservative) policymakers and (liberal) activists.

Update: I cited Kagan's piece, not b/c I necessarily support the argument, but b/c it seemed central to part of Sanger's op-ed. Here's Dan Nexon shredding Kagan to pieces.

Ethics and Global Governance

Two stories this weekend related to global governance which made me think about ethical issues and global politics. The first is an interview with World Bank president Jim Yong Kim. The second is a feature in the Washington Post Magazine about U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power.

President Kim was asked why the Bank withheld aid towards a health project in Uganda following passage of anti-gay legislation in that country. After all, the Bank's approach to aid is supposed to be apolitical. In response, Kim mentioned that the Bank has a commitment to non-discrimination. In this particular project geared towards human health, it was unclear whether the Ugandan government could ensure non-discriminatory practices in its health clinics. The decision to withhold aid was a management rather than a political-based decision. As such, the Bank can continue supporting other projects in Uganda such as those related to infrastructure which has little to do with discriminating against gay people. Likewise, the Bank will continue to support projects in Russia, despite Russia behaving badly in the Crimea. From the Bank's perspective, their programs in Russia are intended to protect the poor, improve business climate, and support growth. Apolitical development still raises a few ethical issues, however. For instance, should IGOs provide government assistance to regimes with poor human rights records (Kim cites N.Korea becoming a potential recepient country if it opens up) which might legitimate such regimes? Or if the goal is to improve the lives of people, can politics be cast aside so long as the Bank or IMF can ensure that governments will not misuse funds? The Bank adopts the latter position. But how can one credibly trust regimes if corruption, nepotism, and instability are the norm in a given polity? The Bank has their own mechanism to investigate whether and how governments are properly implementing projects and can always threaten to pull the plug. I supposed the Bank's approach to development is one of ethical pragmatism.

The second story is more pertinent to my research on ideas and foreign policy. Based on Samantha Power's pre-government opining, we now she's a passionate adovcate of human rights and humanitarian assistance. However, Power admits that once inside government the issues appear much more complex. Take for instance US refusal to sign the Convention to Ban Landmines in light of the need for such weapons in the DMZ between North and South Korea. As one official recalls Power stating, ‘I didn’t have any idea how complicated these things become once you’re in government . . . This is as far from a no-brainer as I’ve ever seen.” A study of Samantha Power shows how elite views become moderated once in government, something I argued in my book about the formation of an elite security consensus. Political constraints prevent leaders from implementing their own policy preferences. Also, through socialization processes, the views of elites within the foreign policy and security establishment begin to  converge. Real differences continue to exist (particularly within Congress), but in the bureacracies, positions move towards the middle making bipartisanship in foreign policy/security a bit easier.

North Korea New Round-up: Comission of Inquiry on Human Rights; NK Photos; Cell Phones

The UNHRC's Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released its report a couple weeks ago. An excerpt from the report is here.  One of the more interesting highlights is committee's suggestion that NK leaders might face charges at the International Criminal Court.

More details about North Korean cell phones appeared on 38 North by Yonho Kim, a corresonpdant for Voice of America. Earlier, on 38 North, Ruediger Frank presented a somewhat comical analysis of tablets in North Korea.

Some truths about photos from North Korea.

Hagel Announces Pentagon Budget Cuts...and Peace Activists are Unhappy?!

I was almost certain the peace activist community would rejoice at Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's announced budget cuts, much in the same way that I'd expect conservatives such as Dick Cheney to argue that cuts would be "absolutely devastating."  Other news outlets  such as NPR and  NYTimes also predicted a backlash from Army proponents, defense contractors, Congressmen etc... Thus, I was surprised to see Hagel's announcement drawing flak from activists like Bruce Gagnon who wrote, "Despite mandates for cuts in military spending after agreements with Congress under sequestration, Hagel actually calls for an increase of more than $115 billion for war making." Gagnon's focus is more about where the budget is being reallocated (i.e. what the Pentagon is buying) rather than cuts to troops, housing, and military pensions. As Gagnon writes, "The writing on the wall is clear - cuts in troop levels and increase in high-tech space directed war-making capability." Anyone want to fact-check this?

Update: David Edelstein at Georgetown suggests that military cuts functions as a signal from Washington to our allies and adversaries that the U.S. is "tying its hands." That is we're letting adversaries (i.e. Iran) know that we really do have no intentions of attacking by decreasing are capabilities. And we're telling allies (i.e. Japan, Korea) that they will need to contribute more for their own defense. Over at the Duck, Musgrave and Ward have their own take on the tying hands logic...that this will prevent future administrations from taking on costly, unilateral actions.  Of course, this assumes that the Obama Administration made the decision based on a long term horizon  - why would he care how future administrations address security crises which may require having all options on the table. It also doesn't preclude the possibility that given the United States' tremendous military edge, the U.S. could still engage in some misguided adventure. 

No wonder why peace activists don't see this announcement as relief. Joe Gerson at AFSC announced that "the reduction of the size of the U.S. Army grows in large measure from its new Air-Sea Battle doctrine for possible future wars in Asia and the Pacific."

Social Movements and World Politics: Ukraine and Venezuela

Ukraine and Venezuela are the two latest countries where massive protests have erupted. CFR compiled some background articles to the Ukraine protests as did Josh Busby at the Duck. I'm also posting a couple CNN and NY Times.

RIA Novosti/Andrey Stenin)

articles on Venezuela from

I'm less interested in examining how or why protests erupted in these two places than in understanding what implications the dyamics of protest in Ukraine, Venezuela, and other countries have on world politics. Thinking back to a paper I wrote outlining different mechanisms in which social movements, the protests in the Ukraine do suggest some relationship between social movements and international relations with the Ukrainian state playing an intermediary role. In particular, Ukrainian protests have clearly signalled to the outside world strong dissatification with President Yanukovych's earlier decision to break-off a potential deal with the EU. How else might social movements relate to world politics in this case? Movements may...

1. Signal to outsiders the level of domestic support for either the EU or Russia
2. Reify lines between East and West as the EU and Russia propose diverging policy positions to address the Ukrainian crisis.
3. Potentially force the Yanokovych government to reverse course on international policy.
4. Draw in outside powers to respond and intervene in a domestic crisis.
5. Produce demonstration effects in other countries

The above arguments indicate a signalling and bargaining effect generated by social movements. Domestic regimes must bargain with opposition movements to meet specific political demands (i.e. government transition, new international deals etc...). Meanwhile, protest movements signal to outsiders the size, power, and degree of resolve the opposition has in challenging the regime. This may help determine to what extent outside actors (states, NGOs, IGOs etc...) might intervene on behalf of either the opposition or incumbent regime.

News Roundup: Latin America, Gun Control, Asia Historical Memory, ISA blog policy snafu

Have not been able to blog since the birth of our daughter last Nov. Basically, it's a trade-off between extra sleep or blogging (or doing actual work and blogging). I've been wanting to write on a variety of topics, so as a happy-medium, here's news round-up to ease my way back into the blog.

The left turn in Latin America: My Latin Americanist colleague says he's had enough of the "left turn" in Latin American politics when I mentioned this overview provided by the Washington Post. I was still curious to know how much of the turn was driven by social movements (since we hear about populist policies from the likes of the late Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales) or whether the turn to the left can be explained within the confides of institutional and electoral politics. Some answers might be found in Steve Levitsky and Ken Robert's book, Resurgence of the Latin American Left, and also in Max Cameron and Eric Hershberg's Latin America's Left Turn. There's also an emerging cleavage which actually cuts across the left-right divide: nationalist vs internationalist (or protectionism vs. free trade as outlined in the article). 

Gun control: The shooting in the Columbia, MD mall was only twenty miles from my home. In the aftermath, Dana Miibank asks if we've become numb to mass shootings. Despite numerous attempts to address gun violence after each tragedy (i.e. Tucson, AZ; Aurora, CO; Newtown, CT; Navy Yard in Washington DC), and with each mass shooting claimed as a "critical juncture" for gun control advocates, the ball has not moved forward all that much. Aside from the power of the NRA (or in large part b/c of their advocacy) my own research suggests that powerful ideational (which translate to political) barriers exist which gun control advocates have not been able to penetrate in spite of the powerful emotional claims/frames they've created.  An interesting research question is to explore whether public opinion functions independent of this ideational barrier (i.e. if public opinion now strongly favors gun control measure, why have we not seen greater shifts in policy on this issue).

Korea-Japan, historical memory: For my students taking East Asian IR with me this semester, I shared how historical issues have managed to find their way into local politics in the DMV area. Korean-Americans actually lobbied and received a commitment from new VA governor Terry McAuliffe to include "East Sea" in any VA state issued textbook which also states the body of water between Korea and Japan as the "Sea of Japan."  McAuliffe now has four lobbyists and the Japanese Ambassador on his arse. Ddoh! It's a choice between votes (many more voting Koreans than Japanese in VA) or economic largesse (Japan reportedly invested $1 billion in the state of VA). And from a couple years ago in DC, there was the sale and return of  the Phelps House to the Korean government. The Phelps House was the first Korean embassy in the U.S. located on Logan Circle, to be sold for $5 by the Japanese after Korea became its colony. Fred Hiatt takes a broader look at some of these historical issues and wonders if we really have/are pivoting to Asia (and implies we should).

ISA blog snafu: Of all the comments about ISA governing council's proposal on blog policy, Amanda Murdie provided a response which resonated closely with my own reactions.

Closure of Manas Air Base

I was contacted a few weeks ago by Stars and Stripes, the U.S. military's news organization to comment on the closure of Manas Air Base in Kyrgzstan and base relocation to Romania. Despite the time I put in researching and answering questions, my comments were never used. So I've put up my responses to the questions below. Here's additional commentary from Alex Cooley, a true expert on this subject.

1. What are your general thoughts on the Manas Base?

Political instability and conflict in the Middle East have been ongoing if not rising the past few years. Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan is winding down. Therefore, it makes a lot of strategic sense for the U.S. to shift air transit operations from Kyrgyzstan to Romania which is much closer to current global hot spots along the Mediterranean and the Middle East .

2. Do you think they (the Kyrgz) actually wanted the U.S. operations to leave, or were they hoping for better terms and the U.S. called their bluff?

The Kyrgyzstan government has played base politics with the United States before, ratcheting upward the "rent" for Manas during negotiations in 2006. More importantly, in 2009, the Kyrgyz president announced his decision to terminate the base agreement, only to have the U.S. triple its offer to keep U.S. flights operating.  I'm not aware if the U.S. and Kyrgyz government attempted to negotiate a deal again, but it should have been obvious to the Kyrgyz that their bargaining power had been significantly reduced with the war in Afghanistan drawing to a close. So it does not seem likely that the Kyrgz were expecting to extract better terms from the U.S. 

3. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Russia has its own base in Kyrgyzstan and is a major economic benefactor so the Kyrgyz may have felt some pressure from Moscow, if not directly at least indirectly, to support its patron. But the decision was most likely one emanating from the Kyrgz themselves given the declining utility of the base for the U.S. and demonstrated by the overwhelming support in Parliament to not renew the base agreement.  

4. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Romania is a much more reliable partner than Kyrgyzstan.  Romania is a member of NATO and has a proven track record of defense cooperation with the U.S. The presence of U.S. bases in Romania should therefore be more stable and less politicized. We are also less likely to see economic opportunism from the Romanian government.