Is North Korea Irrational?

No. For decades academics have been  writing on the rationality of the Kim family (and autocratic survival more generally), but journalists find it easier to sell a story when you can pitch North Korea as a land of crazies. David Kang's earlier academic piece in International Security, his interview on NPR yesterday, and an article from Anna Fifield in the Washington Post all reiterate this point.

If the goal is regime survival, than North Korean actions are indeed rational and successful. Nuclear weapons, strict control of information, and curtailment of freedoms, corruption, deification of regime...all these things are intended to keep the Kim family in power.  North Korea does not play by international rules, it regularly violates norms, and many of its actions are inviolable if not despicable (this is probably true to some degree of all governments). North Korea is certainly and may appear to play by its own rules and logic. But that doesn't make it irrational.

South Korea Post-Impeachment Round-up

I haven't been able to keep up, much less write about the South Korean impeachment, but I'm posting some analysis and discussion for later reading written by friends and colleagues here.

I begin with the Asan Institute's biweekly newsletter, Asan Korea Perspective which gives us a barebones explanation of the grounds for impeachment and outcome of the South Korean Supreme Court's decision to impeach President Park Geunhye. There's also public opinion data related to the impeachment with 77% approving impeachment.

Charges and Court's Ruling. Source: Asan Korea Perspective Vol 2, no.6)

The Washington Post provided a video summary of the impeachment.

Celeste Arrington provides her thoughts at the Monkey Cage and the next steps for an election in which a progressive candidate is assumed to win.

Many praised the Court's ruling as a win for democracy and  South Korea's own democratic process. This included the editorial board of the Washington Post, but they also reminded us that the impeachment itself doesn't solve Korea's many domestic and foreign policy problems. Darcie Draudt also reminds us that several dimensions of South Korean democracy (most notably freedom of speech) the past few years have been in decline. She asks whether the impeachment will actually lead to longer reaching domestic institutional reforms to reduce corruption. And Kathy Moon weighs in with a provocative, but dead center quote in Quartz, "I find worrisome this glorification of South Korea’s protests. If governance structures were working properly then citizens normally would be channeling their concerns through institutional processes—reaching out to their elected leaders, going to the courts. Spilling out into the street is a sign of political dysfunction.”

Anna Fifield provided a barrage of reportage on the effects of the impeachment on everything from North Korea-China relations to the joy and images of celebration of Park's impeachment.

North Korea and Revolutions

Here's a piece by Andrei Lankov evaluating the possibility of revolution in North Korea based on five indicators in James DeFronzo's book “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements” whether a society is ripe for a revolt. It's overly simplistic, and you can't just check boxes - the causal conditions and antecedents (both structural and agent-driven) are probably more complicated. But it's still worth going through this thought experiment.

South Korea-China Relations and THAAD

Very briefly, this 38 North report is the best run-down of THAAD deployment and the tensions it has generated between the ROK and China. As the author states:

When the decision was originally made, the ROK government anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but went ahead with it for several reasons. First, its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. Second, the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance. In doing this, it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces. Third, Seoul understood the system’s effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security. Fifth, the ROK government dismissed the fear that a THAAD battery in its territory would become integrated into the US ballistic missile defense system as groundless.In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye’s conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay.

However, China holds a very different view of the South Korean decision. First, Beijing believes that one THAAD battery can neither deter North Korea militarily nor compel Pyongyang to change its behavior. Second, it thinks the system’s detection range could later be changed to suit US needs, enabling THAAD to potentially target Chinese assets, including strategic missile systems and forcing Beijing to spend more on defenses for its coastal missile bases. Third, Beijing is aware that a long-term goal of the US rebalance to Asia is to check or block China through security cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Fourth, it expects an additional strategic burden from changes to the regional “power balance,” such as new Russian defenses against THAAD that Beijing will also have to take into account.

On a related note, CFR published a study on South Korea's option in Northeast Asia in response to the China factor.

Between Action and Inaction in Syria

This is the most damning op-ed I've seen to date regarding President Obama's foreign policy on Syria. The Washington Post editorials have been highly critical of U.S. inaction for some time as you can read on Aug. 16, 2016, and July 2, 2016, and from editorial page editor Fred Hiat who states that the Obama Administration not only failed  to take action in Syria, but "soothed the American people into feeling no responsibility for the tragedy." But the op-ed by Leon Wieseltier is scathing, calling Obama's words "outrageously hypocritical." Wieseltier writes, "The administration creatively pioneered a third option, which it pursued not only in Syria but also in Ukraine and elsewhere: Between action and inaction, it chose inconsequential action (italics mine). There is the Obama doctrine!"

 

It's hard to place blame on the Obama Administration for the tragedy taking place right now in Aleppo. One might instead blame Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, or perhaps Iran and Russia for inflicting hurt and destruction as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Powers did in a speech which has gone viral (to which the Russian ambassador replied, "I don't want to remind these three countries [US, France, UK] about their role in unwinding the Syrian crisis, which led to such difficult consequences, and let terrorists spread in Syria and Iraq). But where questions lie for the next Administration is whether the U.S., as a great power, has a moral responsibility to push harder militarily against the Syrian government an do more to protect civilians.

Obama's critics argue that there are serious costs to inaction. In contrast, proponents have argued that greater U.S. involvement would have only made the conflict worse, with more death and suffering. Can the U.S. to do more to take a stand against al-Assad in which the costs (in lives and treasure) do not exceed the benefits? I can clearly see the administration has been wrestling between a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness resulting in such inconsequential inaction.

Amid Scandal, Protests Force South Korean President to Resign

Rarely does one find a case of social movement protest so effective that they bring down the democratically elected leader of a country in a matter of months. Yet that's exactly what happened in South Korea. Following a bizarre scandal of corruption and extortion involving South Korean president Park Geun-Hye exposed in March, President Park announced yesterday that she would resign.

Source: Kim Jong-hi/Reuters

For a blog titled Social Movements and World Politics, and a scholar who writes about South Korean civil society, I've ignored this case for far too long. Rather than wade into the complexities of the scandal and the rise of protests myself, however, I'll take the easy road and link some of the best analysis in English I've found to date.

Deep ties between Choi Soon-sil, the figure at the center of the scandal, and President Park are explained in the blog Ask a Korean!

Stephan Haggard on the Witness to Transformation blog has thus far a 4 part analysis on "Park Geun-hye Unravelling". Part I focuses on her approval rating and decline in popularity. Part II, perhaps the most useful, spells out the players and issues involved in the scandal. Part III focuses on political options for Park, and leading candidates of other political parties should Park step down. Part IV provides text of the prosecutor's statement specifically outlining Park's illegal transgressions including: abuse of authority and coercion against specific companies and individuals; divulgence of state secrets; and attempted fraud.

An Asan Institute brief published on Nov. 21, 2016 provided a list of allegations against Choi Soon-Sil, weekly protest numbers, and approval ratings of political parties and potential presidential political candidates.

Asan Institute: Original sources in footnotes of briefing

Eunjung Lim at SAIS-Johns Hopkins has a short analysis on Park's resignation in historical context. The New York Times' Choe Sang-Hun explains the steps of impeachment, although this is now a moot point. 

To be updated...

Here's a video of the protests last weekend to give you a sense of the size and scope of protest, although I cringe at the misleading analysis of how protests actually mobilize and operate.

 

Update 12/9/16

 

Park was impeached. Here's analysis by Scott Snyder from Forbes, and a piece by Darcie Draudt at JHU (and Scott's former research assistant). And of course, Steph Haggard's post and a video interview with Marcus on the Witness to Transformation blog.

 

Update 12/19/16

 

Some guidance on what happens next. Most importantly, power is transferred to the Prime Minister

 

Update 12/22/16

 

Here's an EAI opinion brief from SNU sociologist Seokho Kim that places the recent anti-Park protests within the broader context of (the failure of ) South Korean civil society the past decade. Basically, civil society had been defunct since the 2008 anti-U.S. beef protests, and only with the sinking of the Sewol did we begin to see its revival. As the EAI summary states:

Seokho Kim of Seoul National University explores whether popular opinion that led to the protests against Park Geun-hye is a sure sign that civic space is undergoing a revival in South Korea. Kim emphasizes that these protests are not spontaneous outburst of anger, but rather a culmination of the condensed anger and frustration of the citizens fuelled by social inequality, intensified polarization, and declining opportunities for social mobility. In order for the protests in 2016 to not end up as a one-time eruption, Kim urges that the civil society must expand its outreach to the citizens

 

 

Advice on Edited Volumes

One of my co-editors sent me this link about the pitfalls of participating in edited volumes. Since I'm currently in the middle of editing a volume, and organizing a conference to produce another volume, I found this article dreadfully amusing. Here's an excerpt of what Joseph Weiler, President of EUI writes:

The routine is well-known and well-practised. You receive an invitation to present a paper at some conference. You accept (see below). You may adapt something you have already written or something that you are working on which is in some way connected. It is often not exactly what the conveners had asked for or had in mind, but perhaps close enough so as not to have to reject the invitation. The conveners are often accomplices in this little approximation. They are committed to the conference; it is often part of some grant they have received. Almost always you are pressed for time – after all it is not as if these invitations arrive when you are sitting back, twiddling your thumbs and looking for things to do. In general they are disruptive of your flow of work. So the result is not as good as it might have been... 

You attend the conference. It shows. The papers presented are of very variable quality and relevance. There is the usual conference overload so that the habitual 10-15 minute ‘commentator’ input may be interesting but of limited value to your paper... 

...The book is then published with an enticing title and on occasion wonderful artwork. More often there is ‘programmatic artwork’: flags, a globe, whatever. The publishers assess the captive market and act accordingly. The print runs are small, the price typically exorbitant and in any event unattractive for individual purchase. It is common that the conveners have budgeted a subsidy to the publishers. An expensive cemetery – rightly so. If you are lucky, the book may be reviewed. And if you are even luckier, the review will be more than, well, a rehashed version of the ‘Introduction’ and road map.

Part of our group at a conference at Deakin University
(Melbourne) in June 2015. We already replaced someone
from this group which attests to some of the challenges of  pursuing
edited volumes, but also our commitment to ensuring quality.
Photo Credit: Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation 

I pretty much agree with everything above and the entire blog post. But based on my limited experience (n=2) organizing collaborative projects, I still believe there is much intellectual and professional merit in putting together such volumes. To give the concrete example of our work on North Korean human rights (NKHR) discourse and advocacy, I have learned much about this issue from our collaboration. I do believe our understanding of NKHR discourse and advocacy networks is poorly understand, and that collectively we have something to say on this matter which is new and different, and hopefully useful.

The volume is not simply a check box to satisfy our funders. There is no way my co-editor and I would spend countless hours, at times neglecting family duties. to do this project if we didn't believe there was some intellectual and practical value behind our efforts. Admittedly, the hardest part has been getting our collaborators to get on board and push them in the direction we'd like. But I'm confident our upcoming conference and follow-up book workshop will motivate us to put together something coherent and meaningful. That's the challenge ahead of us as we approach our big event in a few weeks!