Government Shutdown and the Asia Pivot

Stymied by tea party Republican efforts to block the Affordable Health Care Act (aka Obamacare) and the decision of Democrats to stand firm against further delay of the new health care law, the federal government shut-down last week. I try to stay out of politics on this blog, but my own take (along with the majority of the country) is that a group of minority Republicans have forced the Party establishment to make unreasonable demands on a policy which has legitimately passed through several hurdles in our democratic system. A Post op-ed makes this very point. Jon Stewart does it with less grace but way more humor here.

Moving beyond this domestic debacle, others have pontificated on the repercussions of the government shutdown on foreign policy. Josh Busby writes that lawmakers have weakened America’s ability to serve as a force for attraction around the world. Anne Applebaum states that the shutdown has not only damaged U.S. credibility abroad, but democracy itself. The Post argues national security faces greater risks with intelligence and security forces not operating at full capacity. And Ralph Cossa at CSIS, Pacific Forum had a tongue-in-cheek memo for Republicans and the President:

Memo to Congressional Republicans: Remember Ronald Reagan's "shining city on a hill"? You just turned the lights off.

Memo to President Obama: remember your "pivot" to Asia? Its credibility is fading even faster than Congressional approval ratings.

One major foreign policy casualty of the government shutdown last week was Obama's cancellation of his Asia trip - specifically his attendance at the APEC and ASEAN summit meetings in Indonesia and Brunei, as well as stops to Malaysia and the Philippines. Now most Americans will agree that the President has no business flying off to Asia given the political mess back at home. But considering the pivot to Asia as one of the most touted foreign policy initiatives of the Administration, it sends mixed signals when the President bails on a trip to the region, even if he does send Secretary of State John Kerry as a stand in. Beyond missed opportunities to reassure partners in Asia and hold discussion with leaders from China and Russia, several critics have argued that Washington's absence opens the door for China to exert greater influence in the region. An article in the Global Post goes further by contrasting Washington's uneven attention towards Asia while Beijing's strengthened diplomatic, military, and economic influence in the region.

I'm not a China alarmist by any means, and we shouldn't read too much into Obama's absence in Asia. Also, in the past few weeks, Sec Def Chuck Hagel spent an unprecedented four days in South Korea reaffirming the U.S.-ROK alliance while both he and Sec State John Kerry traveled to Tokyo for the 2+2 meetings to strengthen U.S.-Japan ties (including permission from Japan to house U.S. drones on Japanese soil). Still,  lingering concerns remain about U.S. commitment to the region from our allies. Mike Green and Matt Goodman at CSIS address this point and suggest how Washington might rectify the situation: 1) reschedule a visit to the region early next year; 2) provide greater clarity and Congressional support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade negotiations; 3) protect the U.S. defense budget from making deep cuts on Asia.

I do think the Obama Administration recognizes the long-term strategic value of engaging Asia. But there have been too many fires to put out (i.e. Arab Spring, Libya, Syria, and now the federal shutdown) which pull us away from our longer term strategic goals whether on foreign or domestic policy. We can rebound from temporary setbacks, but we shouldn't lose our eye on the ball. While we fix our gaze on China wondering whether the U.S. is in relative decline, the rest of the world will closely follow the U.S. and our increasing polarization and gridlock in Washington for signs of American decline. Why? Because the decline of great powers often begins at home, not abroad.
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Update: The Washington Post published an article with the headline "China's Xi takes advantage of Obama absence." Yes, this is an opportunity for China to exercise its charm, but I wonder if the media is overplaying this tune. I'm sure Xi's trip to parts of Indonesia and Malaysia were already planned. Another article suggests that U.S. and China are "grappling for influence" in Southeast Asia. Yes, but this competition is not new. The question is whether it's a benign, competitive (for lack of a distinct adjective), or hostile form of competition.

Finally, Elina Noor argues that Obama missed a chance to promote the TPP and gave up some ground to China to elevate ties with countries such as Malaysia. However, an Obama trip would have been more symbol than substance and in the long run does not affect US-Malaysia ties. Citing Malaysia's relationship with Beijing and Washington, she writes "To view them in mutually exclusive terms would be a simplistic reduction of what in reality are rich, cross-cutting, and commonly reinforcing interests between and among all three in a messy noodle bowl of regional economic and security frameworks."

Closure of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti

Source: Department of the Navy; CIA World Factbook. Image source: 

GeoEye via Google Earth. Printed in The Washington Post Sept. 24, 2013. 

Last month, Djibouti requested that a fleet of U.S. drones relocate from Camp Lemonnier following several crashes. Although we don't know the details, Washington and Djibouti seemed to have reached this agreement amicably. For the most part, Djibouti, officials have been satisfied with the arrangement ($37 million yearly rent), and from the standpoint of base politics, relocating now rather than after some catastrophic accident seems like the wiser option.

North Korea Collapse Scenarios

Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute published a critical assessment of a new RAND study, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. In skimming Hayes critique, two points come to the forefront. First, the study is unclear about the probability of whether collapse is imminent: when vs. if North Korea will collapse. Bruce Bennett, the author of the study, is more nuanced in his report even if RAND's publication division plays up the "imminent" card. For instance, the first key finding listed in RAND's executive summary is that "There Is a Reasonable Probability That North Korean Totalitarianism Will End in the Foreseeable Future." As such, the report may not provide the best basis for policy. As Hayes writes, "The problem with Bennett’s report is that it quickly moved from the purely 'conceptual space' into the media space,  and is fast headed for the policy-political space." Given the probability of competing non-collapse scenarios, Hayes cautions hastily drawing immediate policy conclusions out of the study.

Second, the collapse argument has been around for two decades now.  Take just one scenario for instance: David Collins' collapse scenario in 1995 in the wake of the famine:

Phase One:resource depletion
Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion
Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government
Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough
Phase Five: active resistance against the central government
Phase Six: the fracture of the regime
Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.

As we all know, collapse has yet to happen, and has forced some analysts such as Aidan Foster-Carter and David Maxwell to backtrack on their earlier predictions with Maxwell writing a piece about why North Koreans don't rebel.

For someone like me who wants to know whether pockets of civil society exist in North Korea, the study is a must read because any collapse scenario will implicate or have implications for ordinary North Koreans. North Koreans may mobilize to hasten or complicate a devolving North Korean state in a hard collapse scenario. And in a soft-landing scenario, civil society (or its development) will be instrumental in bringing about a less chaotic transition.

Teaching About China's Maritime Dispute

CFR unveiled a snazzy new interactive tool to study China's maritimes disputes. This is a great educational tool for students, complete with discussion and essay questions, and something I'll try to incorporate next semester in my U.S., China, and International Relations of East Asia course. Ironically, however, using such a tool will probably require more, not less time for prep since the instructor has to preview all the material beforehand. Anyway, kudos to CFR.

Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space

Anti-War Protests, Pacificism, and Syria

I've avoided discussion on Syria since there are a million other outlets pontificating on this issue already. However, two articles appeared on my radar, both in reaction to the recent surge in activity from anti-war groups so I'll comment on anti-war protests. Liberal anti-war groups largely supported Obama'd bid for election in 2008. However, Syria provides the first major break between the administration and demonstraters. It's no suprise that activists, who we often assume are principled actors, can too play politics, forming coalitions with lawmakers, disparate groups, and whoever will help them push their short term agenda. Who would have thought conservative libertarians and left-wing pacificists jumping in bed! But this also shows that coalitions are fluid, and their relationship with formal political parties are complex as argued by Michael Heaney and Fabio Rojas here. More related to my own (not-yet-off-the-ground) research is a confirmation about the worldviews and constraints of policymakers and activists. They are socialized into two completely different worldviews such that no permanent coalition could be ever formed in finding a solution to peace.

Source: Nikki Kahn/Washington Post

The second article is an op-ed from documentary filmaker Sebastian Junger titled " When the best chance for peace means war." It's essentially a rebuke of pacifism in the wake of humanitarian disaster as Junger writes, "At some point, pacifism becomes part of the machinery of death." Evoking just means for the use of force, he adds, "Every war I have ever covered — Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Liberia — withstood all diplomatic efforts to end it until Western military action finally forced a resolution." This last point is the tough question for pacfisits. The pacifist reponse is to always look for diplomatic solutions, even when such solutions have been exhausted. At times coercion, or the threat of coercion, are needed to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough.

A Caring Society

Anne Marie-Slaughter has written an inspiring piece about what at first sounded like another call  for bridging the policy-accademic divide, but instead turned into an appeal for greater investment in producing an ethos of "care" in our society and abroad. She writes, "Common purpose creates the trust and empathy that reveal us as individual human beings, not as statistics and stereotypes." Of course, she leaves it up to academics to come up with the great ideas to institute a policy of care and compassion. :)

Social Movements and the Politics of Markets

A compadre of mine in the social movements and IR field, Joshua Busby, has come out with a new book co-authored with Ethan Kapstein on social movements and the politics of markets.  Most of my work linking IR with social movements deals with security issues. But Josh's work reminds us that there's a host of social movement issues related to IPE as well: globalization, global financial institutions, labor markets, development, global inequality and so forth.  I've cross-posted Joshua's entry about his book from the Duck of Minerva blog here.