News Roundup: Latin America, Gun Control, Asia Historical Memory, ISA blog policy snafu

Have not been able to blog since the birth of our daughter last Nov. Basically, it's a trade-off between extra sleep or blogging (or doing actual work and blogging). I've been wanting to write on a variety of topics, so as a happy-medium, here's news round-up to ease my way back into the blog.

The left turn in Latin America: My Latin Americanist colleague says he's had enough of the "left turn" in Latin American politics when I mentioned this overview provided by the Washington Post. I was still curious to know how much of the turn was driven by social movements (since we hear about populist policies from the likes of the late Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales) or whether the turn to the left can be explained within the confides of institutional and electoral politics. Some answers might be found in Steve Levitsky and Ken Robert's book, Resurgence of the Latin American Left, and also in Max Cameron and Eric Hershberg's Latin America's Left Turn. There's also an emerging cleavage which actually cuts across the left-right divide: nationalist vs internationalist (or protectionism vs. free trade as outlined in the article). 

Gun control: The shooting in the Columbia, MD mall was only twenty miles from my home. In the aftermath, Dana Miibank asks if we've become numb to mass shootings. Despite numerous attempts to address gun violence after each tragedy (i.e. Tucson, AZ; Aurora, CO; Newtown, CT; Navy Yard in Washington DC), and with each mass shooting claimed as a "critical juncture" for gun control advocates, the ball has not moved forward all that much. Aside from the power of the NRA (or in large part b/c of their advocacy) my own research suggests that powerful ideational (which translate to political) barriers exist which gun control advocates have not been able to penetrate in spite of the powerful emotional claims/frames they've created.  An interesting research question is to explore whether public opinion functions independent of this ideational barrier (i.e. if public opinion now strongly favors gun control measure, why have we not seen greater shifts in policy on this issue).

Korea-Japan, historical memory: For my students taking East Asian IR with me this semester, I shared how historical issues have managed to find their way into local politics in the DMV area. Korean-Americans actually lobbied and received a commitment from new VA governor Terry McAuliffe to include "East Sea" in any VA state issued textbook which also states the body of water between Korea and Japan as the "Sea of Japan."  McAuliffe now has four lobbyists and the Japanese Ambassador on his arse. Ddoh! It's a choice between votes (many more voting Koreans than Japanese in VA) or economic largesse (Japan reportedly invested $1 billion in the state of VA). And from a couple years ago in DC, there was the sale and return of  the Phelps House to the Korean government. The Phelps House was the first Korean embassy in the U.S. located on Logan Circle, to be sold for $5 by the Japanese after Korea became its colony. Fred Hiatt takes a broader look at some of these historical issues and wonders if we really have/are pivoting to Asia (and implies we should).

ISA blog snafu: Of all the comments about ISA governing council's proposal on blog policy, Amanda Murdie provided a response which resonated closely with my own reactions.

Closure of Manas Air Base

I was contacted a few weeks ago by Stars and Stripes, the U.S. military's news organization to comment on the closure of Manas Air Base in Kyrgzstan and base relocation to Romania. Despite the time I put in researching and answering questions, my comments were never used. So I've put up my responses to the questions below. Here's additional commentary from Alex Cooley, a true expert on this subject.

1. What are your general thoughts on the Manas Base?

Political instability and conflict in the Middle East have been ongoing if not rising the past few years. Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan is winding down. Therefore, it makes a lot of strategic sense for the U.S. to shift air transit operations from Kyrgyzstan to Romania which is much closer to current global hot spots along the Mediterranean and the Middle East .

2. Do you think they (the Kyrgz) actually wanted the U.S. operations to leave, or were they hoping for better terms and the U.S. called their bluff?

The Kyrgyzstan government has played base politics with the United States before, ratcheting upward the "rent" for Manas during negotiations in 2006. More importantly, in 2009, the Kyrgyz president announced his decision to terminate the base agreement, only to have the U.S. triple its offer to keep U.S. flights operating.  I'm not aware if the U.S. and Kyrgyz government attempted to negotiate a deal again, but it should have been obvious to the Kyrgyz that their bargaining power had been significantly reduced with the war in Afghanistan drawing to a close. So it does not seem likely that the Kyrgz were expecting to extract better terms from the U.S. 

3. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Russia has its own base in Kyrgyzstan and is a major economic benefactor so the Kyrgyz may have felt some pressure from Moscow, if not directly at least indirectly, to support its patron. But the decision was most likely one emanating from the Kyrgz themselves given the declining utility of the base for the U.S. and demonstrated by the overwhelming support in Parliament to not renew the base agreement.  

4. To what degree do you think Russian pressure was involved in the Kyrgyz attitudes, or was it more a matter of local opposition to the American presence?

Romania is a much more reliable partner than Kyrgyzstan.  Romania is a member of NATO and has a proven track record of defense cooperation with the U.S. The presence of U.S. bases in Romania should therefore be more stable and less politicized. We are also less likely to see economic opportunism from the Romanian government. 

News Roundup: Asia Pivot; Philippine Disaster; Kony 2013; Korean Politics and More...

There's so much news and so little time to post these days that I've decided to adopt something similar to the Duck's "Morning Linkage" news updates. These are basically news, academic research, and reports which revolve around my research & teaching interests.

Disaster and Relief Effort in the Philippines

• Typhoon Haiyan  has crippled the middle islands of the Philippines. The U.S. military is once again playing a leading role in disaster relief efforts in Asia. Foreign Policy published this article interestingly titled, "Everyone Hate U.S. Bases in Asia - Until Disaster Strikes." Goodwill efforts go far for the military as was the case in Indonesia in 2004 and Japan in 2011. This is in comparison to China's alleged $100,000 pledge (yes, that's correct, 100K). Diplomatic reasons for the paltry sum are given here. Reuters may be exaggerating to make the Chinese look really bad, but the general point about aid and goodwill still stands.
• I'm sure it's been done already, but it might be interesting to conduct a study on the role of the U.S. military and overseas U.S. military presence following foreign disasters? How does U.S. military participation in relief efforts affect local and regional opinion of the U.S. and U.S. military? Does "goodwill" have longer term regional effects? Does disaster relief draw the U.S. military far from its traditional mandate/mission and to what extent can/should the U.S. military be involved in providing humanitarian assistance.
•  Josh Busby had a good  post on thinking about natural disasters and insecurity. We often lump such studies under the rubric of "human security," but Busby, reflecting on his own work on climate change and security in Africa, suggests ways to think about natural hazards and "harder" security issues (i.e. bringing back guns, bombs, bullets). One interesting aspect noted by Busby (via Max Fisher) is the importance of governance and its relationship to disaster response. Looting, violence, and a general breakdown in order is very well a function of governance, state capacity, and perhaps civil-military relations.Jennifer Keister makes excellent points on governance and disaster response here.  The aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan certainly brings interesting comparisons to disaster response in Japan after the 2011 tsunami or the United States after Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Asia pivot related content

• Bob Kelly at the Duck had a long, but insightful piece on ROK-Japan relations, an issue I've also blogged about in the past. What was more interesting was his sweeping overview of East Asian security, the Asia Pivot, and US-Sino relations and where ROK and Japan fit in the broader strategic landscape. This makes a good read for undergrads interested in Asian security.
• Here's a recent CNAS report from Ely Ratner on the Asian Pivot and U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. I'd like to take very small credit for suggesting a few ideas to Ely in the early phase of this project.

South Korean Politics

• The ROK government is seeking a ban on the United Progressive Party (UPP), South Korea's far left party for being pro-North Korea. I've had some interaction with UPP party members since they've been a key supporter of anti-U.S. base protests. Anyway, the article falls in line with a recent paper I read by UCSD professor's Steph Haggard and Jong-Sung You about a decline (or at least lower levels relative to other OECD countries) in civil liberties in South Korea. This is supported by several indexes which measure civil liberties, media openness, and democracy (i.e. Freedom House scores). It also falls in line with my argument about a strong security consensus held by foreign policy and security elites in South Korea.

Kony 2013

• I assigned this piece for my undergrads: a follow-up to the viral Kony 2012 video. The article highlights the unique and unusual interesection of interests between civil society/human rights activists and the U.S. military. As the article states, Invisible Children and other young activists were instrumental in pushing the U.S. government to take action against Kony. This comes despite the fact that Kony “is not targeting U.S. citizens. He’s not targeting U.S. embassies. He’s not al-Qaeda.” Despite the lack of threat to the US, the U.S. military may find other reasons for getting involved in the Kony hunt: 1) it gives them a reason for military presence in sub-Sahara Africa; 2) strengthens relations between U.S. and African countries; 3) allows the US to train African militaries.  So a win-win situation for activists and the U.S. miltiary. Would love to see a research article about the rise of Kony 2012, the convergence of political interests, and perhaps long term consequences of such action beyond Kony's future capture. 

Base Politics

• One of the anti-base protest cases I examined in my book was the protest against base expansion in Vicenza, Italy. The U.S. Army wanted to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, split between Germany and Italy, to northern Italy. Base construction is now complete, but David Vine just emailed me asking if I knew why the U.S. decided to keep two brigades in Germany. This was news to me so didn't have a clear answer.  But here was my educated guess: 

"The military states strategic reasons for keeping a batallion in Germany. Recent departures at Grafenwoehr have left more space with better training facilities for the 173rd. Of course, this defeats the earlier idea of consolidating the 173rd in one location.  This is purely speculation on my part, but is it possible that the Germans wanted to retain some US presence? When the DoD (and CBO) made its early recommendations for base realignment, Germany faced the largest reductions and closures. Not that there's much love for Washington these days from Berlin, but among foreign policy circles, I thought I read or heard somewhere that a few Germans believed the reductions were too much and too fast.

The question which I'm afraid I don't have an answer to, is how the US and Germany decided to retain some of the 173rd in Germany. Did the US ask Germany (likely with Germany willing to oblige); did Germany ask the US (less likely, but possible as a way of reinvigorating strategic ties); and finally, our milliion dollar question, if the  US asked Germany was it b/c of the newfound opportunity to use a large training facilitiy (although hard to believe the US wouldn't have thought of this earlier) or b/c of political opposition either in Vicenza locally, or from Rome, which left the US seeking some last minute basing solution." 

On this last point, if anti-base movements were a part of the decision to keep parts of the 173rd in Germany, I'm curious to know if Vicenza activists celebrated this announcement as a  a partial victory in blocking some US troops.

Government Shutdown and the Asia Pivot

Stymied by tea party Republican efforts to block the Affordable Health Care Act (aka Obamacare) and the decision of Democrats to stand firm against further delay of the new health care law, the federal government shut-down last week. I try to stay out of politics on this blog, but my own take (along with the majority of the country) is that a group of minority Republicans have forced the Party establishment to make unreasonable demands on a policy which has legitimately passed through several hurdles in our democratic system. A Post op-ed makes this very point. Jon Stewart does it with less grace but way more humor here.

Moving beyond this domestic debacle, others have pontificated on the repercussions of the government shutdown on foreign policy. Josh Busby writes that lawmakers have weakened America’s ability to serve as a force for attraction around the world. Anne Applebaum states that the shutdown has not only damaged U.S. credibility abroad, but democracy itself. The Post argues national security faces greater risks with intelligence and security forces not operating at full capacity. And Ralph Cossa at CSIS, Pacific Forum had a tongue-in-cheek memo for Republicans and the President:

Memo to Congressional Republicans: Remember Ronald Reagan's "shining city on a hill"? You just turned the lights off.

Memo to President Obama: remember your "pivot" to Asia? Its credibility is fading even faster than Congressional approval ratings.

One major foreign policy casualty of the government shutdown last week was Obama's cancellation of his Asia trip - specifically his attendance at the APEC and ASEAN summit meetings in Indonesia and Brunei, as well as stops to Malaysia and the Philippines. Now most Americans will agree that the President has no business flying off to Asia given the political mess back at home. But considering the pivot to Asia as one of the most touted foreign policy initiatives of the Administration, it sends mixed signals when the President bails on a trip to the region, even if he does send Secretary of State John Kerry as a stand in. Beyond missed opportunities to reassure partners in Asia and hold discussion with leaders from China and Russia, several critics have argued that Washington's absence opens the door for China to exert greater influence in the region. An article in the Global Post goes further by contrasting Washington's uneven attention towards Asia while Beijing's strengthened diplomatic, military, and economic influence in the region.

I'm not a China alarmist by any means, and we shouldn't read too much into Obama's absence in Asia. Also, in the past few weeks, Sec Def Chuck Hagel spent an unprecedented four days in South Korea reaffirming the U.S.-ROK alliance while both he and Sec State John Kerry traveled to Tokyo for the 2+2 meetings to strengthen U.S.-Japan ties (including permission from Japan to house U.S. drones on Japanese soil). Still,  lingering concerns remain about U.S. commitment to the region from our allies. Mike Green and Matt Goodman at CSIS address this point and suggest how Washington might rectify the situation: 1) reschedule a visit to the region early next year; 2) provide greater clarity and Congressional support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade negotiations; 3) protect the U.S. defense budget from making deep cuts on Asia.

I do think the Obama Administration recognizes the long-term strategic value of engaging Asia. But there have been too many fires to put out (i.e. Arab Spring, Libya, Syria, and now the federal shutdown) which pull us away from our longer term strategic goals whether on foreign or domestic policy. We can rebound from temporary setbacks, but we shouldn't lose our eye on the ball. While we fix our gaze on China wondering whether the U.S. is in relative decline, the rest of the world will closely follow the U.S. and our increasing polarization and gridlock in Washington for signs of American decline. Why? Because the decline of great powers often begins at home, not abroad.
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Update: The Washington Post published an article with the headline "China's Xi takes advantage of Obama absence." Yes, this is an opportunity for China to exercise its charm, but I wonder if the media is overplaying this tune. I'm sure Xi's trip to parts of Indonesia and Malaysia were already planned. Another article suggests that U.S. and China are "grappling for influence" in Southeast Asia. Yes, but this competition is not new. The question is whether it's a benign, competitive (for lack of a distinct adjective), or hostile form of competition.

Finally, Elina Noor argues that Obama missed a chance to promote the TPP and gave up some ground to China to elevate ties with countries such as Malaysia. However, an Obama trip would have been more symbol than substance and in the long run does not affect US-Malaysia ties. Citing Malaysia's relationship with Beijing and Washington, she writes "To view them in mutually exclusive terms would be a simplistic reduction of what in reality are rich, cross-cutting, and commonly reinforcing interests between and among all three in a messy noodle bowl of regional economic and security frameworks."

Closure of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti

Source: Department of the Navy; CIA World Factbook. Image source: 

GeoEye via Google Earth. Printed in The Washington Post Sept. 24, 2013. 

Last month, Djibouti requested that a fleet of U.S. drones relocate from Camp Lemonnier following several crashes. Although we don't know the details, Washington and Djibouti seemed to have reached this agreement amicably. For the most part, Djibouti, officials have been satisfied with the arrangement ($37 million yearly rent), and from the standpoint of base politics, relocating now rather than after some catastrophic accident seems like the wiser option.

North Korea Collapse Scenarios

Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute published a critical assessment of a new RAND study, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. In skimming Hayes critique, two points come to the forefront. First, the study is unclear about the probability of whether collapse is imminent: when vs. if North Korea will collapse. Bruce Bennett, the author of the study, is more nuanced in his report even if RAND's publication division plays up the "imminent" card. For instance, the first key finding listed in RAND's executive summary is that "There Is a Reasonable Probability That North Korean Totalitarianism Will End in the Foreseeable Future." As such, the report may not provide the best basis for policy. As Hayes writes, "The problem with Bennett’s report is that it quickly moved from the purely 'conceptual space' into the media space,  and is fast headed for the policy-political space." Given the probability of competing non-collapse scenarios, Hayes cautions hastily drawing immediate policy conclusions out of the study.

Second, the collapse argument has been around for two decades now.  Take just one scenario for instance: David Collins' collapse scenario in 1995 in the wake of the famine:

Phase One:resource depletion
Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion
Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government
Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough
Phase Five: active resistance against the central government
Phase Six: the fracture of the regime
Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.

As we all know, collapse has yet to happen, and has forced some analysts such as Aidan Foster-Carter and David Maxwell to backtrack on their earlier predictions with Maxwell writing a piece about why North Koreans don't rebel.

For someone like me who wants to know whether pockets of civil society exist in North Korea, the study is a must read because any collapse scenario will implicate or have implications for ordinary North Koreans. North Koreans may mobilize to hasten or complicate a devolving North Korean state in a hard collapse scenario. And in a soft-landing scenario, civil society (or its development) will be instrumental in bringing about a less chaotic transition.

Teaching About China's Maritime Dispute

CFR unveiled a snazzy new interactive tool to study China's maritimes disputes. This is a great educational tool for students, complete with discussion and essay questions, and something I'll try to incorporate next semester in my U.S., China, and International Relations of East Asia course. Ironically, however, using such a tool will probably require more, not less time for prep since the instructor has to preview all the material beforehand. Anyway, kudos to CFR.

Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space