Social Movements and the Politics of Markets

A compadre of mine in the social movements and IR field, Joshua Busby, has come out with a new book co-authored with Ethan Kapstein on social movements and the politics of markets.  Most of my work linking IR with social movements deals with security issues. But Josh's work reminds us that there's a host of social movement issues related to IPE as well: globalization, global financial institutions, labor markets, development, global inequality and so forth.  I've cross-posted Joshua's entry about his book from the Duck of Minerva blog here.

Civil Society, Civil Nuclear Cooperation, and Nuclear Disarmament

Back in June during the Mansfield Foundation's U.S.-Korea Scholar-Policy program, Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists and Mary Beth Niikitin led an interesting discussion about the 123 Agreement and US-ROK civilian nuclear energy cooperation. I expected a boring talk, but it turned out to be one of the most interesting panels. Civilian nuclear diplomacy seemed to touch on every aspect of IR theory relevant to me: international security, two-level games, foreign policy, transnational activism, civil
society etc..

In a nutshell, Korea wants to expand its civilian nuclear energy capabilities and become a global supplier. However, Korea is prohibited from taking these steps under the U.S.-ROK "123" Agreement (following section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act agreement). As Mark Holt argues, U.S. consent is required for any reprocessing or enrichment activities related to U.S.-supplied materials and technology. Unable to come to an agreement, the U.S. and Korea decided to extend the current terms of the 123 Agreement and return to negotiations in 2014. The issue is complicated because

1. South Korea has growing energy demands and as their deal with the UAE suggests, a lot of money can be made from exporting the technological know-how. 
2. At the international level, the U.S.has to consider non-proliferation norms without appearing as if it carries double-standards. If  Korea is granted permission to expand its civilian nuclear program, why not North Korea? Why not Iran? These were some of the criticisms faced by the Bush Administration over the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement in 2005. South Korea must also consider global non-proliferation norms, as well as its alliance partnership with the U.S.
3. At the domestic level, we might see three reactions: a) From the right: This is a matter of national sovereignty, Korea has the right to develop its nukes; b) From the left: nuclear energy is a dangerous option; c) From businesses: nuclear energy export leads to profit.

The issue of civilian nuclear cooperation can get technical very quickly, but it does seem like a great case for political scientists to explore, especially those who are into two-level games type research.

And although not related to civil nuclear cooperation, the role of civil society and nuclear disarmament has again come to my attention. The research conducted by the Nautilus Institute reminds me that it is not just left-wing peace activists who support disarmament, but those in the policy world as well. Another link on transnational civil society and disarmament is here.

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Mobile Phones, Collective Action, and Social Capital

In my last post, I mentioned ownership and use of cell phones as a means for examining social capital. According to the World Bank study I cited, the idea was that rural areas with high cell phone ownership would produce a type of social network facilitating communication. I thought of tagging a study in the APSR which also used mobile phone onto the previous post, but decided it was worth creating a new post.
In the May 2013 issue of APSR, Jan Pierskalla and Florian Hollenbach find that:

The availability of cell phones as a communication technology allows political groups to overcome collective action problems more easily and improve in-group cooperation, and coordination. Utilizing novel, spatially disaggregated data on cell phone coverage and the location of organized violent events in Africa, we are able to show that the availability of cell phone coverage significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict.

The authors argue that cell phones helps facilitate in-group organization and the coordination of insurgent attacks. Hence cell phone coverage should be correlated with increased political violence. I haven't read the entire article, but their insights provide a counterpoint to many of the positive stories attached to technology, social media, and mobilization (i.e. Arab Spring, Occupy Movements, Candlelight Vigils in South Korea). It also takes us back to basic questions about social capital and what it's used for. Does social capital have to promote larger social (and not just private) benefits? The classic example are mafia groups and organized crime. Lots of social capital in those organizations. But towards what purpose?

Studying Civil Society in North Korea

CFR recently published my report on South Korean civil society and the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Civil Society North Korean-style :)

But my attention this week has turned to civil society in North Korea. Civil society in North Korea?!? Well no, its probably non-existent. But  a map of DPRK which locates where market activity is taking place and where humanitarian organizations operate exists. I wonder if the map might help researchers a) locate where one could go to look for potential early signs of things like trust, social capital, or civil society at the local level and b) compare this to other comparable regions in DPRK without the presence of market activity, aid agencies, etc..... it would be a natural or field experiment of sorts to see whether market activity or foreign presence has helped create social networks outside of government control. One could test basic concepts such as the relationship between market activity and social capital (i.e. whether market exchanges facilitate social capital and trust). My wife tells me economists think the relationship is reverse: social capital helps facilitate market exchanges. The larger point, however, is whether market activity or long term foreign presence helps create pockets of civil society in North Korea. Such a study might also lead us to examine the degree of  internal support for the regime as well as issues related to governance in a post-unification, post-transition scenario. 

Obviously the obstacles to such a study are enormous without real access into North Korea. It's not like I could handout survey questions. But there might be other ways of studying social capital. The World Bank has some practical suggestions. And there seem to be plenty of books and articles on measuring and finding social capital. For instance, one study linked cell phone ownership and social capital in Africa...something which might be plausible to examine in North Korea's future with two million cell phone subscribers (mostly in Pyongyang) through Koryolink - an Egyptian venture into the DPRK telecom industry. Rumors have it that there might be a second company entering the market. According to a Nautilus Report, DPRK's IT sector is growing with the mobile industry having "crossed the Rubicon."

One thought was the idea of using market activity as a proxy for civil society. It may be possible that in the unofficial markets, trust between the sellers and customers is the core of what enables market to run. It's hard to make transactions that could potentially throw you in jail if you don't trust your counterpart who might report you to authorities for engaging in illicit trade. On the other hand, I've heard some horror stories about market activity promoting rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and greed in DPRK and in pockets of China (the exact opposite of social capital!).

Finally, it's possible that social capital may take on an entirely (North Korean) bent which may not be easily observed. Would the concept of social capital in North Korea exist in the same way it does in other parts of the world? My discussions with defectors and NGO workers is that North Koreans have a hard time trusting anyone after having lived under a watchful regime where even family members become informants. Marc Howard's Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe raises some of these challenges for Eastern Europe (the article length version in Journal of Democracy is here). But living under decades of juche (self-reliant) ideology may present a whole different set of challenges for the growth of civil society in North Korea.

Recent Protests in Turkey and Brazil

For a blog on social movements, I haven't done much tracking of the two recent major protests in Turkey and now Brazil. This AP article provides a basic comparison of the two protests. David Meyer has a better comparison here. In trying to understand protests, everyone looks for parallels: Student rebellions of 1968, Occupy Wall Street, Iranian Green Revolution of 2009, the Arab Spring?

Source: Reuters

Mass protests at the outset appear random and chaotic. The spark which triggers mobilization is rarely predictable. Yet, once a protests gets underway, for those well-versed in social movement theory, mobilization patterns and behavior all seem fairly predictable. At a broad level, there is nothing particularly unique about either protest. As Christian Davenport argues, however, the media would have you think otherwise.

Let's start with Turkey. Few people realize that the protests over Gezi Park had actually been ongoing for a couple of years on a very small scale by one main group (Taksim Solidarity). Only when the government began the process of razing the park did protests escalate, triggering mass protests. The police overreacted and cracked down on protesters. Images of violent clashes circulated in the media fueling more attention, resources, and warm bodies for the movement. At this point, the protests became less about saving Gezi Park, and more about grievances against the Erodgan government. This opened the door for a wide variety of groups to join the fray. It's unclear whether any formal coalition has organized. Soli Ozel believes that the protests are rooted in political dissatisfaction with Erdogan and his authoritarian handling of social and economic issues. This suggests that protests will continue to reemerge, even if this current protest cycle dies down. But on the other hand, without the right political timing or without additional resources and leadership, the movement risks losing momentum and becoming co-opted by the state.  Of course, the local-cultural nuances at the micro-level are always unique.But the broader dynamics of movement escalation and state-societal interaction spelled out here are almost identical to what I witnessed regarding anti-base movements on Jeju Island a couple years ago. They also follow patterns similar to protests during the Arab Spring or the Occupy movements.

Moving onto Brazil, we see a similar chain of events. Long standing grievances about poor public services relative to Brazil's high tax rate have irked Brazilians. But only with the announced fare hike did a political opportunity for larger scale protests exist. Civil societal pressure led to modest concessions from the government in hopes that part o the movement might seek asylum. What next? This excellent article in the Post raises that very question and highlights a key dilemma: "If protests focus too narrowly on single issues such as bus fares, they risk losing steam when the issue is addressed. And if they embrace too many issues, they risk spreading themselves too thin to achieve any of their goals."

Source: Tasso Marcelo - AFP/Getty Images

The concessions intended to ease and co-opt protests seems to have failed in the short-run. But where is this all heading? The motive and grievances of protesters go well beyond fare hikes at this point. Contrary to this interview on NPR where a young activist states, "We don't believe in organiz[ing] ourselves in leadership, and someone just following orders. And I think that leadership is not something that would help us. On the opposite, I think we should all be organizing as equals,"  Contrary to the preceding quote, I'm certain there is some form of organization and leadership being assembled as we speak. But still, protesters (as in Turkey) have yet to form a list of specific demands or form any clear leadership. In that sense, the comments of the young protester seem a little naive. But who am I to judge. It is after all their movement. For protesters in Turkey and Brazil, simply being able to vent and letting their government and the entire world know that they are fed up with government restrictions or poor government service may be the ultimate goal. Maybe politicians and policymakers will listen and make changes. Maybe they won't.

Going back to my original point, the recent protests in Turkey and Brazil follow broad patterns outlined by social scientists. This increases my confidence in academic theory and that theory can actually be useful.

Update: A similar sort of argument from Anne Applebaum looking at Brazil, Turkey, Egypt.

The Laotian Nine: Escaping or Trafficked out of North Korea?

A North Korean human rights issue which has captured much attention recently is the return of the Laotian Nine: last month, nine North Korean defectors (all reportedly orphans) caught in Laos were detained by the Laotian government before being repatriated back to North Korea. The nine, with the aid of an activist/pastor, had navigated the underground railroad out of North Korea through China and into Laos over the past two years in hopes of seeking asylum in South Korea. Laotian actions potentially violated international law which prevents countries from repatriating refugees if their lives are endangered. Because of the media spotlight, there's some hope that the nine orphans, mostly children, will avoid being sent to the gulags, but there fate now is unknown.The case has received attention not only because of the number of children involved, but because Laos had been seen as a relative safe haven for defectors.

It's clear that Pyongyang has been cracking down on the number of defectors the past few years. There's speculation that the North Koreans (and perhaps the Chinese) may have pressured the Laotian government this time to repatriate the nine young defectors. The Laotian (and North Korean) government claimed that the nine were "trafficked"  out of North Korea by a Christian activist/pastor.

Here lies the moral and legal dilemma faced by third party countries like Laos or China and the importance of labels. In China, those who escape North Korea are labeled as "economic migrants" rather than refugees. As economic migrants, they are not protected under international law and therefore sent back to North Korea. In the Laotian nine case, Vientiane claimed the nine were "trafficked", an action which paradoxically makes the children victims of human rights abuse. Morally, we know it's wrong to send defectors back to North Korea if the chance of torture, hard labor, or death for defectors are high (which they are according to human rights reports). But legally, what do you do if providing safe haven or aiding defectors violates the sovereignty of another country (in this case North Korea). To put this in perspective, if a U.S. citizen breaks the law and flees another country, the US would certainly not want other countries giving safe haven to defectors and insist they be repatriated back to the U.S. (i.e. draft dodgers during the Vietnam era, or more recently, Edward Snowden). And yes, I'm aware the U.S. is no North Korea.

Of course, we tend to treat North Korea as a country which has given up its right to be judged as a sovereign state since North Korea repeatedly violates international law (or norms, natural law etc...) and apply domestic laws arbitrarily and unevenly (North Korea laws are interpreted and applied at the discretion of the regime. But here's a somewhat alternative view). Most human rights advocates, including myself, are appalled at the decision to repatriate the nine defectors, mostly children. Yet from the perspective of Vientiane, Beijing, or Pyeongyang which also consider national interests, diplomatic relations, and economic costs and not just moral reputation and international codes of ethics, the decision is surely a complicated one. Activists and states which adhere closely to the UN conventions must continue to persuade - through instrumental means or moral suasion - why a blanket policy of repatriation is wrong (i.e. there must be a way to distinguish between refugees, economic migrants, and trafficked persons). They must also press countries which have some diplomatic purchase over North Korea (i.e. China) to push Pyeongyang to address issues which are at the root cause of defection: food shortages, abject poverty, and human rights abuses.

RAND Study: Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Force

RAND recently published a massive study titled Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces. Commissioned by the Pentagon, it's probably the most comprehensive study on overseas bases since the Overseas Basing Commission Report released for the U.S. Congress in 2005.

I'm waiting to receive a hard copy of the report so I don't destroy my printer cartridge printing out the free pdf version online. In the meantime, you can get few snippets of the report from Michah Zenko at CFR. For a more Asia-oriented assessment of the report's findings, see this Indian Times article. Apparently, the report suggests using Port Blair in India as a site for a drone base.

Given the publication of this report, there does seem to be renewed interest on the topic of overseas bases. Stacie Pettyjohn, one of the RAND co-authors of the overseas basing study also has a concise new RAND monograph outlining the history of U.S. overseas military presence. A colleague in my department alerted me to a graduate student presenting a paper on "quasi-U.S bases" in Latin America. And of course, there's lots of interest about drone bases, particularly in the Middle East North Africa and Sub-Saharan regions.

I've moved on from base politics research but I suppose one can never fully escape one's past work, especially if they now exist as publications in the public domain. Once I get around to reading the report, I'll update this post with some insights into the RAND study.