Thursday, August 29, 2013

Social Movements and the Politics of Markets

A compadre of mine in the social movements and IR field, Joshua Busby, has come out with a new book co-authored with Ethan Kapstein on social movements and the politics of markets.  Most of my work linking IR with social movements deals with security issues. But Josh's work reminds us that there's a host of social movement issues related to IPE as well: globalization, global financial institutions, labor markets, development, global inequality and so forth.  I've cross-posted Joshua's entry about his book from the Duck of Minerva blog here.

Thursday, August 22, 2013

Civil Society, Civil Nuclear Cooperation, and Nuclear Disarmament

Back in June during the Mansfield Foundation's U.S.-Korea Scholar-Policy program, Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists and Mary Beth Niikitin led an interesting discussion about the 123 Agreement and US-ROK civilian nuclear energy cooperation. I expected a boring talk, but it turned out to be one of the most interesting panels. Civilian nuclear diplomacy seemed to touch on every aspect of IR theory relevant to me: international security, two-level games, foreign policy, transnational activism, civil
society etc..

In a nutshell, Korea wants to expand its civilian nuclear energy capabilities and become a global supplier. However, Korea is prohibited from taking these steps under the U.S.-ROK "123" Agreement (following section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act agreement). As Mark Holt argues, U.S. consent is required for any reprocessing or enrichment activities related to U.S.-supplied materials and technology. Unable to come to an agreement, the U.S. and Korea decided to extend the current terms of the 123 Agreement and return to negotiations in 2014. The issue is complicated because
  1. South Korea has growing energy demands and as their deal with the UAE suggests, a lot of money can be made from exporting the technological know-how. 
  2. At the international level, the U.S.has to consider non-proliferation norms without appearing as if it carries double-standards. If  Korea is granted permission to expand its civilian nuclear program, why not North Korea? Why not Iran? These were some of the criticisms faced by the Bush Administration over the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement in 2005. South Korea must also consider global non-proliferation norms, as well as its alliance partnership with the U.S.
  3. At the domestic level, we might see three reactions: a) From the right: This is a matter of national sovereignty, Korea has the right to develop its nukes; b) From the left: nuclear energy is a dangerous option; c) From businesses: nuclear energy export leads to profit.
The issue of civilian nuclear cooperation can get technical very quickly, but it does seem like a great case for political scientists to explore, especially those who are into two-level games type research.

And although not related to civil nuclear cooperation, the role of civil society and nuclear disarmament has again come to my attention. The research conducted by the Nautilus Institute reminds me that it is not just left-wing peace activists who support disarmament, but those in the policy world as well. Another link on transnational civil society and disarmament is here.
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Mobile Phones, Collective Action, and Social Capital

In my last post, I mentioned ownership and use of cell phones as a means for examining social capital. According to the World Bank study I cited, the idea was that rural areas with high cell phone ownership would produce a type of social network facilitating communication. I thought of tagging a study in the APSR which also used mobile phone onto the previous post, but decided it was worth creating a new post.
In the May 2013 issue of APSR, Jan Pierskalla and Florian Hollenbach find that:
The availability of cell phones as a communication technology allows political groups to overcome collective action problems more easily and improve in-group cooperation, and coordination. Utilizing novel, spatially disaggregated data on cell phone coverage and the location of organized violent events in Africa, we are able to show that the availability of cell phone coverage significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict.
The authors argue that cell phones helps facilitate in-group organization and the coordination of insurgent attacks. Hence cell phone coverage should be correlated with increased political violence. I haven't read the entire article, but their insights provide a counterpoint to many of the positive stories attached to technology, social media, and mobilization (i.e. Arab Spring, Occupy Movements, Candlelight Vigils in South Korea). It also takes us back to basic questions about social capital and what it's used for. Does social capital have to promote larger social (and not just private) benefits? The classic example are mafia groups and organized crime. Lots of social capital in those organizations. But towards what purpose?