President Kim was asked why the Bank withheld aid towards a health project in Uganda following passage of anti-gay legislation in that country. After all, the Bank's approach to aid is supposed to be apolitical. In response, Kim mentioned that the Bank has a commitment to non-discrimination. In this particular project geared towards human health, it was unclear whether the Ugandan government could ensure non-discriminatory practices in its health clinics. The decision to withhold aid was a management rather than a political-based decision. As such, the Bank can continue supporting other projects in Uganda such as those related to infrastructure which has little to do with discriminating against gay people. Likewise, the Bank will continue to support projects in Russia, despite Russia behaving badly in the Crimea. From the Bank's perspective, their programs in Russia are intended to protect the poor, improve business climate, and support growth. Apolitical development still raises a few ethical issues, however. For instance, should IGOs provide government assistance to regimes with poor human rights records (Kim cites N.Korea becoming a potential recepient country if it opens up) which might legitimate such regimes? Or if the goal is to improve the lives of people, can politics be cast aside so long as the Bank or IMF can ensure that governments will not misuse funds? The Bank adopts the latter position. But how can one credibly trust regimes if corruption, nepotism, and instability are the norm in a given polity? The Bank has their own mechanism to investigate whether and how governments are properly implementing projects and can always threaten to pull the plug. I supposed the Bank's approach to development is one of ethical pragmatism.The second story is more pertinent to my research on ideas and foreign policy. Based on Samantha Power's pre-government opining, we now she's a passionate adovcate of human rights and humanitarian assistance. However, Power admits that once inside government the issues appear much more complex. Take for instance US refusal to sign the Convention to Ban Landmines in light of the need for such weapons in the DMZ between North and South Korea. As one official recalls Power stating, ‘I didn’t have any idea how complicated these things become once you’re in government . . . This is as far from a no-brainer as I’ve ever seen.” A study of Samantha Power shows how elite views become moderated once in government, something I argued in my book about the formation of an elite security consensus. Political constraints prevent leaders from implementing their own policy preferences. Also, through socialization processes, the views of elites within the foreign policy and security establishment begin to converge. Real differences continue to exist (particularly within Congress), but in the bureacracies, positions move towards the middle making bipartisanship in foreign policy/security a bit easier.
