Peace, Denuclearziation, and the Gap Between Liberal and Progressive Security Policy

One of my former students, Van Jackson, put together a roundtable on the future of progressive foreign policy in the Texas National Security Review. On his Facebook, I weighed in on a discussion in which someone questioned whether there was enough diversity of views on "progressive" f.p., especially since the writers were all established foreign policy scholars. These progressive ideas are not new, but have been articulated by peace activists. However, the foreign policy/security views of peace activists are generally dismissed as radical, naïve, or unrealistic by mainstream policymakers (what Walt calls the establishment).

I was reminded of the roundtable (which I still haven't read but should) when I saw this clip of activists Sung-hee Choi, an activist I might call a friend, interrupting a peace and denuclearization conference hosted by the ROK government and the UN. In the video, she demands how such a conference could be held on Jeju Island without inviting or hearing the input of the local villagers who live by a naval base which permits nuclear submarines to port. In her rant, she criticizes the President Moon's policies and refers to his government as a puppet of the US.

What I find interesting, if not mildly puzzling, is how progressive activists criticize a president who's staked so much capital in building peace with North Korea and taking the engagement path towards denuclearization. In this case, I want to argue that there might be a distinction between liberal vs. progressive policy views. The established left support liberal foreign policy, whereas activists support progressive foreign policy. Of course, this may just be another name for the mainstream (or center) left and the radical (or far) left so no need to reinvent the wheel. Is it possible, though that policymakers are picking up some of the ideas of the radical left. If liberals are still part of the foreign  policy establishment, they are in cahoots with conservatives. Thus if someone wants to break the mold of the establishment, they have to enter the territory of progressives.

Fearless Speech Index

I recently joined Heterodox Academy which encourages academics to support a diversity of viewpoints.  This week's newsletter highlighted an op-ed by professor Adam Grant at Wharton who encourages more arguing and fighting at home which helps train kids to grow up to be more creative and open minded. 

In that post, a quote struck me as consistent with my own observations and experience: "Universities—ideal homes for constructive disagreement—can now be places where students and professors alike often feel silenced." Results from a survey tracking a "fearless speech index" can be found here. Researchers are trying to determine to what degree students feel comfortable speaking about the following topics in class, and the reasons why they do/don't speak up about 3 issues: race, gender politics. There's a "control" category for comparison. The topic of race generated the most discomfort, and criticism from  other students (not professors) ended up being the biggest concern/reason for not speaking out. As an Asian-American, race is not as uncomfortable for me, but as a conservative Christian, gender is probably the hardest. 

Russia, Turkey, and IR Paradigms

In a nod to ideological alliances, Anne Applebaum argues that dictators will choose other dictators at the end of the day and cites Turkish President Recep Erodgan's recent meeting with Russia's Vladimir Putin as an example. Despite Turkey's membership in NATO, Edrogan has used the military coup to crackdown on even the slightest potential for opposition.  As Applebaum writes:

(Alexander Zemlianichenko/Associated Press)

Geostrategic, military and even historical calculations should make Turkey and Russia antagonists. But their meeting illustrates something that many Western politicians and “realist” thinkers find difficult to understand: that ideas and ideology sooner or later trump “interests.” If Turkey were still a democracy, Erdogan would be looking to his Western allies to help him push back against Russia. But contact with the West also means contact with Western ideas. Dependence on the West means dependence on states that believe in the legal norms which Erdogan wants to repress, states that might support the people Erdogan wants to lock up.

Victory for constructivists? Does this really mean ideas trump interests? Well, Turkey's move does indicate the power of ideas. But ideas too reflect particular interests. What's important here (for IR students) is the relationship between ideas and interests and whether in the case of Turkey and Russia, ideas are defining actors' interests.

Perspectives on the Greek Euro-crisis

Much of the hoopla on Grexit has passed, but I encountered a WaPo article this week which very

(Petros Giannakouris/AP)

much resonated with my research interests on why the far left (and activists) deviate from mainstream policymakers in their vision of good governance. Both believe they are working for the greater public good - but how they achieve this is driven by widely different ideas about the relationship between politics and economics. This is really a battle of ideas. The chasm between the two are found in the excerpts below.

The new government’s prescription was to tear up Greece’s colossal bailout deals and dare Europe to offer its loans with fewer of the strings that party officials believed were strangling the economy. The strategy may have been radical, but officials thought their proposals were sensible, and they expected that Europe would soon yield. 

In frigid February, when negotiators sat down across from each other for the first time, the members of the Syriza squad, some of whom were still in their 20s, were abuzz with ideas about putting struggling workers ahead of corporate interests.

Their counterparts from European finance ministries and the International Monetary Fund wanted bloodless numbers. What were Syriza’s concrete proposals? And how would they affect Greece’s bottom line? 

Sometimes they were scarcely speaking the same language, as worldviews clashed and tensions started to mount. Syriza’s top negotiators were fresh out of posts as Marxist-oriented economics professors. Their aides were PhD students, steeped in the heady discussions of the academy. The European side, meanwhile, was unaccustomed to hearing rhetoric that had died out of the political mainstream with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

Both the Greek socialist government and the more conservative EU and IMF policymakers believe they are doing what is best to improve the situation. But the key word is believe - and their fundamental beliefs about how best to keep afloat are in sharp contrast to one another.

Most of the commentary from academic colleagues have bashed Germany and the EU in support of Greece.  But to echo other conservative pundits, the country must take ownership and can't just rely on multiple bailouts. As much as Greece wants to blame the EU, they also have to point to their own economic woes. This was basically the attitude of Jong-Wha Lee at Korea University who compared Greece with Korea during the IMF crisis and stated Korea got its act together with less bailout money and more stringent austerity measures. Larry Summer also adopts this view, but also make an appeal to the EU in a more even-keeled approach to avoiding a game-of-chicken doomsday.

Autocrats Unite...and the Deep Divide to Global Peace

Saw this op-ed by David Sanger from someone's Facebook post about the rise of autocrats and the threat of U.S. global under-reach (i.e. how the world might face doom if no leader is willing to tend to the international garden "so that small problems didn’t turn into big ones." Sanger cites Bob Kagan's piece which places this argument in historical context. The arguments are all reasonable, but his conclusion that the U.S. at times must act as an enforcer and be a forceful menace is sure to raise eyebrows. Take for instance, this quote from an activist in Hawaii I know commenting on Obama's recent West Point speech:

What makes us "exceptional" is the fact that WE LIVE IN THE MOST HATED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND ARE CONSIDERED THE NUMBER ONE OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING WORLD PEACE. And that is NOTHING to be proud of. And about "America must always lead on the world stage..." Too easily said when America builds the stage wherever it wants, imposes the props, writes the script, and dupes the American audience (that would be the taxpayers whose money funds American terrorism) into swallowing the idea it was an honorable, must-do, performance.

Again, struck by the vast chasm in thought about achieving global peace and stability between (conservative) policymakers and (liberal) activists.

Update: I cited Kagan's piece, not b/c I necessarily support the argument, but b/c it seemed central to part of Sanger's op-ed. Here's Dan Nexon shredding Kagan to pieces.

Ethics and Global Governance

Two stories this weekend related to global governance which made me think about ethical issues and global politics. The first is an interview with World Bank president Jim Yong Kim. The second is a feature in the Washington Post Magazine about U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power.

President Kim was asked why the Bank withheld aid towards a health project in Uganda following passage of anti-gay legislation in that country. After all, the Bank's approach to aid is supposed to be apolitical. In response, Kim mentioned that the Bank has a commitment to non-discrimination. In this particular project geared towards human health, it was unclear whether the Ugandan government could ensure non-discriminatory practices in its health clinics. The decision to withhold aid was a management rather than a political-based decision. As such, the Bank can continue supporting other projects in Uganda such as those related to infrastructure which has little to do with discriminating against gay people. Likewise, the Bank will continue to support projects in Russia, despite Russia behaving badly in the Crimea. From the Bank's perspective, their programs in Russia are intended to protect the poor, improve business climate, and support growth. Apolitical development still raises a few ethical issues, however. For instance, should IGOs provide government assistance to regimes with poor human rights records (Kim cites N.Korea becoming a potential recepient country if it opens up) which might legitimate such regimes? Or if the goal is to improve the lives of people, can politics be cast aside so long as the Bank or IMF can ensure that governments will not misuse funds? The Bank adopts the latter position. But how can one credibly trust regimes if corruption, nepotism, and instability are the norm in a given polity? The Bank has their own mechanism to investigate whether and how governments are properly implementing projects and can always threaten to pull the plug. I supposed the Bank's approach to development is one of ethical pragmatism.

The second story is more pertinent to my research on ideas and foreign policy. Based on Samantha Power's pre-government opining, we now she's a passionate adovcate of human rights and humanitarian assistance. However, Power admits that once inside government the issues appear much more complex. Take for instance US refusal to sign the Convention to Ban Landmines in light of the need for such weapons in the DMZ between North and South Korea. As one official recalls Power stating, ‘I didn’t have any idea how complicated these things become once you’re in government . . . This is as far from a no-brainer as I’ve ever seen.” A study of Samantha Power shows how elite views become moderated once in government, something I argued in my book about the formation of an elite security consensus. Political constraints prevent leaders from implementing their own policy preferences. Also, through socialization processes, the views of elites within the foreign policy and security establishment begin to  converge. Real differences continue to exist (particularly within Congress), but in the bureacracies, positions move towards the middle making bipartisanship in foreign policy/security a bit easier.

The Spread of Ideas and the Protestant Reformation

I assigned Daniel Philpott's Revolutions in Sovereignty in my grad seminar. What struck me was the mechanisms leading to the transnational diffusion of ideas and the spread of a movement (in this case the Protestant Reformation). It's a classic example of social/transnational movement theory applied to history.

Philpott pinpoints the origins of the movement to Luther's theology. Luther didn't create ideas from thin air, but through a process of reflection, influenced by "late medieval theology, espeically nominalism, which emphasized God's inscrutability and fallen man's distance from Him" (p.123). Luther's own spiritual criss stemmed from "excessive monastic discipline," and his revulsion against corrupt practices of the Church.

Luther's ideas first spread within monasteries, then to the clergy, then to congregations. Missionaries and church pastors helped transmit ideas. Two novel means of disseminating information were the sermon (previously, the Word was not preached, but conducted through ritual and readings of Scripture) and the pamphlet (with the invention of the printing press).

Ideas here are powerful b/c they first shape identities. After potential converts encounter reformation theology, through a process of reflection and mental toil, they begin to identify themselves as Protestants.

Second, ideas are a form of social power. Converts begin to organize themselves and transalte their commitment to political orders (i.e. new converts might mobilize into political parties, congregations, etc...).

Its the poltiical theology of Reformation which becomes really interesting. The reformers were critical of the hierarchal authority of the Church (105-107). These new converts aligned (or were perhaps used) with secular authorities (i.e. Protestant German princes) who were also opposed to the Church, but more specifically, Charles V and the Holy Roman Emperor. These reformers demanded that the spiritual and secular realm be organized separately. Thus, Philpott finds a correlation between regions where the Reformation crisis was powerful, and strong political interests in establishing a Westphalian sovereign state system.