Is North Korea Irrational?

No. For decades academics have been  writing on the rationality of the Kim family (and autocratic survival more generally), but journalists find it easier to sell a story when you can pitch North Korea as a land of crazies. David Kang's earlier academic piece in International Security, his interview on NPR yesterday, and an article from Anna Fifield in the Washington Post all reiterate this point.

If the goal is regime survival, than North Korean actions are indeed rational and successful. Nuclear weapons, strict control of information, and curtailment of freedoms, corruption, deification of regime...all these things are intended to keep the Kim family in power.  North Korea does not play by international rules, it regularly violates norms, and many of its actions are inviolable if not despicable (this is probably true to some degree of all governments). North Korea is certainly and may appear to play by its own rules and logic. But that doesn't make it irrational.

South Korea Post-Impeachment Round-up

I haven't been able to keep up, much less write about the South Korean impeachment, but I'm posting some analysis and discussion for later reading written by friends and colleagues here.

I begin with the Asan Institute's biweekly newsletter, Asan Korea Perspective which gives us a barebones explanation of the grounds for impeachment and outcome of the South Korean Supreme Court's decision to impeach President Park Geunhye. There's also public opinion data related to the impeachment with 77% approving impeachment.

Charges and Court's Ruling. Source: Asan Korea Perspective Vol 2, no.6)

The Washington Post provided a video summary of the impeachment.

Celeste Arrington provides her thoughts at the Monkey Cage and the next steps for an election in which a progressive candidate is assumed to win.

Many praised the Court's ruling as a win for democracy and  South Korea's own democratic process. This included the editorial board of the Washington Post, but they also reminded us that the impeachment itself doesn't solve Korea's many domestic and foreign policy problems. Darcie Draudt also reminds us that several dimensions of South Korean democracy (most notably freedom of speech) the past few years have been in decline. She asks whether the impeachment will actually lead to longer reaching domestic institutional reforms to reduce corruption. And Kathy Moon weighs in with a provocative, but dead center quote in Quartz, "I find worrisome this glorification of South Korea’s protests. If governance structures were working properly then citizens normally would be channeling their concerns through institutional processes—reaching out to their elected leaders, going to the courts. Spilling out into the street is a sign of political dysfunction.”

Anna Fifield provided a barrage of reportage on the effects of the impeachment on everything from North Korea-China relations to the joy and images of celebration of Park's impeachment.

North Korea and Revolutions

Here's a piece by Andrei Lankov evaluating the possibility of revolution in North Korea based on five indicators in James DeFronzo's book “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements” whether a society is ripe for a revolt. It's overly simplistic, and you can't just check boxes - the causal conditions and antecedents (both structural and agent-driven) are probably more complicated. But it's still worth going through this thought experiment.

South Korea-China Relations and THAAD

Very briefly, this 38 North report is the best run-down of THAAD deployment and the tensions it has generated between the ROK and China. As the author states:

When the decision was originally made, the ROK government anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but went ahead with it for several reasons. First, its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. Second, the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance. In doing this, it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces. Third, Seoul understood the system’s effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security. Fifth, the ROK government dismissed the fear that a THAAD battery in its territory would become integrated into the US ballistic missile defense system as groundless.In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye’s conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay.

However, China holds a very different view of the South Korean decision. First, Beijing believes that one THAAD battery can neither deter North Korea militarily nor compel Pyongyang to change its behavior. Second, it thinks the system’s detection range could later be changed to suit US needs, enabling THAAD to potentially target Chinese assets, including strategic missile systems and forcing Beijing to spend more on defenses for its coastal missile bases. Third, Beijing is aware that a long-term goal of the US rebalance to Asia is to check or block China through security cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Fourth, it expects an additional strategic burden from changes to the regional “power balance,” such as new Russian defenses against THAAD that Beijing will also have to take into account.

On a related note, CFR published a study on South Korea's option in Northeast Asia in response to the China factor.