Supressing Dissent in China: Some Random Thoughts

I was alerted to a couple interesting pieces pertaining to suppression of freedom of speech in China. For sure the CCP still relies on brute force and fear to silence its critics. But the CCP as of late seems to be relying on softer approaches of repression, using ideological education and propaganda in conjunction while curbing information and stymieing freedom of speech. The use of such soft tactics are employed against perpetual activists as well s ethnic and religious minorities (notably the Uighyurs in Xinjiang). Below I present (random) thoughts about free speech, civil society, and democratic change with parallels to North Korea.

The first article is a story by Jianying Zha in the New Yorker about the CCP's use of vacations to keep Chinese dissidents from spoiling high profile international summits hosted by Beijing. They call this bei lüyou, which means “to be touristed.” Here is an excerpt from Zha describing the practice as used against her brother, democracy activist Jianguo Zha:

The Beijing police took my brother sightseeing again. Nine days, two guards, chauffeured tours through a national park that’s a World Heritage site, visits to Taoist temples and to the Three Gorges, expenses fully covered, all courtesy of the Ministry of Public Security. The point was to get him out of town during the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in early September. The capital had to be in a state of perfect order; no trace of trouble was permissible. And Zha Jianguo, a veteran democracy activist, is considered a professional troublemaker.

While President Xi Jinping played host to African dignitaries in the Great Hall of the People, the police played host to my big brother at various scenic spots in the province of Hubei, about a thousand kilometres away. A number of other Beijing activists and civil-rights lawyers, including several whom Jianguo knows well, were treated to similar trips. 

Vacations sound a lot better than beatings. Moreover, bei luyou fulfills two functions. It prevents dissidents from creating disturbances, and in the long run political instability.  Sending activists on vacation in close quarters with their government minders might even convince dissidents that the CCP is not all that bad with relationships formed between police and activists. Indeed, Zha wonders if her brother has gone soft, even if he holds onto his core beliefs about democracy. At the same time, bei luyou is used to reward police and security officials. Policing is not easy - it's probably a demoralizing job. Thus sending agents on these plum vacation assignments might help boost morale, as Zha argues. 

On the CCP's war against democracy and the suppression of speech, Zha highlights formidable obstacles. Here's another excerpt describing the extent of Chinese censorship and greater sophistication of China's "Great Firewall."

A day later, he opened a new account, with the name BeijingZhaJianguo6, but a line had been crossed. After five shutdowns, as the police had warned him, he was blocked from large online groups. This is how all Chinese companies, including giants like Alibaba and WeChat’s owner, Tencent, defer to the police state. Savvy Chinese Internet users, with or without the aid of a V.P.N., employ all sorts of techniques to break through the Great Firewall, and Jianguo has definitely learned a few tricks to evade the censors. But lately the situation has deteriorated. On certain days, even after all the camouflaging maneuvers, a fresh opinion piece of his would vanish mysteriously, with no error message. Neither the sender nor the recipients would even know that something had gone amiss unless they checked with one another.

This is bei hexie, “to be harmonized,” a form of virtual erasure. Bent on transforming the global Internet into a Chinese Intranet, official censors have made deft and extensive use of the method. You may know about Vice-President Mike Pence’s recent speech on the Trump Administration’s China policy, viewed by many as a declaration of a new cold war. But in China very few saw the actual text; it was met with swift bei hexie. The current arms race between the censors and the censored in China can be summed up in an old proverb: The monk grows taller by an inch, but the monster grows taller by a foot.

Chinese society has transformed since Deng's marketization efforts in the 1980s. "Liberals," or at least those sympathetic to liberal reforms have emerged. Distinguished from more "radical" dissidents (i.e. professional activists), these "liberals" are part of the upper crust in Chinese society. Zha describes them as "educated urbanites who generally embrace Western ideas of democracy, want the rule of law, and are critical of the party-state." Yet unlike the "radicals," they also fear deviating from the status quo.  These urbanites themselves do not seem keen on holding a revolution like the radicals of the past. This is where I draw a few parallels to North Korea's nouveau riche. North Korea's new "money masters" and those of the rising middle class may think about greater openness (in terms of economic and political liberalization). However, they may not want to upend the system which they likely benefit from through corruption or ties to state elites, or by simply profiting from government ineptitude (i.e. they meet private demands through markets which the government cannot adequately provide)

Zha writes that the CCP fears Chinese activists because they might further infect or incite broader opposition against the state. But the CCP seems to have held such forces in check thus far:

Back in the late nineteen-nineties, the Democracy Party of China was a fringe group of radicals whom the government could easily quarantine. Reformist intellectuals, who supported a path of incremental change, viewed men like Jianguo as politically naïve and their mission as suicidal. Few people even knew that his party existed. But now, using social media, Jianguo has accomplished something that his old comrades never could. He has reached the much larger camp of Chinese liberals—educated urbanites who generally embrace Western ideas of democracy, want the rule of law, and are critical of the party-state. Although they have flourished in China’s “reform era”—decades of fast growth that have brought them apartments, cars, holiday travels, study abroad for their children—they are mostly convinced of the superior vitality of the multiparty system. In a joke they liked about the 2016 U.S. election, a bunch of eunuchs are so appalled by the bawdy quarrels among the married folk that they congratulate themselves: “How fortunate we are to be castrated!” Yet many Chinese liberals doubt that the Western system is feasible in their country. They fret about the burden of history, about the prospect of chaos and mob rule. In their own lives, they avoid radicals and former political prisoners, for fear that such association might jeopardize their personal freedom. They shun the sort of political action that could put their comfortable life style at risk.

The second article is from Darren Byler, a recent anthropology graduate about surveillance of the Uighurs population in Xinjiang Province. I had just read a memo from another ethnomusicology graduate student about the roadblocks she faced conducting research among the Uighurs which corroborate observations in this piece.

The CCP has a policy of sending thousands, if not millions of ethnic Han Chinese (mostly civil servants) to live with Muslim families and build relationships with them. As the Global Times reported,  "The regional Party committee of Xinjiang has asked officials and government staff at all levels to live in the local villages and communities they represent, in an effort to spread the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)." This is done in part to monitor, and in part to reeducate Uighurs so that they can appreciate the Chinese state (and its power) and hopefully integrate into Chinese society. Here's an excerpt from Byler:

The “relatives” have been essentially conscripted into service in three separate waves. The first campaign started in 2014, dispatching some 200,000 Party members, including minority Party members, to “Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Bring Together the Hearts of the People” (fang minqing, hui minsheng, ju minxin, 访民情、惠民生、聚民心)—through long-term stays in Uighur villages. In 2016, a second wave of 110,000 civil servants were sent into Uighur villages as part of a “United as One Family” (jie dui renqin, 结对认亲) campaign which focused on placing “relatives” in the homes of Uighurs whose family members had been imprisoned or killed by the police.

In 2017, the third wave of visits began as part of an extension of the 2016 campaign. This third phase of the campaign assigned more than one million civilians to Muslim “relatives” in villages for a series of week-long homestays—often focusing on the extended family of those who had been detained in the drastically-expanded “transformation through education” program

Taken as a whole, these three waves of the village-based cadre team program that paired civilian workers with adopted Uighur and Kazakh families bore a resemblance to other programs that “sent down” state workers and students to learn from the “common people” during the Maoist period of the 1960s and 1970s. What differentiates this state intervention from these similar forced visits is that, in this case, power is flowing urban civilians as representatives of the state and Han values to rural Uighur and Kazakh “masses,” as training manuals put it...

The “relatives” were given written guidelines on how to conduct themselves. Based on reports from Uighur contacts in Urumchi and Khotan, such manuals provided guidelines and forms that needed to be filled out and then digitized for security databases. In a manual that was used in Kashgar prefecture, relatives were given specific instructions on how to get their “relatives” to “let down their guard.” The manual, which was posted on the Internet but taken down just as this story was going to press, advised “relatives” to show “warmth.” “Don’t lecture right away” it suggested, and show concern regarding their families and bring candy for the children. It provided a checklist that included questions such as: “When entering the household, do family members appear flustered and use evasive language? Do they not watch TV programs at home, and instead only watch VCD discs? Are there any religious items still hanging on the walls of the house?”

The whole program feels a bit like proselytization: Christian evangelization or Mormon missions. The Han "relatives" may feel that they are breaking ground, and "connecting" with Uighurs. Some Uighurs may warm up to their "relatives'" and perhaps mutual understanding and genuine companionship develops in a few cases. But misunderstanding and rejection are also seem common. As Byler uncovers:

The “relatives” I interviewed often failed to understand the way their hosts viewed their role. Perhaps because they had not observed Uighur life before their arrival, they did not realize how fear, anger, and sadness had gripped the villagers who they were hoping to teach Han secular values.

In their stories about what they had done, visiting civil servants often did not note that the security institutions that they supported were one of the primary causes of Uighur poverty.

One young Han woman I spoke with who grew up in Urumchi but had not been sent down herself noted that the team she was familiar with was puzzled by the way that Uighur families simply placed the gifts the “relatives” gave them in the corner of their house. They said that when they came back weeks later, it appeared as though the gifts had not been used. They did not understand why their gifts were rejected.

Two of the workers I interviewed said that they hoped that their interactions with Uighurs and Kazakhs would foster genuine friendships. They said they were saddened by the lack of “openness” on the part of their Muslim counterparts.

Finally, Byler argues that the program not only violates the freedom and ethical rights of Uighurs, but also imposes directives which make public servants complicit in unethical actions (although this depends on whose ethic standards one makes such determination):

The tyranny that is being realized in Northwest China pits groups of Chinese citizens against each other in a totalitarian process that seeks to dominate every aspect of life. It calls Han “relatives” into coercive relations with their Uighur and Kazakh hosts, producing an epidemic of individualized isolation and loneliness as families, friends, and communities are pulled apart. As new levels of unfreedom are introduced, the project produces new standards of what counts as normal and banal. The “relatives” I spoke to, who did the state’s work of tearing families apart and sending them into the camp system, saw themselves as simply “doing their jobs.”

Are such "soft tactics" such as "vacationing", re-education, and cohabitation better alternatives to violent repression? Are they more effective? It does appear that authoritarians are getting smarter in how they attempt to control civil society, information, and freedom of speech.  For instance, in Russia, there's evidence of "weaponizing misinformation": in addition to posting untruths to incite fringe groups like the American alt-right, Russians might aim at more "mainstream" groups (i.e. Democratic party members, disarmament groups) which might help promote Russian interests.

South Korea-China Relations and THAAD

Very briefly, this 38 North report is the best run-down of THAAD deployment and the tensions it has generated between the ROK and China. As the author states:

When the decision was originally made, the ROK government anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but went ahead with it for several reasons. First, its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. Second, the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance. In doing this, it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces. Third, Seoul understood the system’s effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security. Fifth, the ROK government dismissed the fear that a THAAD battery in its territory would become integrated into the US ballistic missile defense system as groundless.In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye’s conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay.

However, China holds a very different view of the South Korean decision. First, Beijing believes that one THAAD battery can neither deter North Korea militarily nor compel Pyongyang to change its behavior. Second, it thinks the system’s detection range could later be changed to suit US needs, enabling THAAD to potentially target Chinese assets, including strategic missile systems and forcing Beijing to spend more on defenses for its coastal missile bases. Third, Beijing is aware that a long-term goal of the US rebalance to Asia is to check or block China through security cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Fourth, it expects an additional strategic burden from changes to the regional “power balance,” such as new Russian defenses against THAAD that Beijing will also have to take into account.

On a related note, CFR published a study on South Korea's option in Northeast Asia in response to the China factor.

The One-Child Policy and Teaching About Human Rights in China

China ended it's controversial one-child policy last week, most likely on economic rather than any humanitarian grounds given potential labor shortages and an ageing population. The NY Times provided a timeline chronicling the implementation and effects of the policy. The one-child policy is often associated with forced abortions, compulsory sterilization, infanticide, and other abuses committed by party officials (usually at the local level). Here is one anecdote from the Washington Post:

Katherine Hesse. From NY Times.
 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/world/asia/one-child-rule-china.html

His wife was seven months pregnant with their second child when the group of people barged into his home and took her away. He followed them to the local hospital, where — against medical advice and despite his pleadings — they jammed a needle into her belly.“They grabbed my wife’s body like they were grabbing a pig, four or five people holding her hands and legs and head, and injected a shot into her belly,” the man said, asking not to be named for fear of retribution. “Neither my wife nor I signed any consent form.”Ten hours later, she gave birth to a boy, wriggling and faintly crying. But the doctors in southern Hunan province would not even let her hold the dying infant, the husband said. They put the baby in a plastic bag and instructed him to pay a cleaner a small sum to bury it on a nearby hill.

Several other news stories appeared about the horrors of the one-child policy last week. See here, here, and here. Adding to criticism, despite the welcome end to the one-child policy, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International argued that the policy change didn't address the deeper issue of setting limits on child bearing. Coincidentally, I invited renowned activist Chen Guangchen, currently affiliated with Catholic University, to my class the week before China's announcement. Mr. Chen has made it his life commitment to challenge the abuses associated with the one-child policy. Despite this qualified victory, I'm certain he will continue to press on with his activism.

There is no question that this policy has resulted in horrible abuses. A classic example of initially well-intentioned social engineering gone wrong (future labor shortages, uneven gender ratios, inability to support ageing population etc...). But from a teaching standpoint, I am curious to hear the official Chinese stance on the one-child policy. Was there ever any merit to this policy which has been thoroughly tarnished in the West?  Did the CCP intentionally encourage abuse to support policy? Some of the articles I read indicated it wasn't necessarily the central government which enforced abortions, bur rather local party cadres intent on moving up in the ranks. How effective was the one-child policy? Amartya Sen argues more credit is given to the one-child policy than warranted (he attributes declining fertility to other factors such as women empowerment  and new norms of smaller households).

I have one student from mainland China in my Intro to IR class and wondered what was going through his mind during Chen Guangchen's discussion. His presence has made me mindful of how I discuss China in class, especially after inviting Mr. Chen. I wouldn't say it's self-censoring, but I'm reminded that all sides of the debate should be represented, even if China is an easy target to condemn for its human rights abuses.

Teaching About China's Maritime Dispute

CFR unveiled a snazzy new interactive tool to study China's maritimes disputes. This is a great educational tool for students, complete with discussion and essay questions, and something I'll try to incorporate next semester in my U.S., China, and International Relations of East Asia course. Ironically, however, using such a tool will probably require more, not less time for prep since the instructor has to preview all the material beforehand. Anyway, kudos to CFR.

Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space

Chinese Global Order?

I gave a talk at a panel on U.S.-China relations organized by one of our graduate students. Hats off to our graduate students for putting together an informative panel with a delicious spread. Unfortunately, attendance was low and 75% of the food remained untouched. I restrained myself from hoarding (For full disclosure, I left with an extra sandwich and cookie).

Anyway, I offered three insights in my portion of the presentation:
1) A brief overview of U.S.-China relations and the shift in U.S. rhetoric towards China acting as a "responsible player" in 2005 to an "irresponsible competitor" in 2010.
2) Reasons to be skeptical about China replacing the U.S. as a regional or global leader anytime soon.
3) U.S.-China relations and North Korea.
I'll just mention a few things about point #2. Given China's enormous size and population, it's inevitable that China will surpass the U.S. in several categories we consider as part of a nation's power portfolio (i.e. size of economy). Does this mean that China will overtake the U.S.?

It depends on what we mean by overtake. Although China may rival the U.S. in terms of capabilities, it's far less clear if China will overtake the U.S. as a global or even regional leader. The real question we should be asking ourselves is whether China has what it takes to be a global leader. Here are four questions worth raising:

1. Do other nations trust China (or at least trust China more than the US)?
2. Is China willing to provide both public and private goods?
3. Do other states perceive China as a legitimate global leader?
4. Do other states aspire to follow the ideals, values, and political ideology of China?

A key issue is determining how China's rising capabilites are linked to non-material factors like status, trust, and legitimacy which say more about global leadership than a countries rising capabilities.

Secretary State Clinton's First Visit to China

Human Rights (HR) groups like Amnesty were upset over Clinton’s remarks in her first trip to China. She commented that pressing China on issues like Tibet, or religious freedom “can’t interfere” with dialogue on other issues such as economic and environmental cooperation, or the stalled 6-party talks with N. Korea.

HR groups interpreted Clinton’s statement as implying that HR would play less of a priority in U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations. This comment triggers a key debate. Are Clinton’s statements any different from past Administration’s approach towards China? Yes, Bush often criticized China for HR abuses, but the US continued to cooperate w/China on economic and security issues, resulting in a period of relative improvement in US-China relations.

If you approach this from a liberal perspective, the argument is (and I believe this is Clinton’s position), it’s more fruitful to maintain dialogue and cooperation on several key issues, rather than risk jeopardizing bilateral ties over one (alebeit very important) issue. The hope is that China will eventually improve its record on human rights as it moves to become a more responsible, internationally legitimate player in int’l affairs. On the other hand, is it OK for the US to lower its standards or principles to achieve cooperation in other issues?

There are short term and long term trade-offs. But it leaves us with a fundamental question: can we ever follow a morally responsible foreign policy 100% of the time? This leads to a follow-up question: what is morally responsible? Calling out states on human rights violations may be the principled thing to do. However, if criticizing China on HR results in icy relations with negative repurcussion for the global economy, the U.S. job market, more pollution, would this still fall under the rubric of morally responsible? Rather than "calling out" China (i.e. pointing fingers), perhaps the U.S. could "encourage" China to improve its human rights record. This would continue to acknolwedge HR abuses in China, w/out risking damage to other areas of cooperation.

Note: Today's Post had an editorial criticizing Clinton's remarks. While Clinton is correct that HR talk has not changed much over the past decade, her comments can support or break the will of thousands of Chinese who fight for greater government accountability, civil liberties, and human rights. Also, will a slap on the wrist on HR issues really sour economic and security issues if they are also in China's interest to cooperate? Very good point.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/23/AR2009022302412.html?sub=AR