The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe

I finally had a chance to read Daniel Nexon’s The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe. It’s not a quick read (not the first half at least). But the book is refreshingly different from standard IR fare making it worth reading. Although not his main argument, Dan makes a compelling case why realism as an analytic paradigm doesn’t travel as well as we believe across space/time. He does this though in a manner which doesn’t completely dismiss or ignore the “states-under-anarchy” framework.  

Dan’s work provides fuel for not one, but two of my research agendas so my mind was in overdrive trying to figure out how to apply/incorporate his work with my own. I’m not going to review the book but instead I’ll glean a few useful insights from it for my own work on a) social movements and world politics and b) East Asian international relations.

Social Movements and World Politics

Yes, it’s the title of my blog.  As you recall, the blog was created as a space for me to write up thoughts about my research on said topic.  As I wrote in my research statement, “I attempt to craft a coherent theory synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations (IR) theory …To do this, I unpack various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences (and vice-versa).”

Dan’s book falls squarely into this research agenda.  At the most obvious level, he shows how mobilization against dynastic rulers and the rise of religious movements (the Protestant Reformation) triggered a set of processes which exposed, exploited, and eroded the weak political structures inherent in “composite states” (or dynastic agglomerates) characteristic of early modern Europe. As Dan argues, transnational religious movements “altered the structural opportunities and constraints of power-competition” (4).  These movements played a significant (although by no means sufficient) role in the development of the modern nation-state system.

A broader contribution is his linking of collective action problems and mobilization at the domestic and international level through the concept of nested relational networks.  Dan writes, “Treating structure of international interaction in terms of nested relational configurations allows us to link variation in the structure of polities (i.e. states) – and other corporate actors (i.e. social movements) – to international structures. Not only does this analytic move capture the co-constituted relationship between agents and structures at different levels of analysis, but it provides a way to think about how transactional patterns give rise to opportunity structures for collective action in world politics” (51). In particular, the density of network relations and degree of identity cohesion between actors at the domestic and international level shapes the opportunity structure of actors for mobilization and cooperation. 

So Dan addresses two of my proposed research goals a) synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations and b) unpacking various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences   

East Asian International Relations

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe is as far as one can get from contemporary Asia. Yet I found Dan’s relational institutionalism applicable to the persistence of U.S. bilateral alliances and  the structure of post-Cold War Asia.  Although I take an ideational-institutional approach in explaining alliance resilience, the inertia of patron-client relations also helps explain the continuation of bilateralism in Asia.  Affective and material ties between the U.S. its Asian alliance partners (i.e. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) encourages cooperation.  Ikenberry (2011) describes the type of order produced by patron-client relations as “rule by relations.” Rule by relations may move from a strong to weak form of patronage (colonial rule à neocolonial ruleà client-state relationship à special relationship), but such shifts don’t necessarily reduce the affective and material ties present in bilateral alliances. “Clients” in special relationships may still act out of loyalty to the patron or out of material interests in the form of prestige, security, or wealth. 

Finally, Dan’s clarification of relational structures helps me think about my own relational approach to East Asian security. I’ve been working forever on a paper which criticizes traditional structural approaches (i.e. polarity) applied to Asian security and instead advocate a relational view of East Asian order. The ties generated by East Asian international relations suggests a bifurcated network with China and the U.S. centered as hubs. Reviewers have uniformly agreed that the first half reads much better than the second half so hopefully insights from Ch. 2 of The Struggle for Power in will help improve the second half of the paper. 

Afghanistan Basing Strategy

Will the U.S continue counterterrorism operations in Pakistan? Kim and Fred Kagan believe the answer to this is tantamount to whether the U.S. can retain U.S. bases and maintain current force levels in Afghanistan.  I hate math, but here’s an application of the transitive axiom:

No bases = no ability to strike terrorist cells in Afghanistan/Pakistan. 

No large troop presence = no bases.

Therefore, no large troop presence = no ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia.

My focus here is less on counterinsurgency operations and more about the need and purpose of overseas bases. To strike terrorist cells without the presence of ground troops, the U.S. will have to rely on a) Predator drones; b) special mission units c) precision guided missiles. The Kagans think options A and B are not possible without bases.

Policymakers for the past decade have argued for a smaller footprint regarding U.S. overseas bases – a shift away from large permanent structures to “lighter” facilities. Post-reconstruction Iraq and Afghanistan were supposed to be the two exceptions. The Iraqis gave us the boot so we’ll have little “permanent” presence in that country. But the Kagans demonstrate why bases – physical structures, not merely access agreements or basing rights to host nation bases – still matter. Whether we get bases in Afghanistan will largely be determined by the Afghanis and to a lesser extent U.S. negotiating skills.  Like many policymakers, the Kagans omit the fact that the fate of our policy often rests with the host nation and base politics. We can’t just retain bases and 68,000 troops simply because it makes strategic sense (or not). 

Garment Factory Ablaze in Bangladesh: The Conundrum of Improving Workers' Rights

This story on the garment factory fire in Bangladesh is just terrible and tragic. I’m usually ambivalent when it comes to labor activism and unions. But this story screams out the need for greater accountability and better protection for workers. The young man who desperately called his mother from a 5^th floor bathroom to tell her he was about to die as the building burned was particularly heart-wrenching. In many ways, it echoes the travesty in Chinese factories producing Apple ipads reported earlier this year.  

As in the Apple case though, improving labor standards is not so easy when existing economic structures and business pressures pose obstacles for reform. Consumers want lower prices. Suppliers must offer competitive bids. Factories must yield high output.  Laborers are desperate for work. Companies must meet consumer demand. 

Boycotting Sears and Wal-mart is probably not the way to go (see this link for reasons why). But like the case between Apple and Foxcon, exposing labor human rights violations in factories and linking them back to retailers may put pressure on firms, suppliers, and factories to address labor rights. Garment workers have also taken matters into their own hands and mobilized protests in Bangladesh 

The real challenge is altering the behavior incentives of consumers and producers. Many consumers in the developed world might be willing to pay a few dollars if they knew it translated into saved lives in Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, or Honduras. But the garment (electronics, toy...take your pick) industry would have to collude with one another and self-reinforce labor standards to prevent any one firm from producing goods at a significantly lower cost.  I’m not sure how many Americans are more likely to buy things labeled as “fair-trade” or “sweatshop-free” if they can find similar products at lower cost.

It’s easy to see why Karl Marx inspired generations of revolutionaries and activists. But it’s just as easy to see why he was wrong about overthrowing the structure we curse and embrace and call capitalism.

Update #1: Following the collapse of factory killing hundreds of workers, an activist from Bangladesh calls on Americans to press companies to improve standards, but does NOT endorse a boycott.

Update #2 (5/12/13): Looks like retailers like H&M (my wife's latest go to store) have decided to sign an accord which adheres to safety measures. As this article states," The move comes just days shy of a deadline imposed by workers’ rights groups that said they would hold street protests and otherwise increase pressure on clothing brands that did not sign the agreement by Wednesday." So were retailers pressured into signing? Is this a logic of consequence or appropriateness, or does that even matter?

Wal-Mart, however, has opted out of the safety plan and instead announced it would conduct their own set of inspections in factories. Perhaps Wal-Mart found the plan too restrictive??

Here's an op-ed from the Post's Harold Meyerson with more on this issue.

Update #3 (7/13/13): The spate of tragedies has led North American retailers to launch there own worker safety initiative in Bangladesh. Are such measures of corporate social responsibility really a sign of changing norms and practices, or is it a way to deflect outside criticism that American retailers are part of the problem and not the solution. As the Post points out, one weakness is the self-regulatory nature of this initiative. The Economist has a more skeptical take.

Update #4 (12/28/15): Two years after the Rana Plaza incident, slow progress on labor reforms and politics between European and N. American corporate alliances in establishing mechanisms for inspections and monitoring of factory conditions as reported by the Post.

Code Pink and Drone Wars in Pakistan

The Post ran an interesting story about the peace march organized by populist former cricket-star turned politician Imran Khan. Apparently Khan organized thousands of protestors to join him at a rally in South Waziristan to protest the drone campaign being waged against Islamist militants in the region. Joining this effort was a small contingent from the U.S. women's peace group, Codepink.  Now that takes balls (yes, the irony) to walk into a region known best for breeding insurgents.

(Un)fortunately, the Pakistan military prevented Khan and his entourage from entering South Waziristan because it couldn't guarantee security for the peace marchers. I'm not surprised that Pakistanis would organize a rally against drone strikes in their own country. And we shouldn't be surprised that Pakistanis might be joined by other transnational peace groups also committed to ending drone strikes which carry questionable legal and moral implications. In fact, the Drone Campaign Network has declared this week "Drones Week of Action."  But the willingness of U.S. peace groups to march into region which saw fierce fighting before Pakistani forces subdued the insurgency only a year or two ago gives us reason to pause.

I was curious to see what comments readers posted on the Washington Post article. As usual, you had both supporters (of Khan's movement) and haters chiming in. What is striking here is the different assumptions and conception readers have about peace and security. Here are a few comments.

I had reactions similar to the commenter below:

“You hit people with these drones and you create instant enemies,” said JoAnne Lingle, a silver-haired Mennonite from Indianapolis. “It’s supposed to be increasing our national security and it’s doing the opposite.”"

Gee, I hope Code Pink told the Taliban, al Qaeda and their Pakistan Army masters that when you hit people with suicide bombers and IEDs you also create instant enemies. This protest is ridiculous. For the terrorist gangs like the Taliban and al Qaeda, civilians are the primary target. For the U.S., enemy insurgents are the primary target. Drones allow much tighter targeting of the enemy and greatly reduced civilian casualties. 

 Here's a comment siding with Khan and Codepink in support of world peace:

By all standards the current war in Afghanistan is quite ugly and the allied forces are in a morass; they are stuck in a quagmire and they do not see any way out. In 11-years old war the allied forces from 44 countries have failed to defeat these militants who are wearing sandals, turbans, and wielding AK-47 Rifles. Many see the use of the drones as a frustration tool as it's kill ratio is: 2% terrorists as they are called, and 98% innocent women and children. DRONES FLY CHILDREN DIE! 

As the march was taking place my mind flashed back to that brave American girl Rachel Corrie who in 2004 stood between a marching Israeli bulldozer and a Palestinian house. This innocent, angel-like girl thought that the Israeli bulldozer will stop because after all she was from a friendly brotherly country USA, but the arrogant bulldozer did not stop and crushed her to death. Later, the Israelis dubbed her as "terrorist" because she was trying to save "an enemy's house" from demolition.  

The delegation of 32 Americans headed by Mary Ann Wright had a conscience, they traveled all along from USA to Islamabad using their own funds, to stand with Imran Khan against the drone strikes because they felt that the drones are counter-productive and as a result of that the USA is facing more resistance and hatred. I think these individuals are the true Americans, they love their country, they love Pakistan, and they love the humanity. They certainly won hearts and minds of the people. And, yes, the struggle between right and wrong, between the good and the bad, between the Satan and the righteous, will go on! People were even ready to throw stones at Jesus Christ! 

Imran Khan is the leader not only for Pakistan but for the world also. With people like him there will be peace in the world. 

Let's unite to wage peace in the world!

 And here's someone calling on readers to take part in a virtual march against the drone wars:

Join the virtual march against the US drone war

Hundreds of thousands of people in my country, Pakistan, are under siege from US drones: robot weapons that indiscriminately kill children, and terrorise families every day. This weekend I am leading a peace march against this secret war, and if all of you join me virtually, we could create a public storm to stop this torment.

America’s deadly drones campaign is illegal and counterproductive -- instead of beating terrorists it is driving more people to anti-American extremism. Families across the border region in Waziristan, the flash point of this war, live in constant fear of being targeted, under the deafening buzz of these remote-controlled planes 24 hours a day. Extraordinarily, the US denies any civilian deaths, but will not reveal the names of those killed, while independent reports tell of the trauma and killing of hundreds of civilians, many of them children.

This weekend, if you join me on the march, we have the chance to bring global attention to this war zone and show the United States that people across Pakistan and the world want an end to this robot war. Sign the petition now and tell everyone. We will announce all those marching virtually to the media, we will carry a flag from every country where people have signed, and when we reach 500,000 signatures I will demand a meeting with President Obama to present the petition:

http://www.avaaz.org/en/petition/Join_the_virtual_march_against_the_US_drone_war/?tponBdb

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Update #1: So who makes up the coalition against drone strikes.  In the U.S., probably anti-war, civil liberties, and international law groups in the U.S. Internationally, you have peace groups, local indigenous populations, and anti-American elements.

North Korean Revolution, Maybe?

Andrei Lankov wrote an interesting op-ed in last week's Washington Post countering some of the optimism following reports about signs of reform taking place in North Korea under Kim Jong-Un (KJU). Signs of reform range from the serious (allowing North Koreans to retain a certain percentage of their crops) to the silly (riding roller-coasters and watching Disney characters).

It’s unclear whether these signs of reform are the beginning of a new era or whether they are temporary measures. In the past, North Korea has frequently demonstrated signs of reform only to leave its people and the rest of the world wanting. Some such as Victor Cha argue we’ve seen this behavior before and downplay prospects for reform.

Andrei’s point is not whether the reforms this time are real or not. The question is what will happen to North Korea if its tries to reform. Reforms obviously carry risks for the regime. Economic liberalization will inevitably require greater opening to the outside world creating pressure for even more reforms. What Lankov notes is the unique position of North Korea. Unlike other past authoritarian or communist regimes which faced similar risks, the North Korean regime is more susceptible to implosion. Once ordinary North Koreans begin to see how much better off Koreans south of the 38^th parallel live, the regime’s lies about the superiority of juche and the DPRK will become starkly clear. North Koreans will demand for more change, question the authority and legitimacy of the North Korean state, and possibly call for unification with the South.

I’m reminded by E.H. Carr about the power over public opinion and the role of propaganda in building state power. By walling off all outside information, the state can create it's own fantasy world. But there's the danger that the truth will out the state propaganda machine. 

Japan's Dilemma: Nuclear Energy

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has a problem. Noda faces stiff opposition not only from anti-nuclear activists and a Japanese public still grappling with the effects of the Fukushima disaster, but even leaders within his own Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

This Asahi Shimbun article captures the dilemma of adopting a nuclear zero policy. It's a tough call. Japan clearly needs energy which nuclear reactors have provided for decades. Anti-nuclear activists claim Japan can achieve these goals without nuclear power. But what are the costs (economic, environmental, and social) of using alternative energy sources? Who seeks to gain/lose from a nuclear zero policy - and I don't mean the obvious vested interests in the energy sector, but in terms of your everyday Japanese citizen.

Historical Institutionalism and International Relations

I’m swinging as far as possible from social  movements in this post, but I just re-read Dan Nexon’s article responding to Orfeo Fiortes' IO review essay on historical institutionalism (HI) in international relations (IR). Fiortes and Nexon adopt two different approaches.

 Fiortes: Microfoundations and preference formation. The sunk costs, increasing returns, and framing effects generated by institutions shape actors’ preferences.

Nexon: Dynamic processes embedded in context. Nexon sees much more variation in institutional processes. HI “develops a toolkit for grappling with the dynamic nature of causal processes and their embeddednness within specific socio-historical contexts.”  Nexon emphasizes the “contingent nature of change processes.”

Both approaches highlight the importance of sequencing, timing, and path dependency. But Fiortes’ treatment of these mechanisms don’t differ that greatly from rational institutionalism. Preferences still dictate choices leading to outcomes. Nexon, alternatively moves from microfoundations to middle-range-theory where he believes HI provides the most promise and points to the “variable nature of change processes” [emphasis mine]. Network structures of institutions, relational mechanisms, practice and habitus, norm diffusion are also processes which may take on characteristics of HI. Nexon finds the emphasis on a “specific decision-theoretic framework to institutional choice” problematic because it limits what HI has to offer about change and transformation in IR. What we wind up with are “static models offering invariant explanations across time and space.” 

My own research on the evolution of East Asia’s regional architecture closely resembles the Fiortes version of HI, but my understanding of the social world is much more in line with Nexon (note to self: revisit APSA paper through Nexon’s framework).  There are affinities between constructivism, HI, and the connection between institutions, ideas and policy preferences which may link the Fiortes with the Nexon view.

One possible critique of Nexon’s approach though is that it dilutes the theoretical precision of HI. It becomes unclear exactly what HI is or does if we take the middle-range theory approach. I suspect Nexon sees HI as a tent which encompasses a wide variety or mechanisms and processes but some may still appreciate the narrower view of HI.

Chick-Fil-A

Chick-Fil-A has been receiving a lot of attention after President Dan Cathy's public support of traditional marriage (or anti-gay marriage stance - the framing depends on which side of the debate you're on).  It's odd that big city mayors from Boston to Chicago to Washington DC got so worked up about Chick-Fil-A. It's not as if the franchise discriminates serving gay customers. Calls for boycotting/banning the franchise triggered a response from Chick-Fil-A fans (re: the conservative base) who believed local governments and same-sex marriage supporters were infringing on Mr. Cathy's right to express his own views.

Anyway, David Meyer had two excellent posts on this debating the efficacy of boycotting Chick-Fil-A and the large turnout of Chick-Fil-A supporters in response. As Meyer notes, large corporations may support a variety of causes which we may or may not support. Does that warrant a boycott? Should supporters of traditional marriage boycott Amazon because Jeff Bezos is campaigning for same-sex marriage in the state of Washington. Should progressive activists boycott Apple because they haven't pushed for improved labor standards in China?

Brad Hirschfield had an interesting comment about the whole Chick-Fil-A fiasco which he claims may actually be one of the finer moments of collective action and social movements.

Without wasting time on fights about who the “real” victims of intolerance are, we can simply point out the hysterical and instructive irony that this is where those who support Chick-fil-A and those who most oppose it are actually quite alike. In each case, a group of aggrieved people who feel their rights and dignity being infringed upon embrace the notion of political and collective social action.

ROK-Japan Relations: GSOMIA

Sorry, this won't be a post about social movements (but I'll put up a good post from the field next on protests, policing, and contentious performances).

A few weeks ago, the breakdown of the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) generated a political firestorm in Seoul. Coincidentally, I was in Seoul interviewing officials about China, Japan, Korea trilateral cooperation. I sheepishly admit that I was unaware about the diplomatic fallout until meeting a Chosun Ilbo journalist who kept mentioning “GSOMIA” (as I sat there nodding my head pretending that I knew what he was talking about).

Since I was in Seoul meeting Korean and Japanese diplomats I decided to find out more on this topic. I thought about posting my thoughts at the time since I had a little bit of inside information. The blog posting fell to the wayside, but I’ve been provoked to finally write in reaction to Jenny Lind’s article about GSOMIA in the Atlantic.

You can read about the GSOMIA fiasco here and here, but basically, the Japanese and South Korean government secretly negotiated an information and intelligence sharing agreement. GSOMIA was devised primarily as an intelligence sharing agreement on North Korea. But perhaps more significantly, it was meant to further strengthen ROK-Japan military ties (and by extension trilateral relations with the United States) which had already been moving forward through observations and joint training exercises the past year.

So why did GSOMIA cause such a domestic uproar in Korea? After all, as one Japanese diplomat mentioned to me, “It’s in South Korea’s own interest to have an agreement.” More broadly, why do two liberal democracies closely allied to the U.S., sharing common threats, and geographically proximate to one another fail to form an alliance? On GSOMIA specifically, several explanations are possible:

1.Domestic politics: The ROK government bungled the deal by making it secret and not revealing it to the public until days before the official signing, thus turning the issue into political fodder.

2.Historical animosity: Koreans remain sensitive about strengthening military ties with Japan given Japan’s unwillingness to own up to its past role during the colonial period.

3.China/Balance of Power: Paranoid about getting caught between great power rivalries, ROK does not want to provoke China, or at least give China the impression that U.S.-Japan-ROK relations are tightening at the expense of China.

Based on her own sources, Lind believes the answer boils down to #3. After reading her article, I was left wondering if we had met an entirely different set of ROK experts. In conversations with (mostly) people associated with the Foreign Ministry, and from mainstream Korean media reports, it sounded like #1 and #2 were the most likely candidates. My own personal view is that GSOMIA fell victim to domestic politics, which by default is linked to the history issue.

I think the China factor had some role to play here. But none of the people I talked to seemed to think the China card was a serious factor. There are other mechanisms that ROK uses to signal its willingness to cooperate with China even as it seeks to strengthen the US-Japan-ROK security ties. This includes the relatively new China-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation secretariat (TCS) which was proposed by the current ROK administration.

Although Lind states that ROK officials shied away from GSOMIA because many South Koreans fear that GSOMIA would be perceived as part of the U.S.-led security architecture positioned against China, I disagree that this was the major reason for the political fall-out at the eleventh hour. First, the fact that the ROK government was ready to sign GSOMIA until the uproar created initially by the opposition party, and subsequently lawmakers from even the ruling party, suggests that most ROK policy officials did not see the China factor as a major problem. One possible exception to this point is if the deal was so secret that the decision was implemented without the approval and knowledge of key NSC or defense officials – but I find that hard to believe. Second, implied here is the idea that the U.S. was somehow pushing ROK and Japan to make this deal (this was how far left parties interpreted GSOMIA). It’s true that Washington would like to see trilateral relations strengthened. But as one insider mentioned, the U.S. remains a constant, not a variable in promoting US-ROK-Japan relations. The U.S. position is to always encourage trilateral relations but it tends not to over push ROK-Japan, partially because it relates to historical issues.  The U.S. tries not to stick its nose in tricky historical problems (despite Hillary Clinton recently commenting on the comfort women issue). Third in the grand scheme of things, why would information sharing between Japan and Korea about North Korea overly threaten China. South Korea even signed a GSOMIA with Russia. Fourth and finally, if South Koreans were really paranoid about irking China, they wouldn't offer to strengthen trilateral relations with the U.S. two weeks later as they did at the last ASEAN Regional Forum. See Clinton's remarks here.

ROK-Japan relations presents one of the more interesting puzzles in IR. The inability to form a true alliance defies the logic of the liberal peace and realism. Victor Cha was one of the first scholars to examine ROK-Japan relations in-depth. Cha pinpoints the inability of ROK-Japan relations to develop beyond the “quasi-alliance,” somewhat paradoxically, to the U.S.: when U.S. commitment to both countries is strong, the incentive for Tokyo and Seoul to strength their own remains low.

In my view, domestic politics, should be given more credit than is often given. From a realist standpoint, ROK and Japan should want stronger ties in today’s security environment. But domestic politics makes this tricky. ROK must sell the security utility of such a pact, but they can’t do this without domestic support. ROK must have some concession from Japan which creates political space for ROK government to promote security cooperation with Japan. Thus, if Japan truly wants greater security cooperation and strengthen ROK-Japan ties, it would/should make concessions either on comfort women issue (i.e. compensation) or history textbook/Dokdo.

But the dilemma for Japan is that its own domestic constituents would be upset if government “caved” in on these demands from ROK. Capitulation would be perceived as a sign of weakness, especially when the population believes Koreans are “emotional,” making outrageous demands for issues which occurred decades ago. Japanese civilians were also victims (twice over: by the Japanese military government and U.S. air power). Japan and Korea both have their hands tied to domestic politics.

Will we see a second push for GSOMIA anytime soon? Certainly not until after the Korean presidential elections at the of the year.

CIA Bases in Africa

The Washington Post is running a series about the expansion of U.S. intelligence operations in Africa. Part I highlights the network and mission of these small bases. The bases are used to train African troops, track terrorists, chase Somali pirates, and catch rebels like Joseph Kony in Uganda. Some host drones, but interestingly, many field single-engine turboprop airplanes (PC-12)to keep operations under the radar (figuratively, not literally). Moreover, as Part II argues, "To further disguise the mission, the U.S. military has taken another unusual step: It has largely outsourced the spying operation to private contractors." Known bases exist in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles.

What's the connection to social movements? First, peace activists have been drawing attention to the secret network of bases for over a decade. This article basically supports Chalmers Johnson's claims about the existence of a vast network of secret military bases. Whether they exist to expand U.S. global domination and militarization is up for debate. U.S. and African officials obviously believe they add security and stability to the region.

Second, the Pentagon is making good on recommendations of the Overseas Basing Commission to rely more on cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, permanent bases. Basing access is perhaps more important than basing rights today. Joint access allows the CIA or Pentagon to avoid criticism that they're establishing a foreign base. Joint access adds legitimacy to U.S. presence, something the U.S. takes into greater consideration these day in an era of relative decline. There's a strategic rationale for establishing "light" rather than permanent bases in the post-Cold War era and particularly in Africa. But to what extent was this strategy a result of anti-base opposition since the late 1980s? The U.S. may also be looking to avoid the type of base politics which led to alliance tensions with the Philippines (1990-91), South Korea (2002-03), and Okinawa (1995-present).

NATO Counter-Summit

Much of downtown Chicago was shutdown last weekend due to the NATO summit. Media coverage focused largely on the summit's main agenda: ending the war in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, there wasn't a whole lot of coverage on the protests, even though a few brief moments of violence erupted. I suspect protestors did not make a huge issue out of "police brutality" since this would have undermined the credibility and distracted attention from the message of peace activists. Most activists were not looking for confrontation.

There's already been a lot of coverage about the summit. Steve Walt, who called the summit a "useless waste of time, money, and fuel" had by far the funniest comments (I don't think he intended to be funny). Anyway, what some may not have been aware about was the NATO "counter-summit" which took place at the same time in Chicago. Since the "Battle of Seattle" in 1999, parallel counter-summits have often accompanied global summits (i.e. G-8 Forum, IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, etc...). Counter-summits are organized by peace and global justice activists who use this media platform to voice their concerns and views about peace, global capitalism, the environment, human rights etc... This particular NATO counter-summit focused on ending the Afghan war; moving U.S. tax dollars from the Pentagon to meet human needs at home, and dissolving NATO. A longer list of reasons to oppose NATO (although many of the points are only marginally related to NATO if at all) and the counter-summit conference agenda and daily schedule can be found in the provided links. And here is information about the Network for a NATO-Free Future.

I'm trying to understand how and why activists and government officials come to such radically different conclusions about peace and security, and what international relations theory might tell us about these divergent worldviews. For most of the world (or at least the West), NATO is an organization which provides security, protection, peace and stability. Yet, peace activists see NATO largely as an organization that bombs, maims, and destroys. So is NATO good or bad? Or is this nothing but a contest about the meaning and interpretation of NATO? World leaders met in Chicago to work on an exit strategy so in some ways it was ironic to see protests against the Chicago summit.

Evangelicals and Politics

Evangelicals get a bad rap for their intolerance and their association with right-wing conservatism. Some of this criticism is deserved. But I've also felt that the media and broader American public lump all "religious" Christians (those actively practicing their faith) into the category of "evangelical" and "conservative."

My own research (and advocacy) on North Korean human rights and humanitarian aid suggests this is wrong. I've encountered several evangelicals working with faith-based NGOs who think outside of the conservative box, supporting a more liberal political agenda. I've also read a couple of blogs by self-proclaimed liberal evangelicals. The death of evangelical theologian heavyweight John Stott last year also prompted Nicholas Kristof to write about compassionate evangelicals fighting for social justice.

Anyway, I just read Chris Seiple's critical response to Robert Putnam's Foreign Affairs piece "God and Caesar in America" which confirmed my observations. I think the problem in identifying "liberal" evangelicals has to do with the fact that they operate relatively silently and without recognizable leaders. Sieple offers a nice description:

They want to be defined by what they are for -- an orthodox reading of scripture, the interpretation and application of which they must faithfully grapple with -- instead of what they are against... They largely hold the same values as Evangelicals, they just aren't angry about it...

They might find aspects of the Democratic Party appealing, especially its heart for the disenfranchised, and be "turned off" by the Republican religious narrative Putnam and Campbell describe. At the same time, they do not feel comfortable with a party that seemingly resists any public discussion of what it means to be pro-life and to believe that marriage should be between a man and a woman.

Adding to Seiple's response, I'd add that whether this group votes Republican or Democrat will depend on how they balance their position on social issues (poverty, education, health) versus social values (gay marriage, abortion).

So what's this have to do with social movements? Well, my impression is that you're more likely to see right-wing evangelicals take it to the street (i.e. the Tea Party, North Korean human rights) than their more progressive brethren. Which is why the media and mainstream America will continue to lump all evangelicals into the conservative, right-wing camp.

Social Movement Outcomes

I just saw this blogpost discussing social movement outcomes and the impact of the Occupy Movements. I'm largely in agreement with the author that the impact will be more indirect, having some influence on culture, than direct.




Anyway, it's made me think about my chapter on Jeju anti-base protests I'm supposed to write for an edited volume. I'm not sure if protestors will actually prevent the construction of the ROK naval base. One potential huge political opportunity for activists is if the progressive Democratic United Party (DUP) win the National Assembly elections in April. The DUP has claimed it will review (if not halt) current base construction plans. Aside from the immediate effect of halting base construction, anti-base activists are forcing at least some segments of political society to rethink the purpose of the base and what it actually means for South Korean security.

Social Movements and North Korea

Not possible. End of post.

Well, yes...but that doesn't mean we can't think about possibilities. Occasionally when I mention to other North Korean watchers that I do research on social movements, I get asked about the (lack of) prospects for a social movement in NK.

Here was an email I sent in response to a comment about social capital and civil society in North Korea

As for social movements, yes, most people discount an Arab Spring for NK b/c it lacks civil society. But in the study of revolutions (not that i'm advocating a revolution in NK) there is something known as preference falsification where people convey their preference for social conformity in public while holding different thoughts privately. So N.Koreans praise the regime in public while holding genuine thoughts to themselves. A side effect of preference falsification is the dampening of knowledge and information and an inability to gauge true level of discontent. So no one complains despite hardship. Under certain conditions though, private thoughts may emerge in public which may embolden others to convey their true preferences and demand for change. One of those conditions is probably the existence of information networks (or social capital if you want to call it that) so underground churches could play that role. In places like E. Germany where this theory was applied (by an economist, Timur Kuran), a network of both underground activists and some associational life (workers unions) brought safety in numbers once grievances were expressed out into the open forced regimes to make concessions.

One research I'd be curious to explore is whether development projects or something like the Kaesong Industrial Complex foster trust networks and social capital among North Koreans. Likewise, I wonder if there are there trust networks built among migrants who cross borders between NK and China as the come into contact with one another.

Perhaps we need a network

Scaling Down U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa

The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military is likely to "scale back plans to build key bases in Japan and Guam because of political obstacles and budget pressures." An earlier Stars and Stripes report (citing Bloomberg) stated that the 8,000 U.S. marines slated for relocation from Okinawa to Guam would instead be rotated through Australia and the Philippines. Additionally, the relocation of the 8,000 Marines wouldn't be contingent on the relocation of Futenma Air Station to northern Okinawa. The Pentagon hasn't released any details when the marines would leave or to what extent it would scale back its base ambitions in Okinawa or Guam.

Given U.S. defense spending cuts, I'm not entirely surprised about the U.S. and Japan backing away from the 2006 Guam Accord. Delinking the Futenma issue from the Guam relocation plan takes a lot of pressure off Tokyo from both Washington and Okinawan anti-base protestors. It's unclear whether Tokyo can now give the green light on base expansion in northern Okinawa (assuming that the U.S. still want a heliport in Okinawa) due to ongoing anti-base opposition in Okinawa. My hunch is if the U.S. really wants a heliport and have the budget for it, they'll push Japan harder for Futenma's relocation and Tokyo will probably comply.

The scenario Okinawans hope for are deeper budget cuts which lead to the closure of Futenma. Such a scenario would represent a big victory for anti-base movements. But can we claim that social movements were effective? Is the real explanation U.S. budget cuts? If one examines movements from a long time horizon one could argue that movements helped stave off immediate base expansion/relocation/opening maintaining at least the status quo until the rise of some fortunate turn of events (i.e. budget cuts, changed strategic environment etc...) leading to base closure. In this case, Futenma's relocation would count as a partial victory with anti-base pressure leading to delays and some concessions in reducing Okinawa's base burden.

But in the grand scheme of things, Okinawans would be hard-pressed to challenge the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As I argue in my book, Tokyo is constantly playing a balancing act between pressure from Washington and Okinawan demands but more often falls on the side of its security patron.