Revisiting Jeju Anti-Base Protests

I'm making a return to my blog after a long absence...

Exactly 3 years ago I was on Jeju Island doing research on anti-base protests against the construction of the South Korean naval base. The paper I’ve written has gone through the grinder at several journals. I agree with much of what critics have to say, and most reviews do mention that I do have a potential argument worth making. I just haven’t figured out a good way to deliver it in 10,000 words or less. I’m using this blog post as a warm-up exercise to retool the article for a non-IR/poli-sci journal.

It’s no surprise that peace activists and national security/foreign policy government officials often clash on a number of issues. But little understood is how or why such differences occur – especially when both sides profess to make claims advancing peace and security. Usually differences are attributed to different political ideologies wrapped around labels such as progressive and conservative.  

Moving beyond such obvious labels, I examine discourse and text to help us understand why activists and policymakers in South Korea came to major blows (literally) regarding the construction of a naval base designed to protect South Koreans. While many reasons exist in favor of or against the naval base – the claims made by local and transnational activists on one hand and ROK government and military officials on the other align fairly neatly along two dimensions. The first is based purely on arguments based on the logic of “realism.”  Bases (as an element of power) are either a source of security or insecurity depending on whether one sees bases as defending the national interest or provoking China and other countries in the region. The government claims the former, activists claim the latter logic. The second dimension focuses on the primary referent of security: states or people. Government focus on the state; activists focus on individual lives at the very local level.

Activists and government officials tend to carry different assumptions regarding international politics. Based on these two dimensions, we can see how far they might diverge on their views about Jeju naval base construction. The figures below (click to enlarge) are ideal types, but you get the picture how, why, peace activists and government diverge sharply in their views about peace and security.

Figure 1: Coding scheme mapping realist and critical worldviews

Drones and Bases

Back in 2008 when I was rewriting the conclusion to my book on anti-base protests, there was a lot of discussion about AFRICOM and the possibility of building new bases in sub-Sahara Africa. As the Post reports, this is now becoming reality with the expansion of drone technology. Meanwhile, drone use is likely to expand in the Middle East Here's a brief about UAE purchasing surveillance drones from the U.S. Will we see protests against U.S. bases in Africa soon?

Update (2/28/13)

• Niger base confirmed. Media reported last week that about 100 troops are now in Niger. 
• Also, a symposium on the drone debate

Jeju Naval Base Protests in Seoul

I've given several talks about the Jeju anti-base protests the past few months, the latest one at Stanford's  FSI/Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The Jeju anti-base movement has survived longer than I (and probably activists themselves) anticipated. Here's a good overview from a Hawaii activist...although I remind readers that the article tends to embellish if not overexaggerate the "threat" of U.S. military presence. 

Not having heard much about Jeju Island, several researchers at FSI took interest in Jeju Island. They'll probably be hearing more about Jeju now that a major film about the Jeju 4.3 Uprising took the top prize at Sundance. It'll be interesting to see if activists capitalize on this Sundance victory to rejuvenate protests. The obvious frame extension is that war and suffering must not be repeated again on Jeju Island.

CIA Bases in Africa

The Washington Post is running a series about the expansion of U.S. intelligence operations in Africa. Part I highlights the network and mission of these small bases. The bases are used to train African troops, track terrorists, chase Somali pirates, and catch rebels like Joseph Kony in Uganda. Some host drones, but interestingly, many field single-engine turboprop airplanes (PC-12)to keep operations under the radar (figuratively, not literally). Moreover, as Part II argues, "To further disguise the mission, the U.S. military has taken another unusual step: It has largely outsourced the spying operation to private contractors." Known bases exist in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles.

What's the connection to social movements? First, peace activists have been drawing attention to the secret network of bases for over a decade. This article basically supports Chalmers Johnson's claims about the existence of a vast network of secret military bases. Whether they exist to expand U.S. global domination and militarization is up for debate. U.S. and African officials obviously believe they add security and stability to the region.

Second, the Pentagon is making good on recommendations of the Overseas Basing Commission to rely more on cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, permanent bases. Basing access is perhaps more important than basing rights today. Joint access allows the CIA or Pentagon to avoid criticism that they're establishing a foreign base. Joint access adds legitimacy to U.S. presence, something the U.S. takes into greater consideration these day in an era of relative decline. There's a strategic rationale for establishing "light" rather than permanent bases in the post-Cold War era and particularly in Africa. But to what extent was this strategy a result of anti-base opposition since the late 1980s? The U.S. may also be looking to avoid the type of base politics which led to alliance tensions with the Philippines (1990-91), South Korea (2002-03), and Okinawa (1995-present).

Scaling Down U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa

The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military is likely to "scale back plans to build key bases in Japan and Guam because of political obstacles and budget pressures." An earlier Stars and Stripes report (citing Bloomberg) stated that the 8,000 U.S. marines slated for relocation from Okinawa to Guam would instead be rotated through Australia and the Philippines. Additionally, the relocation of the 8,000 Marines wouldn't be contingent on the relocation of Futenma Air Station to northern Okinawa. The Pentagon hasn't released any details when the marines would leave or to what extent it would scale back its base ambitions in Okinawa or Guam.

Given U.S. defense spending cuts, I'm not entirely surprised about the U.S. and Japan backing away from the 2006 Guam Accord. Delinking the Futenma issue from the Guam relocation plan takes a lot of pressure off Tokyo from both Washington and Okinawan anti-base protestors. It's unclear whether Tokyo can now give the green light on base expansion in northern Okinawa (assuming that the U.S. still want a heliport in Okinawa) due to ongoing anti-base opposition in Okinawa. My hunch is if the U.S. really wants a heliport and have the budget for it, they'll push Japan harder for Futenma's relocation and Tokyo will probably comply.

The scenario Okinawans hope for are deeper budget cuts which lead to the closure of Futenma. Such a scenario would represent a big victory for anti-base movements. But can we claim that social movements were effective? Is the real explanation U.S. budget cuts? If one examines movements from a long time horizon one could argue that movements helped stave off immediate base expansion/relocation/opening maintaining at least the status quo until the rise of some fortunate turn of events (i.e. budget cuts, changed strategic environment etc...) leading to base closure. In this case, Futenma's relocation would count as a partial victory with anti-base pressure leading to delays and some concessions in reducing Okinawa's base burden.

But in the grand scheme of things, Okinawans would be hard-pressed to challenge the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As I argue in my book, Tokyo is constantly playing a balancing act between pressure from Washington and Okinawan demands but more often falls on the side of its security patron.

ROK Naval Base Protest Comes to DC

Interesting to see the naval base protest come to my home in DC....right when I'm away for a conference.



Good to see an exercising of Freedom of Speech. But seeing President Lee M.B. referred to as a dictator on one of the signs, I wonder if protestors are aware of Lee M.B.'s own rags-to-riches story.

Jeju Protestors Arrested

I predicted this about a month ago, but the ROK government has steadily increased the level of coercion the past two months to end protests against the construction of the ROK naval facility in Jeju.

NY Times reports 25 activists were detained today. Activists and residents have a valid point about environmental consequences. Who wants a giant military base on a beautiful island known best for honeymooning? On the other hand, the ROK government's heightened sensitivy to security threats following a turn of events the past couple of years (read Chinese assertiveness and DPRK aggression) have made them adamant about this base. One way or another, the ROK government will have its base.

Update on Base Politics in Okinawa and Jeju Island

Looks like there's some demand for a strategic review of the current Futenma relocation plan led by Senate Armed Service committee members Carl Levin, John McCain and Jim Webb. I'm guessing Tokyo is too preoccupied with the Fukushima aftermath to really deal with base issues, much less pay for expensive relocation costs to Guam. Of course, the US is looking to cut costs in defense spending.

Meanwhile the anti-base network has been spreading the word about the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island. My understanding is that it's a South Korean naval base. Activists claim that the base is intended to serve U.S. military purposes. The base would allow U.S. carriers and ships to port, and possibly house Aegis destroyers which would obviously support joint command operatives but to say it's a U.S. base is incorrect (although it's useful to frame it as such).