ISIS and A New Strategy for Bases?

Richard Immerman, who sponsored a conference on US Bases and the Construction of Hegemony earlier this fall, sent us a link to this NY Times article about the Pentagon working to build a string of bases in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East to address the threat from ISIS and its affiliates. I'm not sure how new this strategy is since plans like these have been in the works since the Bush Administration. However, it appears that the threat of ISIS has given strategic planners renewed interest in coordinating base policies.

David Vine's Base Nation

Celeste Ward Gventer reviewed David Vine's book, Base Nation in this Sunday's Washington Post. The book, which was added to my syllabus on the Politics of Overseas Bases and American Empire, basically presents an argument for why overseas U.S. bases do more harm than good. In the bad category, they're expensive, force local people off land, tie the US to dictatorships, result in environmental destruction, corrupt local economies.  

David and I have had several conversations over the years about bases. Although we disagree on several key points about the nature and consequence of US basing, we both agree that a consensus of sorts exists among policy elites regarding basing strategy. However, one point Gventer raises which is absent from Vine's book, and which Stacie Pettyjohn and I address in a working paper evaluating realist and imperial interpretations of overseas base expansion is the relationship between American strategy and bases. Gventer writes: 

Bases are merely a symptom of U.S. strategy, a visible sign of America’s expansive view of its role in the world. Indeed, the bases underscore the relative continuity of American strategy since the end of World War II.

Stacie and I have a slightly different take. US strategy evolves, as reflected by reductions, downsizing, and consolidation of overseas bases over time, and particularly following the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review.

Revisiting Jeju Anti-Base Protests

I'm making a return to my blog after a long absence...

Exactly 3 years ago I was on Jeju Island doing research on anti-base protests against the construction of the South Korean naval base. The paper I’ve written has gone through the grinder at several journals. I agree with much of what critics have to say, and most reviews do mention that I do have a potential argument worth making. I just haven’t figured out a good way to deliver it in 10,000 words or less. I’m using this blog post as a warm-up exercise to retool the article for a non-IR/poli-sci journal.

It’s no surprise that peace activists and national security/foreign policy government officials often clash on a number of issues. But little understood is how or why such differences occur – especially when both sides profess to make claims advancing peace and security. Usually differences are attributed to different political ideologies wrapped around labels such as progressive and conservative.  

Moving beyond such obvious labels, I examine discourse and text to help us understand why activists and policymakers in South Korea came to major blows (literally) regarding the construction of a naval base designed to protect South Koreans. While many reasons exist in favor of or against the naval base – the claims made by local and transnational activists on one hand and ROK government and military officials on the other align fairly neatly along two dimensions. The first is based purely on arguments based on the logic of “realism.”  Bases (as an element of power) are either a source of security or insecurity depending on whether one sees bases as defending the national interest or provoking China and other countries in the region. The government claims the former, activists claim the latter logic. The second dimension focuses on the primary referent of security: states or people. Government focus on the state; activists focus on individual lives at the very local level.

Activists and government officials tend to carry different assumptions regarding international politics. Based on these two dimensions, we can see how far they might diverge on their views about Jeju naval base construction. The figures below (click to enlarge) are ideal types, but you get the picture how, why, peace activists and government diverge sharply in their views about peace and security.

Figure 1: Coding scheme mapping realist and critical worldviews

Closure of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti

Source: Department of the Navy; CIA World Factbook. Image source: 

GeoEye via Google Earth. Printed in The Washington Post Sept. 24, 2013. 

Last month, Djibouti requested that a fleet of U.S. drones relocate from Camp Lemonnier following several crashes. Although we don't know the details, Washington and Djibouti seemed to have reached this agreement amicably. For the most part, Djibouti, officials have been satisfied with the arrangement ($37 million yearly rent), and from the standpoint of base politics, relocating now rather than after some catastrophic accident seems like the wiser option.

RAND Study: Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Force

RAND recently published a massive study titled Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces. Commissioned by the Pentagon, it's probably the most comprehensive study on overseas bases since the Overseas Basing Commission Report released for the U.S. Congress in 2005.

I'm waiting to receive a hard copy of the report so I don't destroy my printer cartridge printing out the free pdf version online. In the meantime, you can get few snippets of the report from Michah Zenko at CFR. For a more Asia-oriented assessment of the report's findings, see this Indian Times article. Apparently, the report suggests using Port Blair in India as a site for a drone base.

Given the publication of this report, there does seem to be renewed interest on the topic of overseas bases. Stacie Pettyjohn, one of the RAND co-authors of the overseas basing study also has a concise new RAND monograph outlining the history of U.S. overseas military presence. A colleague in my department alerted me to a graduate student presenting a paper on "quasi-U.S bases" in Latin America. And of course, there's lots of interest about drone bases, particularly in the Middle East North Africa and Sub-Saharan regions.

I've moved on from base politics research but I suppose one can never fully escape one's past work, especially if they now exist as publications in the public domain. Once I get around to reading the report, I'll update this post with some insights into the RAND study.

Drones and Bases

Back in 2008 when I was rewriting the conclusion to my book on anti-base protests, there was a lot of discussion about AFRICOM and the possibility of building new bases in sub-Sahara Africa. As the Post reports, this is now becoming reality with the expansion of drone technology. Meanwhile, drone use is likely to expand in the Middle East Here's a brief about UAE purchasing surveillance drones from the U.S. Will we see protests against U.S. bases in Africa soon?

Update (2/28/13)

• Niger base confirmed. Media reported last week that about 100 troops are now in Niger. 
• Also, a symposium on the drone debate

Another Drone Base...This Time Niger

Drone bases are proliferating. Most surveillance drones are housed in East Africa (around the Horn of Africa) but the U.S. is now scoping  out places in West Africa. Here's another link on the story from the NY Times.

U.S. Base Reduction in the Azores

The U.S. is downsizing its presence at Lajes Field, an air base in the Azores. While some (i.e. activists) may welcome this news, the community on the Azores will feel the effects. A reminder that there are always pockets of supporters for U.S. military presence - even if only for economic reasons. Mid-air refueling and the longer range of planes has made the Air Field obsolete. But the downsizing is also a part of further U.S. troop reductions in Europe.

Afghanistan Basing Strategy

Will the U.S continue counterterrorism operations in Pakistan? Kim and Fred Kagan believe the answer to this is tantamount to whether the U.S. can retain U.S. bases and maintain current force levels in Afghanistan.  I hate math, but here’s an application of the transitive axiom:

No bases = no ability to strike terrorist cells in Afghanistan/Pakistan. 

No large troop presence = no bases.

Therefore, no large troop presence = no ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia.

My focus here is less on counterinsurgency operations and more about the need and purpose of overseas bases. To strike terrorist cells without the presence of ground troops, the U.S. will have to rely on a) Predator drones; b) special mission units c) precision guided missiles. The Kagans think options A and B are not possible without bases.

Policymakers for the past decade have argued for a smaller footprint regarding U.S. overseas bases – a shift away from large permanent structures to “lighter” facilities. Post-reconstruction Iraq and Afghanistan were supposed to be the two exceptions. The Iraqis gave us the boot so we’ll have little “permanent” presence in that country. But the Kagans demonstrate why bases – physical structures, not merely access agreements or basing rights to host nation bases – still matter. Whether we get bases in Afghanistan will largely be determined by the Afghanis and to a lesser extent U.S. negotiating skills.  Like many policymakers, the Kagans omit the fact that the fate of our policy often rests with the host nation and base politics. We can’t just retain bases and 68,000 troops simply because it makes strategic sense (or not). 

CIA Bases in Africa

The Washington Post is running a series about the expansion of U.S. intelligence operations in Africa. Part I highlights the network and mission of these small bases. The bases are used to train African troops, track terrorists, chase Somali pirates, and catch rebels like Joseph Kony in Uganda. Some host drones, but interestingly, many field single-engine turboprop airplanes (PC-12)to keep operations under the radar (figuratively, not literally). Moreover, as Part II argues, "To further disguise the mission, the U.S. military has taken another unusual step: It has largely outsourced the spying operation to private contractors." Known bases exist in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles.

What's the connection to social movements? First, peace activists have been drawing attention to the secret network of bases for over a decade. This article basically supports Chalmers Johnson's claims about the existence of a vast network of secret military bases. Whether they exist to expand U.S. global domination and militarization is up for debate. U.S. and African officials obviously believe they add security and stability to the region.

Second, the Pentagon is making good on recommendations of the Overseas Basing Commission to rely more on cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, permanent bases. Basing access is perhaps more important than basing rights today. Joint access allows the CIA or Pentagon to avoid criticism that they're establishing a foreign base. Joint access adds legitimacy to U.S. presence, something the U.S. takes into greater consideration these day in an era of relative decline. There's a strategic rationale for establishing "light" rather than permanent bases in the post-Cold War era and particularly in Africa. But to what extent was this strategy a result of anti-base opposition since the late 1980s? The U.S. may also be looking to avoid the type of base politics which led to alliance tensions with the Philippines (1990-91), South Korea (2002-03), and Okinawa (1995-present).

Scaling Down U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa

The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military is likely to "scale back plans to build key bases in Japan and Guam because of political obstacles and budget pressures." An earlier Stars and Stripes report (citing Bloomberg) stated that the 8,000 U.S. marines slated for relocation from Okinawa to Guam would instead be rotated through Australia and the Philippines. Additionally, the relocation of the 8,000 Marines wouldn't be contingent on the relocation of Futenma Air Station to northern Okinawa. The Pentagon hasn't released any details when the marines would leave or to what extent it would scale back its base ambitions in Okinawa or Guam.

Given U.S. defense spending cuts, I'm not entirely surprised about the U.S. and Japan backing away from the 2006 Guam Accord. Delinking the Futenma issue from the Guam relocation plan takes a lot of pressure off Tokyo from both Washington and Okinawan anti-base protestors. It's unclear whether Tokyo can now give the green light on base expansion in northern Okinawa (assuming that the U.S. still want a heliport in Okinawa) due to ongoing anti-base opposition in Okinawa. My hunch is if the U.S. really wants a heliport and have the budget for it, they'll push Japan harder for Futenma's relocation and Tokyo will probably comply.

The scenario Okinawans hope for are deeper budget cuts which lead to the closure of Futenma. Such a scenario would represent a big victory for anti-base movements. But can we claim that social movements were effective? Is the real explanation U.S. budget cuts? If one examines movements from a long time horizon one could argue that movements helped stave off immediate base expansion/relocation/opening maintaining at least the status quo until the rise of some fortunate turn of events (i.e. budget cuts, changed strategic environment etc...) leading to base closure. In this case, Futenma's relocation would count as a partial victory with anti-base pressure leading to delays and some concessions in reducing Okinawa's base burden.

But in the grand scheme of things, Okinawans would be hard-pressed to challenge the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As I argue in my book, Tokyo is constantly playing a balancing act between pressure from Washington and Okinawan demands but more often falls on the side of its security patron.

The Future of Iraq

“The image of the American soldier is as a killer, not a defender. And how can you give a killer immunity?” Did civilian killings in Haditha and elsewhere turn the tide against long-term US military presence? Washington had hoped to keep Iraq as a staging ground for U.S. presence in the region.

Is this a sign of anti-base victory? Sovereignty was certainly the dominant motif (i.e. master frame) when giving the Americans the boot. It was clear that the majority of Iraqis - at least the ones who had decision power in charting the future of Iraq - did not want an extension of U.S. military. While there was no anti-base movement per se, then anti-base sentiment I imagine was still fairly widespread in Baghdad. But here, base politics also played out on the US side. Insiders claim Obama did not try to oversell the ideas of US troop presence. After all, he too had a campaign pledge to end the war in Iraq.

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki still visited Washington this week to mark the beginning of a new strategic course for US-Iraqi relations, sans US troops. Whether he caved to domestic nationalist pressure or believed that the Iraqis were ready to take responsibility of their own security (likely the former), US troops will exit on Dec. 31 (update, two weeks before deadline so troops can enjoy Christmas at home). Questions will continue to loom, however, whether this was the right decision.

U.S. and East Asia

This has nothing to do with social movements, but since my other research is about East Asian IR, I'll use this space to report important developments. At the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference hosted by AFSC last month, John Feffer alerted everyone to Hillary Clinton's Foreign Policy article, "America's Pacific Century." It didn't strike me as particularly profound. No revolutionary ideas. But it does appear to signal a shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. Clinton's article was no doubt timed for release a month prior to Obama's nine day trip to the region, which included his attendance at APEC in Honolulu, and for the first time, the East Asian Summit in Indonesia.

Somewhat more significant was yesterday's announcement of a new security pact with Australia which would permit the stationing of U.S. troops. This has irked the Chinese and alarmed peace activists who question whether new bases will feed into the security dilemma.

U.S. troops in Australia aren't directed at China per se. Why would the U.S. want conflict with China? But the pact with Australia does broadcast a larger message to all regional actors (including China) that the U.S. intends to remain active in the region. Call it a "warning" to China to "behave" (i.e. comply to international norms, not provoke neighbors on the South China Sea, etc...). Does this set the U.S. and China on a dangerous path? We shall see...

Update on Base Politics in Okinawa and Jeju Island

Looks like there's some demand for a strategic review of the current Futenma relocation plan led by Senate Armed Service committee members Carl Levin, John McCain and Jim Webb. I'm guessing Tokyo is too preoccupied with the Fukushima aftermath to really deal with base issues, much less pay for expensive relocation costs to Guam. Of course, the US is looking to cut costs in defense spending.

Meanwhile the anti-base network has been spreading the word about the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island. My understanding is that it's a South Korean naval base. Activists claim that the base is intended to serve U.S. military purposes. The base would allow U.S. carriers and ships to port, and possibly house Aegis destroyers which would obviously support joint command operatives but to say it's a U.S. base is incorrect (although it's useful to frame it as such).