Peace, Denuclearziation, and the Gap Between Liberal and Progressive Security Policy

One of my former students, Van Jackson, put together a roundtable on the future of progressive foreign policy in the Texas National Security Review. On his Facebook, I weighed in on a discussion in which someone questioned whether there was enough diversity of views on "progressive" f.p., especially since the writers were all established foreign policy scholars. These progressive ideas are not new, but have been articulated by peace activists. However, the foreign policy/security views of peace activists are generally dismissed as radical, naïve, or unrealistic by mainstream policymakers (what Walt calls the establishment).

I was reminded of the roundtable (which I still haven't read but should) when I saw this clip of activists Sung-hee Choi, an activist I might call a friend, interrupting a peace and denuclearization conference hosted by the ROK government and the UN. In the video, she demands how such a conference could be held on Jeju Island without inviting or hearing the input of the local villagers who live by a naval base which permits nuclear submarines to port. In her rant, she criticizes the President Moon's policies and refers to his government as a puppet of the US.

What I find interesting, if not mildly puzzling, is how progressive activists criticize a president who's staked so much capital in building peace with North Korea and taking the engagement path towards denuclearization. In this case, I want to argue that there might be a distinction between liberal vs. progressive policy views. The established left support liberal foreign policy, whereas activists support progressive foreign policy. Of course, this may just be another name for the mainstream (or center) left and the radical (or far) left so no need to reinvent the wheel. Is it possible, though that policymakers are picking up some of the ideas of the radical left. If liberals are still part of the foreign  policy establishment, they are in cahoots with conservatives. Thus if someone wants to break the mold of the establishment, they have to enter the territory of progressives.

What Psychology Tells Us About Dispelling Worldviews

Apparently it's difficult. This piece by David Ignatius on why facts don't seem to matter for Trump supporters is apt for my own research on contrasting views between peace activists and policymakers. In fact, trying to persuade the other and convincing them why they're wrong (or you're right) seems particularly onerous if the research of this 1979 study, "Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence" stands correct. It appears that attempts to debunk myths even has the potential opposite effect of reinforcing myths.

So applied to the politics of peace, activists are socialized at an early stage to hold particular views about nukes, bases, drones etc...As they interact with policymakers, who themselves are socialized into viewing peace through a different lens (i.e. realist, liberal international etc...), neither side cedes ground in trying to understand the facts. The result is polarization of views.

I'm going to need to find some collaborators in psychology and sociology to help me out here.

What Psychology Tells Us About Dispelling Worldviews

Apparently it's difficult. This piece by David Ignatius on why facts don't seem to matter for Trump supporters is apt for my own research on contrasting views between peace activists and policymakers. In fact, trying to persuade the other and convincing them why they're wrong (or you're right) seems particularly onerous if the research of this 1979 study, "Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects ofPrior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence" stands correct. It appears that attempts to debunk myths even has the potential opposite effect of reinforcing myths.

So applied to the politics of peace, activists are socialized at an early stage to hold particular views about nukes, bases, drones etc...As they interact with policymakers, who themselves are socialized into viewing peace through a different lens (i.e. realist, liberal international etc...), neither side cedes ground in trying to understand the facts. The result is polarization of views.

I'm going to need to find some collaborators in psychology and sociology to help me out here.

Strange Bedfellows: Code Pink and John Kerry

If you're a politician with conservative foreign policy views, Code Pink is probably your worst nightmare. They regularly go to battle with members of the U.S. government. But it's good to see (and note) that they are not categorically opposed to U.S. foreign policy, and on rare occasion, go out of the way to applaud the actions of the U.S. government. They did this for Sec. of State John Kerry for his diplomatic engagement with Iran (and Cuba) last week. While activists may be ideological, they can also be pragmatic and support the agenda of the very same officials they target week in and week out - so long as the end goals align.

I thought I would share Code Pink's newsletter:

What. A. Week. Whew! CODEPINK has been in action non-stop. Remember George Bush’s axis of evil? We’ve been pushing an axis of diplomacy: Cuba, Iran, North Korea.Cuba: We participated in the historic flag-raising ceremony at the new Cuban Embassy in Washington DC, threw a salsa party [link to news coverage] outside, and promoted the next step: lifting the trade embargo.
Korea: We hosted a Congressional briefing with Congresswoman Barbara Lee, Congressman Charles Rangel, Gloria Steinem and others delegates from Women Cross the DMZ about peace and reunification in Korea.
Iran: We cheered Secretary John Kerry on in a Senate hearing to show appreciation for the nuclear deal he brokered with Iran, debated Republican presidential candidate Ted Cruz for at least half an hour about his opposition to the Iran nuclear deal, and hosted Iranian dance lessons in front of the White House with our Iranian friends to “humanize” the debate--and have some fun!

Revisiting Jeju Anti-Base Protests

I'm making a return to my blog after a long absence...

Exactly 3 years ago I was on Jeju Island doing research on anti-base protests against the construction of the South Korean naval base. The paper I’ve written has gone through the grinder at several journals. I agree with much of what critics have to say, and most reviews do mention that I do have a potential argument worth making. I just haven’t figured out a good way to deliver it in 10,000 words or less. I’m using this blog post as a warm-up exercise to retool the article for a non-IR/poli-sci journal.

It’s no surprise that peace activists and national security/foreign policy government officials often clash on a number of issues. But little understood is how or why such differences occur – especially when both sides profess to make claims advancing peace and security. Usually differences are attributed to different political ideologies wrapped around labels such as progressive and conservative.  

Moving beyond such obvious labels, I examine discourse and text to help us understand why activists and policymakers in South Korea came to major blows (literally) regarding the construction of a naval base designed to protect South Koreans. While many reasons exist in favor of or against the naval base – the claims made by local and transnational activists on one hand and ROK government and military officials on the other align fairly neatly along two dimensions. The first is based purely on arguments based on the logic of “realism.”  Bases (as an element of power) are either a source of security or insecurity depending on whether one sees bases as defending the national interest or provoking China and other countries in the region. The government claims the former, activists claim the latter logic. The second dimension focuses on the primary referent of security: states or people. Government focus on the state; activists focus on individual lives at the very local level.

Activists and government officials tend to carry different assumptions regarding international politics. Based on these two dimensions, we can see how far they might diverge on their views about Jeju naval base construction. The figures below (click to enlarge) are ideal types, but you get the picture how, why, peace activists and government diverge sharply in their views about peace and security.

Figure 1: Coding scheme mapping realist and critical worldviews

Autocrats Unite...and the Deep Divide to Global Peace

Saw this op-ed by David Sanger from someone's Facebook post about the rise of autocrats and the threat of U.S. global under-reach (i.e. how the world might face doom if no leader is willing to tend to the international garden "so that small problems didn’t turn into big ones." Sanger cites Bob Kagan's piece which places this argument in historical context. The arguments are all reasonable, but his conclusion that the U.S. at times must act as an enforcer and be a forceful menace is sure to raise eyebrows. Take for instance, this quote from an activist in Hawaii I know commenting on Obama's recent West Point speech:

What makes us "exceptional" is the fact that WE LIVE IN THE MOST HATED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND ARE CONSIDERED THE NUMBER ONE OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING WORLD PEACE. And that is NOTHING to be proud of. And about "America must always lead on the world stage..." Too easily said when America builds the stage wherever it wants, imposes the props, writes the script, and dupes the American audience (that would be the taxpayers whose money funds American terrorism) into swallowing the idea it was an honorable, must-do, performance.

Again, struck by the vast chasm in thought about achieving global peace and stability between (conservative) policymakers and (liberal) activists.

Update: I cited Kagan's piece, not b/c I necessarily support the argument, but b/c it seemed central to part of Sanger's op-ed. Here's Dan Nexon shredding Kagan to pieces.

Anti-War Protests, Pacificism, and Syria

I've avoided discussion on Syria since there are a million other outlets pontificating on this issue already. However, two articles appeared on my radar, both in reaction to the recent surge in activity from anti-war groups so I'll comment on anti-war protests. Liberal anti-war groups largely supported Obama'd bid for election in 2008. However, Syria provides the first major break between the administration and demonstraters. It's no suprise that activists, who we often assume are principled actors, can too play politics, forming coalitions with lawmakers, disparate groups, and whoever will help them push their short term agenda. Who would have thought conservative libertarians and left-wing pacificists jumping in bed! But this also shows that coalitions are fluid, and their relationship with formal political parties are complex as argued by Michael Heaney and Fabio Rojas here. More related to my own (not-yet-off-the-ground) research is a confirmation about the worldviews and constraints of policymakers and activists. They are socialized into two completely different worldviews such that no permanent coalition could be ever formed in finding a solution to peace.

Source: Nikki Kahn/Washington Post

The second article is an op-ed from documentary filmaker Sebastian Junger titled " When the best chance for peace means war." It's essentially a rebuke of pacifism in the wake of humanitarian disaster as Junger writes, "At some point, pacifism becomes part of the machinery of death." Evoking just means for the use of force, he adds, "Every war I have ever covered — Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Liberia — withstood all diplomatic efforts to end it until Western military action finally forced a resolution." This last point is the tough question for pacfisits. The pacifist reponse is to always look for diplomatic solutions, even when such solutions have been exhausted. At times coercion, or the threat of coercion, are needed to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough.

Peace Activists, Realism, and the Asian Pivot

Peace activists concerned about Washington’s strategic re-balance towards Asia organized the Working Group for Peace & Demilitarization in Asia and the Pacific. I hadn’t received their e-newsletter in a while but I received one today. Their opinions tend to veer to the left, but they do a great job (and service) presenting news and updates. For instance, I learned about the upcoming meeting between Washington and Tokyo next week where the two sides will discuss revisions to the defense cooperation guidelines. The last review was in 1997. Both sides will likely strengthen relations which have flat-lined a bit under the DPJ. Two issues to watch are cooperation in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and the possibility of Japan expanding the role of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a move more plausible under the newly elected LDP.

The newsletter also alerted the group to the impending “boom” in arms sales to Asia as a result of the strategic re-balance. I was aware that the U.S. had approved sales of the Global Hawk to South Korea (the post didn't mention though that the Koreans intended to play hard-ball). But other allies also have their wish lists: Japan selected the F-35 to replace its fleet of F-4s; Singapore and South Korea are also eyeing this plane; Taiwan is upgrading its existing fleet of F-16A/B fighters.

I'm interested in how these news and facts are interpreted. Activists are informing their network about the impending danger and perils heading towards Asia as the region further militarizes. Many policymakers probably take these facts as a positive sign that Washington is playing an active role in supporting our allies and keeping the peace in the region. Who is right in this debate? It's a bit ironic that both sides resort to realist arguments to stake their claim. It's the security dilemma for peace activists and the balance of power for policymakers.