South Korea-China Relations and THAAD

Very briefly, this 38 North report is the best run-down of THAAD deployment and the tensions it has generated between the ROK and China. As the author states:

When the decision was originally made, the ROK government anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but went ahead with it for several reasons. First, its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. Second, the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance. In doing this, it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces. Third, Seoul understood the system’s effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security. Fifth, the ROK government dismissed the fear that a THAAD battery in its territory would become integrated into the US ballistic missile defense system as groundless.In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye’s conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay.

However, China holds a very different view of the South Korean decision. First, Beijing believes that one THAAD battery can neither deter North Korea militarily nor compel Pyongyang to change its behavior. Second, it thinks the system’s detection range could later be changed to suit US needs, enabling THAAD to potentially target Chinese assets, including strategic missile systems and forcing Beijing to spend more on defenses for its coastal missile bases. Third, Beijing is aware that a long-term goal of the US rebalance to Asia is to check or block China through security cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Fourth, it expects an additional strategic burden from changes to the regional “power balance,” such as new Russian defenses against THAAD that Beijing will also have to take into account.

On a related note, CFR published a study on South Korea's option in Northeast Asia in response to the China factor.

Revisiting the Rebalance to Asia

Joshua Kurlantzick of CFR posted an interesting graphic of US security assistance to Southeast Asia, indicating a net decrease in resources to Southeast Asia between 2010 and 2015 by $34.5 million. Meanwhile assistance to the Middle East and North Africa rose by about $1.3 billion during the same period. The statistics imply that the rebalance to Asia is more rhetoric than actual policy.

However, security assistance and military aid is only one aspect of the rebalance. And it certainly does not factor economic (i.e. TPP) and diplomatic initiatives in the region promoted by the U.S. Aside from security assistance, the rebalance also calls for strengthening bilateral partnerships, both old and new; encouraging the growth of intra-network alliances, and actively participating in multilateral regional forums and dialouges.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter gave his own remarks at CFR on the rebalance. Three things stood out about his remarks. First, India, often seen on the periphery of U.S. Asia policy, is factored more significantly in Washington's conception of Asia's regional architecture. Second, Asia is fine, and perhaps better off, without a formal alliance structure like NATO. Third, the U.S. envisions the regional architecture less as a formal structure, and more as a network.

On this last point, Carter made the following remarks:

America’s bilateral relationships remain the bedrock of our presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific. But in a large and interconnected region, especially one with so many strong, capable, and dedicated players, it makes sense to network and link relationships and produce gains for all....  

Regional security, stability, and prosperity have required nations working together less formally. And the United States has been an important builder, cement, and participant in this arrangement. Today, as the region changes, the United States is augmenting our bilateral relationships and alliance with trilateral and multilateral arrangements. We’re weaving these partnerships together to more effectively bolster American and regional security. This network, with its shared values, habits of cooperation, and compatible and complementary capabilities, will expand the reach of all, responsibly share the security burden, and help ensure peace and stability in the region for years to come. 

This burgeoning networks builds in three ways. First, the Department of Defense is strongly emphasizing trilateral mechanisms to bring together like-minded allies and partners to maximize individual contributions to regional peace and security, and link together nations that previously worked with us mostly separately. .. Second, to improve regional security, we’re encouraging our allies and partners to actively develop their own interconnected security relationships...Third, we’re helping create an interconnected regional architecture, from one end of the region to another, through engagement and activities in multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting ...It’s important to remember that our bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relationships, and the developing network they comprise, is not aimed at any particular country. Rather, it demonstrates that the region wants cooperation, not coercion; and a continuation, not an end, of decades of stability, peace, and progress. The network’s not closed. It excludes no one. We want cooperation and shared leadership so that other nations who want to contribute to regional stability and security, they can work with the other nations of the region to do so... By operationalizing the rebalance, by transforming old alliances and new partnerships, and by networking security, we can . . . promote and defend the principles that have allowed so many in the region to rise and prosper for so long.

Given constant crises unfolding in the Middle East and Europe, the rebalance to Asia may seem like an after thought to the White House. Of even if one accepts the rebalance at face value, the graphics above may suggest that the U.S. is conducting Asia policy on the cheap. That's a fair assessment in a period of tightened budgets. But that should not mean that the rebalance itself is not built on "smart power" principles in which military, economic, and diplomatic elements are channeled to address long term regional goals.

Japan-South Korea Relations and Geopolitical Implications

EAI and Genron NPO hosted a workshop in Seoul a couple months ago and released results of a survey which provide interesting insights into the recent deterioration of bilateral relations. Stephan Haggard takes an early crack at interpreting the data. Although the overwhelming majority of Koreans and Japans still believe in the importance of ROK-Japan relations (well above 50%), only roughly 15% of the population in both countries believe relations will improve. Now that's depressing.

Also interesting are the geopolitical implications of the survey related to relations with China. Take a look at the graphs below:

Clearly the Koreans see the Chinese taking on a global leadership role, whereas the Japanese do not. Also, Koreans see relations with China as important  than relation with Japan. What does this mean for U.S. bilateral alliances? Public opinion is fickle and can shift overnight, but if these results mean anything, one might conclude that Japan will remain faithful to the alliance. South Korea may not: Seoul may hedge, or the voice of China supporters may grow stronger.

Interestingly, more Japanesefeel greater affinity towards Korea than China. We might say this affinity is unrequited since the Koreans feel more affinity towards China than Japan. Again, we can't put much weight on a single public opinion poll, but this does suggest that Seoul may face more domestic constraints on US-Japan-Korea trilateralism than Tokyo.

The complete report, including the figures which I copied on this post, can be found here.

News Roundup: Latin America, Gun Control, Asia Historical Memory, ISA blog policy snafu

Have not been able to blog since the birth of our daughter last Nov. Basically, it's a trade-off between extra sleep or blogging (or doing actual work and blogging). I've been wanting to write on a variety of topics, so as a happy-medium, here's news round-up to ease my way back into the blog.

The left turn in Latin America: My Latin Americanist colleague says he's had enough of the "left turn" in Latin American politics when I mentioned this overview provided by the Washington Post. I was still curious to know how much of the turn was driven by social movements (since we hear about populist policies from the likes of the late Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales) or whether the turn to the left can be explained within the confides of institutional and electoral politics. Some answers might be found in Steve Levitsky and Ken Robert's book, Resurgence of the Latin American Left, and also in Max Cameron and Eric Hershberg's Latin America's Left Turn. There's also an emerging cleavage which actually cuts across the left-right divide: nationalist vs internationalist (or protectionism vs. free trade as outlined in the article). 

Gun control: The shooting in the Columbia, MD mall was only twenty miles from my home. In the aftermath, Dana Miibank asks if we've become numb to mass shootings. Despite numerous attempts to address gun violence after each tragedy (i.e. Tucson, AZ; Aurora, CO; Newtown, CT; Navy Yard in Washington DC), and with each mass shooting claimed as a "critical juncture" for gun control advocates, the ball has not moved forward all that much. Aside from the power of the NRA (or in large part b/c of their advocacy) my own research suggests that powerful ideational (which translate to political) barriers exist which gun control advocates have not been able to penetrate in spite of the powerful emotional claims/frames they've created.  An interesting research question is to explore whether public opinion functions independent of this ideational barrier (i.e. if public opinion now strongly favors gun control measure, why have we not seen greater shifts in policy on this issue).

Korea-Japan, historical memory: For my students taking East Asian IR with me this semester, I shared how historical issues have managed to find their way into local politics in the DMV area. Korean-Americans actually lobbied and received a commitment from new VA governor Terry McAuliffe to include "East Sea" in any VA state issued textbook which also states the body of water between Korea and Japan as the "Sea of Japan."  McAuliffe now has four lobbyists and the Japanese Ambassador on his arse. Ddoh! It's a choice between votes (many more voting Koreans than Japanese in VA) or economic largesse (Japan reportedly invested $1 billion in the state of VA). And from a couple years ago in DC, there was the sale and return of  the Phelps House to the Korean government. The Phelps House was the first Korean embassy in the U.S. located on Logan Circle, to be sold for $5 by the Japanese after Korea became its colony. Fred Hiatt takes a broader look at some of these historical issues and wonders if we really have/are pivoting to Asia (and implies we should).

ISA blog snafu: Of all the comments about ISA governing council's proposal on blog policy, Amanda Murdie provided a response which resonated closely with my own reactions.

Teaching About China's Maritime Dispute

CFR unveiled a snazzy new interactive tool to study China's maritimes disputes. This is a great educational tool for students, complete with discussion and essay questions, and something I'll try to incorporate next semester in my U.S., China, and International Relations of East Asia course. Ironically, however, using such a tool will probably require more, not less time for prep since the instructor has to preview all the material beforehand. Anyway, kudos to CFR.

Update: I removed the map b/c it was taking up a lot of space

Peace Activists, Realism, and the Asian Pivot

Peace activists concerned about Washington’s strategic re-balance towards Asia organized the Working Group for Peace & Demilitarization in Asia and the Pacific. I hadn’t received their e-newsletter in a while but I received one today. Their opinions tend to veer to the left, but they do a great job (and service) presenting news and updates. For instance, I learned about the upcoming meeting between Washington and Tokyo next week where the two sides will discuss revisions to the defense cooperation guidelines. The last review was in 1997. Both sides will likely strengthen relations which have flat-lined a bit under the DPJ. Two issues to watch are cooperation in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and the possibility of Japan expanding the role of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a move more plausible under the newly elected LDP.

The newsletter also alerted the group to the impending “boom” in arms sales to Asia as a result of the strategic re-balance. I was aware that the U.S. had approved sales of the Global Hawk to South Korea (the post didn't mention though that the Koreans intended to play hard-ball). But other allies also have their wish lists: Japan selected the F-35 to replace its fleet of F-4s; Singapore and South Korea are also eyeing this plane; Taiwan is upgrading its existing fleet of F-16A/B fighters.

I'm interested in how these news and facts are interpreted. Activists are informing their network about the impending danger and perils heading towards Asia as the region further militarizes. Many policymakers probably take these facts as a positive sign that Washington is playing an active role in supporting our allies and keeping the peace in the region. Who is right in this debate? It's a bit ironic that both sides resort to realist arguments to stake their claim. It's the security dilemma for peace activists and the balance of power for policymakers.

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe

I finally had a chance to read Daniel Nexon’s The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe. It’s not a quick read (not the first half at least). But the book is refreshingly different from standard IR fare making it worth reading. Although not his main argument, Dan makes a compelling case why realism as an analytic paradigm doesn’t travel as well as we believe across space/time. He does this though in a manner which doesn’t completely dismiss or ignore the “states-under-anarchy” framework.  

Dan’s work provides fuel for not one, but two of my research agendas so my mind was in overdrive trying to figure out how to apply/incorporate his work with my own. I’m not going to review the book but instead I’ll glean a few useful insights from it for my own work on a) social movements and world politics and b) East Asian international relations.

Social Movements and World Politics

Yes, it’s the title of my blog.  As you recall, the blog was created as a space for me to write up thoughts about my research on said topic.  As I wrote in my research statement, “I attempt to craft a coherent theory synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations (IR) theory …To do this, I unpack various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences (and vice-versa).”

Dan’s book falls squarely into this research agenda.  At the most obvious level, he shows how mobilization against dynastic rulers and the rise of religious movements (the Protestant Reformation) triggered a set of processes which exposed, exploited, and eroded the weak political structures inherent in “composite states” (or dynastic agglomerates) characteristic of early modern Europe. As Dan argues, transnational religious movements “altered the structural opportunities and constraints of power-competition” (4).  These movements played a significant (although by no means sufficient) role in the development of the modern nation-state system.

A broader contribution is his linking of collective action problems and mobilization at the domestic and international level through the concept of nested relational networks.  Dan writes, “Treating structure of international interaction in terms of nested relational configurations allows us to link variation in the structure of polities (i.e. states) – and other corporate actors (i.e. social movements) – to international structures. Not only does this analytic move capture the co-constituted relationship between agents and structures at different levels of analysis, but it provides a way to think about how transactional patterns give rise to opportunity structures for collective action in world politics” (51). In particular, the density of network relations and degree of identity cohesion between actors at the domestic and international level shapes the opportunity structure of actors for mobilization and cooperation. 

So Dan addresses two of my proposed research goals a) synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations and b) unpacking various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences   

East Asian International Relations

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe is as far as one can get from contemporary Asia. Yet I found Dan’s relational institutionalism applicable to the persistence of U.S. bilateral alliances and  the structure of post-Cold War Asia.  Although I take an ideational-institutional approach in explaining alliance resilience, the inertia of patron-client relations also helps explain the continuation of bilateralism in Asia.  Affective and material ties between the U.S. its Asian alliance partners (i.e. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) encourages cooperation.  Ikenberry (2011) describes the type of order produced by patron-client relations as “rule by relations.” Rule by relations may move from a strong to weak form of patronage (colonial rule à neocolonial ruleà client-state relationship à special relationship), but such shifts don’t necessarily reduce the affective and material ties present in bilateral alliances. “Clients” in special relationships may still act out of loyalty to the patron or out of material interests in the form of prestige, security, or wealth. 

Finally, Dan’s clarification of relational structures helps me think about my own relational approach to East Asian security. I’ve been working forever on a paper which criticizes traditional structural approaches (i.e. polarity) applied to Asian security and instead advocate a relational view of East Asian order. The ties generated by East Asian international relations suggests a bifurcated network with China and the U.S. centered as hubs. Reviewers have uniformly agreed that the first half reads much better than the second half so hopefully insights from Ch. 2 of The Struggle for Power in will help improve the second half of the paper. 

U.S. and East Asia

This has nothing to do with social movements, but since my other research is about East Asian IR, I'll use this space to report important developments. At the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference hosted by AFSC last month, John Feffer alerted everyone to Hillary Clinton's Foreign Policy article, "America's Pacific Century." It didn't strike me as particularly profound. No revolutionary ideas. But it does appear to signal a shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. Clinton's article was no doubt timed for release a month prior to Obama's nine day trip to the region, which included his attendance at APEC in Honolulu, and for the first time, the East Asian Summit in Indonesia.

Somewhat more significant was yesterday's announcement of a new security pact with Australia which would permit the stationing of U.S. troops. This has irked the Chinese and alarmed peace activists who question whether new bases will feed into the security dilemma.

U.S. troops in Australia aren't directed at China per se. Why would the U.S. want conflict with China? But the pact with Australia does broadcast a larger message to all regional actors (including China) that the U.S. intends to remain active in the region. Call it a "warning" to China to "behave" (i.e. comply to international norms, not provoke neighbors on the South China Sea, etc...). Does this set the U.S. and China on a dangerous path? We shall see...