Security and Human Rights in Trump's Foreign Policy: US Alliances and Autocracies

Every U.S. administration in the postwar period has grappled with the tensions between security and human rights and our relationship with autocratic rulers. No place has this been more obvious than in the Middle East these days. The assumption is that the Trump Administration will care less about human rights, particularly if he sees various foreign relationships as transactional. We may be seeing the first signs of his willingness to turn a blind eye to human rights and democracy in favor of preserving strategic ties. Two recent examples come out of the Middle East.


Andrew Harnik/Associated Press

1. Egypt. President Trump invited Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sissi to an official White House visit this week (post-visit analysis is here). As the Washington Post notes:

"Sissi’s arrival at the White House marked a reversal of U.S. policy after President Barack Obama refused to invite him, because of concerns about human rights violations. Trump and his aides did not mention human rights ahead of Sissi’s visit, suggesting that the issue would be raised in private, if at all. Instead, Trump and Sissi appeared focused on security, and they sought to demonstrate warmth, shaking hands during their brief remarks to reporters."

In an op-ed, Bob Kagan and Michelle Dunne referred to U.S. ties to Egypt as a "dysfunctional relationship" suggesting that there may not even be that much security value to relations with Egypt. They advocate cutting ties, much like Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly have recommended for Pakistan.

2.  Bahrain. The Trump administration agreed to resume arms sales, specifically a $5 billion sale of F-16s, to Bahrain, something the Obama administration had halted because of human rights violations against activists and Shiites. Of course, Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet, and during the Arab Spring, human rights groups criticized President Obama for ignoring the crackdown against protestors.

As reported again in a WaPo article, these decisions are "the latest signals that that the Trump administration is prioritizing support for Sunni-led countries seen as critical to opposing Iran’s influence in the Mideast over human rights issues that Obama had elevated."

As an Asia scholar, I continue to wonder what parallels and lessons might exist with current U.S. support for authoritarian regimes and U.S. relationship with Asian dictators in the 1970s (Philippines, Korea, Taiwan) which were ultimately seen as "successful" in a post-democratic society. Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey are a few contemporary examples worth exploring.

Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Views

I almost never sign on-line petitions, but recently put my name on an open letter penned by Ali Wyn. I rest my case with this recent interview between Donald Trump and the New York Times.

I've pasted part of the transcript below, and two things strike me which are worth bringing up the next time I teach Intro to Int'l Relations, and also for research on the politics of peace. First, Trump fails to realize that maintaining alliances and troops abroad are in our own interest, not just that of allies. Even if allies aren't paying their full share in dollar terms, by hosting U.S. troops, they are contributing to the liberal international order advanced by all previous U.S. administrations since WWII. It's the free-rider problem that Trump is concerned with, but even then, we permit a degree of free-riding b/c to not supply military power in certain parts of the world would in the long-run hurt our interests.

Second, his comments on Korea evokes arguments raised by the political left: reunification may have happened without U.S. presence. He also questions notions of peace. For instance, we claim that U.S. presence brought about peace, yet we see a hostile, nuclear North. Maybe Trump is right. But this is all counterfactual thinking, and we could equally plausibly argue that the absence of U.S. forces may have resulted in a second Korean War (started by either the North or South), or have led to greater provocations from North Korea.

Here's a portion of the transcript with relevant parts highlights.

SANGER: So what we want to do is pick up where we left off in March

. We were listening to Speaker Ryan last night, and he presented a much more traditional Republican, engaged internationalist view of the world. One in which he said that the United States would never lead from behind. In our conversation a few months ago, you were discussing pulling back from commitments we can no longer afford unless others pay for them. You were discussing a set of alliances that you were happy to participate in.

TRUMP:

And I think, by the way, David, I think they will be able to afford them.

SANGER:

They may be.

TRUMP:

We can't.

SANGER: But I guess the question is, If we can't, do you think that your presidency, let's assume for a moment that they contribute what they are contributing today, or what they have contributed historically, your presidency would be one of pulling back and saying, "You know, we're not going to invest in these alliances with NATO

, we are not going to invest as much as we have in Asia since the end of the Korean War because we can't afford it and it's really not in our interest to do so."

TRUMP:

If we cannot be properly reimbursed for the tremendous cost of our military protecting other countries, and in many cases the countries I'm talking about are extremely rich. Then if we cannot make a deal, which I believe we will be able to, and which I would prefer being able to, but if we cannot make a deal, I would like you to say, I would prefer being able to, some people, the one thing they took out of your last story, you know, some people, the fools and the haters, they said, "Oh, Trump doesn't want to protect you." I would prefer that we be able to continue, but if we are not going to be reasonably reimbursed for the tremendous cost of protecting these massive nations with tremendous wealth - you have the tape going on?

SANGER:

We do.

HABERMAN:

We both do.

TRUMP:

With massive wealth. Massive wealth. We're talking about countries that are doing very well. Then yes, I would be absolutely prepared to tell those countries, "Congratulations, you will be defending yourself."

SANGER:

That suggests that our forward deployments around the world are based on their interests - they're not really based on our interests. And yet I think many in your party would say that the reason that we have troops in Europe, the reason that we keep 60,000 troops in Asia, is that it's in our interest to keep open trading lines, it's in our interest to keep the North Koreans in check, you do that much better out away from the United States.

TRUMP:

I think it's a mutual interest, but we're being reimbursed like it's only in our interest. I think it's a mutual interest. ...

SANGER:

We were talking about alliances, and the fundamental problem that you hear many Republicans, traditional Republicans, have with the statement that you've made is that it would seem to them that you would believe that the interests of the United States being out with both our troops and our diplomacy abroad is less than our economic interests in having somebody else support that. In other words, even if they didn't pay a cent toward it, many have believed that the way we've kept our postwar leadership since World War II has been our ability to project power around the world. That's why we got this many diplomats --

TRUMP:

How is it helping us? How has it helped us? We have massive trade deficits. I could see that, if instead of having a trade deficit worldwide of $800 billion, we had a trade positive of $100 billion, $200 billion, $800 billion. So how has it helped us?

SANGER:

Well, keeping the peace. We didn't have a presence in places like Korea in 1950, or not as great a presence, and you saw what happened.

TRUMP:

There's no guarantee that we'll have peace in Korea.

SANGER:

Even with our troops, no, there's no guarantee.

TRUMP:

No, there's no guarantee. We have 28,000 soldiers on the line.

SANGER:

But we've had them there since 1953 and --

TRUMP:

Sure, but that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be something going on right now. Maybe you would have had a unified Korea. Who knows what would have happened? In the meantime, what have we done? So we've kept peace, but in the meantime we've let North Korea get stronger and stronger and more nuclear and more nuclear, and you are really saying, "Well, how is that a good thing?" You understand? North Korea now is almost like a boiler. You say we've had peace, but that part of Korea, North Korea, is getting more and more crazy. And more and more nuclear. And they are testing missiles all the time.

SANGER:

They are.

TRUMP:

And we've got our soldiers sitting there watching missiles go up. And you say to yourself, "Oh, that's interesting." Now we're protecting Japan because Japan is a natural location for North Korea. So we are protecting them, and you say to yourself, "Well, what are we getting out of this?"

SANGER:

Well, we keep our missile defenses out there. And those missile defenses help prevent the day when North Korea can reach the United States with one of its missiles. It's a lot easier to shoot down from there --

TRUMP:

We've had them there for a long time, and now they're practically obsolete, in all fairness.

SANGER:

Relatively new missile defenses would allow us --

Japan-South Korea Relations and Geopolitical Implications

EAI and Genron NPO hosted a workshop in Seoul a couple months ago and released results of a survey which provide interesting insights into the recent deterioration of bilateral relations. Stephan Haggard takes an early crack at interpreting the data. Although the overwhelming majority of Koreans and Japans still believe in the importance of ROK-Japan relations (well above 50%), only roughly 15% of the population in both countries believe relations will improve. Now that's depressing.

Also interesting are the geopolitical implications of the survey related to relations with China. Take a look at the graphs below:

Clearly the Koreans see the Chinese taking on a global leadership role, whereas the Japanese do not. Also, Koreans see relations with China as important  than relation with Japan. What does this mean for U.S. bilateral alliances? Public opinion is fickle and can shift overnight, but if these results mean anything, one might conclude that Japan will remain faithful to the alliance. South Korea may not: Seoul may hedge, or the voice of China supporters may grow stronger.

Interestingly, more Japanesefeel greater affinity towards Korea than China. We might say this affinity is unrequited since the Koreans feel more affinity towards China than Japan. Again, we can't put much weight on a single public opinion poll, but this does suggest that Seoul may face more domestic constraints on US-Japan-Korea trilateralism than Tokyo.

The complete report, including the figures which I copied on this post, can be found here.

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe

I finally had a chance to read Daniel Nexon’s The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe. It’s not a quick read (not the first half at least). But the book is refreshingly different from standard IR fare making it worth reading. Although not his main argument, Dan makes a compelling case why realism as an analytic paradigm doesn’t travel as well as we believe across space/time. He does this though in a manner which doesn’t completely dismiss or ignore the “states-under-anarchy” framework.  

Dan’s work provides fuel for not one, but two of my research agendas so my mind was in overdrive trying to figure out how to apply/incorporate his work with my own. I’m not going to review the book but instead I’ll glean a few useful insights from it for my own work on a) social movements and world politics and b) East Asian international relations.

Social Movements and World Politics

Yes, it’s the title of my blog.  As you recall, the blog was created as a space for me to write up thoughts about my research on said topic.  As I wrote in my research statement, “I attempt to craft a coherent theory synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations (IR) theory …To do this, I unpack various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences (and vice-versa).”

Dan’s book falls squarely into this research agenda.  At the most obvious level, he shows how mobilization against dynastic rulers and the rise of religious movements (the Protestant Reformation) triggered a set of processes which exposed, exploited, and eroded the weak political structures inherent in “composite states” (or dynastic agglomerates) characteristic of early modern Europe. As Dan argues, transnational religious movements “altered the structural opportunities and constraints of power-competition” (4).  These movements played a significant (although by no means sufficient) role in the development of the modern nation-state system.

A broader contribution is his linking of collective action problems and mobilization at the domestic and international level through the concept of nested relational networks.  Dan writes, “Treating structure of international interaction in terms of nested relational configurations allows us to link variation in the structure of polities (i.e. states) – and other corporate actors (i.e. social movements) – to international structures. Not only does this analytic move capture the co-constituted relationship between agents and structures at different levels of analysis, but it provides a way to think about how transactional patterns give rise to opportunity structures for collective action in world politics” (51). In particular, the density of network relations and degree of identity cohesion between actors at the domestic and international level shapes the opportunity structure of actors for mobilization and cooperation. 

So Dan addresses two of my proposed research goals a) synthesizing social movement approaches with international relations and b) unpacking various mechanisms which link social movements to systemic consequences   

East Asian International Relations

The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe is as far as one can get from contemporary Asia. Yet I found Dan’s relational institutionalism applicable to the persistence of U.S. bilateral alliances and  the structure of post-Cold War Asia.  Although I take an ideational-institutional approach in explaining alliance resilience, the inertia of patron-client relations also helps explain the continuation of bilateralism in Asia.  Affective and material ties between the U.S. its Asian alliance partners (i.e. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) encourages cooperation.  Ikenberry (2011) describes the type of order produced by patron-client relations as “rule by relations.” Rule by relations may move from a strong to weak form of patronage (colonial rule à neocolonial ruleà client-state relationship à special relationship), but such shifts don’t necessarily reduce the affective and material ties present in bilateral alliances. “Clients” in special relationships may still act out of loyalty to the patron or out of material interests in the form of prestige, security, or wealth. 

Finally, Dan’s clarification of relational structures helps me think about my own relational approach to East Asian security. I’ve been working forever on a paper which criticizes traditional structural approaches (i.e. polarity) applied to Asian security and instead advocate a relational view of East Asian order. The ties generated by East Asian international relations suggests a bifurcated network with China and the U.S. centered as hubs. Reviewers have uniformly agreed that the first half reads much better than the second half so hopefully insights from Ch. 2 of The Struggle for Power in will help improve the second half of the paper.