Security and Human Rights in Trump's Foreign Policy: US Alliances and Autocracies

Every U.S. administration in the postwar period has grappled with the tensions between security and human rights and our relationship with autocratic rulers. No place has this been more obvious than in the Middle East these days. The assumption is that the Trump Administration will care less about human rights, particularly if he sees various foreign relationships as transactional. We may be seeing the first signs of his willingness to turn a blind eye to human rights and democracy in favor of preserving strategic ties. Two recent examples come out of the Middle East.


Andrew Harnik/Associated Press

1. Egypt. President Trump invited Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sissi to an official White House visit this week (post-visit analysis is here). As the Washington Post notes:

"Sissi’s arrival at the White House marked a reversal of U.S. policy after President Barack Obama refused to invite him, because of concerns about human rights violations. Trump and his aides did not mention human rights ahead of Sissi’s visit, suggesting that the issue would be raised in private, if at all. Instead, Trump and Sissi appeared focused on security, and they sought to demonstrate warmth, shaking hands during their brief remarks to reporters."

In an op-ed, Bob Kagan and Michelle Dunne referred to U.S. ties to Egypt as a "dysfunctional relationship" suggesting that there may not even be that much security value to relations with Egypt. They advocate cutting ties, much like Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly have recommended for Pakistan.

2.  Bahrain. The Trump administration agreed to resume arms sales, specifically a $5 billion sale of F-16s, to Bahrain, something the Obama administration had halted because of human rights violations against activists and Shiites. Of course, Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet, and during the Arab Spring, human rights groups criticized President Obama for ignoring the crackdown against protestors.

As reported again in a WaPo article, these decisions are "the latest signals that that the Trump administration is prioritizing support for Sunni-led countries seen as critical to opposing Iran’s influence in the Mideast over human rights issues that Obama had elevated."

As an Asia scholar, I continue to wonder what parallels and lessons might exist with current U.S. support for authoritarian regimes and U.S. relationship with Asian dictators in the 1970s (Philippines, Korea, Taiwan) which were ultimately seen as "successful" in a post-democratic society. Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey are a few contemporary examples worth exploring.

Between Action and Inaction in Syria

This is the most damning op-ed I've seen to date regarding President Obama's foreign policy on Syria. The Washington Post editorials have been highly critical of U.S. inaction for some time as you can read on Aug. 16, 2016, and July 2, 2016, and from editorial page editor Fred Hiat who states that the Obama Administration not only failed  to take action in Syria, but "soothed the American people into feeling no responsibility for the tragedy." But the op-ed by Leon Wieseltier is scathing, calling Obama's words "outrageously hypocritical." Wieseltier writes, "The administration creatively pioneered a third option, which it pursued not only in Syria but also in Ukraine and elsewhere: Between action and inaction, it chose inconsequential action (italics mine). There is the Obama doctrine!"

 

It's hard to place blame on the Obama Administration for the tragedy taking place right now in Aleppo. One might instead blame Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, or perhaps Iran and Russia for inflicting hurt and destruction as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Powers did in a speech which has gone viral (to which the Russian ambassador replied, "I don't want to remind these three countries [US, France, UK] about their role in unwinding the Syrian crisis, which led to such difficult consequences, and let terrorists spread in Syria and Iraq). But where questions lie for the next Administration is whether the U.S., as a great power, has a moral responsibility to push harder militarily against the Syrian government an do more to protect civilians.

Obama's critics argue that there are serious costs to inaction. In contrast, proponents have argued that greater U.S. involvement would have only made the conflict worse, with more death and suffering. Can the U.S. to do more to take a stand against al-Assad in which the costs (in lives and treasure) do not exceed the benefits? I can clearly see the administration has been wrestling between a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness resulting in such inconsequential inaction.

Military Means to Political Ends: Memories of Clausewitz

Two articles in last Sunday's Post shed light on the problems facing the Obama Adminstration's stated political end in Libya - the departure of Moammar Gaddafi. I hadn't seen Carl von Clausewitz's (the famous 19th century German military strategist) name evoked in a long time, but Gideon Rose raises the key message of Clausewitz: The central strategic challenge of any war is how to use military means to achieve political ends. Rose gets bonus points for also throwing in "the fog of war."

Many commentators have pointed out the mismatch between Obama's military strategy to enforce a no fly-zone and his ultimate desire to see Gaddaffi go. The result will likely be mission creep - even if NATO rather than the U.S. ends up leading this campaign. As Rose quotes, "By intervening to help one side in a civil war, it is now embroiled in Libya’s political future to a vastly greater extent than it was two weeks ago." Moreover, Dan Byman questions the efficacy of the no fly zone, using Iraq in the 1990s as an apt analogy.

This is the sentiment of other commentators such as Fareed Zakaria. You can throw me in with the skeptics about the efficacy of the current policy towards Libya. The best outcome is perhaps putting enough pressure on Gaddaffi to agree to a cease fire and negotiate some poltiical settlement for transition before NATO has to rely on ground troops or supply the rebels with arms.

For international (and perhaps domestic) reputational reasons, there was probably no way Obama could have not responded. So a middle ground approach may have been the best poltical solution on Obama's part.

On a side note, I wonder how a pacifist would respond to the humanitarian crisis in Libya?