Disaster and Relief Effort in the Philippines
- Typhoon Haiyan has crippled the middle islands of the Philippines. The U.S. military is once again playing a leading role in disaster relief efforts in Asia. Foreign Policy published this article interestingly titled, "Everyone Hate U.S. Bases in Asia - Until Disaster Strikes." Goodwill efforts go far for the military as was the case in Indonesia in 2004 and Japan in 2011. This is in comparison to China's alleged $100,000 pledge (yes, that's correct, 100K). Diplomatic reasons for the paltry sum are given here. Reuters may be exaggerating to make the Chinese look really bad, but the general point about aid and goodwill still stands.
- I'm sure it's been done already, but it might be interesting to conduct a study on the role of the U.S. military and overseas U.S. military presence following foreign disasters? How does U.S. military participation in relief efforts affect local and regional opinion of the U.S. and U.S. military? Does "goodwill" have longer term regional effects? Does disaster relief draw the U.S. military far from its traditional mandate/mission and to what extent can/should the U.S. military be involved in providing humanitarian assistance.
- Josh Busby had a good post on thinking about natural disasters and insecurity. We often lump such studies under the rubric of "human security," but Busby, reflecting on his own work on climate change and security in Africa, suggests ways to think about natural hazards and "harder" security issues (i.e. bringing back guns, bombs, bullets). One interesting aspect noted by Busby (via Max Fisher) is the importance of governance and its relationship to disaster response. Looting, violence, and a general breakdown in order is very well a function of governance, state capacity, and perhaps civil-military relations.Jennifer Keister makes excellent points on governance and disaster response here. The aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan certainly brings interesting comparisons to disaster response in Japan after the 2011 tsunami or the United States after Hurricane Katrina in 2005
- Bob Kelly at the Duck had a long, but insightful piece on ROK-Japan relations, an issue I've also blogged about in the past. What was more interesting was his sweeping overview of East Asian security, the Asia Pivot, and US-Sino relations and where ROK and Japan fit in the broader strategic landscape. This makes a good read for undergrads interested in Asian security.
- Here's a recent CNAS report from Ely Ratner on the Asian Pivot and U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. I'd like to take very small credit for suggesting a few ideas to Ely in the early phase of this project.
- The ROK government is seeking a ban on the United Progressive Party (UPP), South Korea's far left party for being pro-North Korea. I've had some interaction with UPP party members since they've been a key supporter of anti-U.S. base protests. Anyway, the article falls in line with a recent paper I read by UCSD professor's Steph Haggard and Jong-Sung You about a decline (or at least lower levels relative to other OECD countries) in civil liberties in South Korea. This is supported by several indexes which measure civil liberties, media openness, and democracy (i.e. Freedom House scores). It also falls in line with my argument about a strong security consensus held by foreign policy and security elites in South Korea.
Kony 2013
- I assigned this piece for my undergrads: a follow-up to the viral Kony 2012 video. The article highlights the unique and unusual interesection of interests between civil society/human rights activists and the U.S. military. As the article states, Invisible Children and other young activists were instrumental in pushing the U.S. government to take action against Kony. This comes despite the fact that Kony “is not targeting U.S. citizens. He’s not targeting U.S. embassies. He’s not al-Qaeda.” Despite the lack of threat to the US, the U.S. military may find other reasons for getting involved in the Kony hunt: 1) it gives them a reason for military presence in sub-Sahara Africa; 2) strengthens relations between U.S. and African countries; 3) allows the US to train African militaries. So a win-win situation for activists and the U.S. miltiary. Would love to see a research article about the rise of Kony 2012, the convergence of political interests, and perhaps long term consequences of such action beyond Kony's future capture.
Base Politics
- One of the anti-base protest cases I examined in my book was the protest against base expansion in Vicenza, Italy. The U.S. Army wanted to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, split between Germany and Italy, to northern Italy. Base construction is now complete, but David Vine just emailed me asking if I knew why the U.S. decided to keep two brigades in Germany. This was news to me so didn't have a clear answer. But here was my educated guess:
"The military states strategic reasons for keeping a batallion in Germany. Recent departures at Grafenwoehr have left more space with better training facilities for the 173rd. Of course, this defeats the earlier idea of consolidating the 173rd in one location. This is purely speculation on my part, but is it possible that the Germans wanted to retain some US presence? When the DoD (and CBO) made its early recommendations for base realignment, Germany faced the largest reductions and closures. Not that there's much love for Washington these days from Berlin, but among foreign policy circles, I thought I read or heard somewhere that a few Germans believed the reductions were too much and too fast.
The question which I'm afraid I don't have an answer to, is how the US and Germany decided to retain some of the 173rd in Germany. Did the US ask Germany (likely with Germany willing to oblige); did Germany ask the US (less likely, but possible as a way of reinvigorating strategic ties); and finally, our milliion dollar question, if the US asked Germany was it b/c of the newfound opportunity to use a large training facilitiy (although hard to believe the US wouldn't have thought of this earlier) or b/c of political opposition either in Vicenza locally, or from Rome, which left the US seeking some last minute basing solution."
On this last point, if anti-base movements were a part of the decision to keep parts of the 173rd in Germany, I'm curious to know if Vicenza activists celebrated this announcement as a a partial victory in blocking some US troops.
