The Iran Nuclear Deal: Historical Lessons

Friday's Washington Post published two op-eds using historical cases to support (Phil Gordon) or counter (Fred Kagan) the viability of the Iranian nuclear deal. Political scientists conduct qualitative case study analysis might be pleased to see such arguments. But taken together, the articles suggest that one may pick and choose historical analogies to prove a point, making the logic of any comparison indeterminate. Not sure if this is good or bad for doing comparative historical case study analysis.

Regime Change as a Non-Proliferation Strategy

Robert Kagan argues, "Regime change in Tehran is the best nonproliferation policy." Supporting an opposition more open to the West, and seeking to reintegrate into the global economy and internatonial order (a big assumption here) could help reverse, or at least slow Iran's march down the nuclear path. Is regime change the safer than the status quo (doing nothing). Kagan believes regime change is safer than waiting for Iran to build the bomb, or having Israel pre-empt Iranian nuclear facilities which could escalate to a regional conflict. But the "do-nothing" option would in my mind be the more conservative/safer strategy. I should qualify that "do-nothing" also includes passing UN sanctions/resolutions and providing public moral support with more quiet political/economic aid. "Do-nothing" is acutally a safe form of attacking the regime's moral legitimacy. This strategy is the better (or at least more legitimate) strategy in ensuring a safer world than regime change IF Iranians can vote out of power (or topple over) the current government before the regime acquires nuclear weapons.

Hard and Human Security: North Korea and Iran?

I met my former dissertation adviser at a conference in Baltimore earlier this month, and shared with him my research ideas related to North Korea. He was OK about the use of network analysis, but troubled by a study focusing on just one country. He sees a fixation on one country as a bad career move. Instead, I should make NK one case of a larger theoretical problem. Iran immediately popped to mind.

Iran and NK are both nuclear proliferaters with dubious human rights practices where the US focuses almost exclusively on the former and treads lightly on the latter. However, Nobel Peace laureate Shirin Ebadi has made a pointed case that supporting democracy (i.e. the opposition) and human rights (those arrested or beaten after the June election unrest) can result in both moral and tactical benefits.

But paying so much more attention to Iran's nuclear ambitions than to its trampling of democracy and freedom is a mistake both tactical and moral. The Post writes:

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad "is at the lowest level of popularity one can imagine," Ms. Ebadi said. "If the West focuses exclusively on the nuclear issue, Ahmadinejad can tell his people that the West is against Iran's national interest and rally people to his cause. But if the West presses also on its human rights record, he will find himself in a position where his popular base is getting weaker and weaker by the day."

Ms. Ebadi suggested that the nature of Iran's regime is more crucial to U.S. security than any specific deals on nuclear energy. Iran's people are not as wedded to the nuclear program as the regime wants outsiders to believe. A democratic government would be unlikely to build a nuclear bomb, she said, and even if it did, the weapon would not be a threat in the hands of a government that would not view America or Israel as enemies. By contrast, she argued, even a seemingly ironclad nuclear agreement with Mr. Ahmadinejad might be of little value: "Imagine if the government actually promised to stop its nuclear program tomorrow. Would you trust this government not to start another secret nuclear program somewhere else?"

Hmmm...we could ask this same question about trust in signing an agreement w/Kim Jong Il. Unfortunately, in NK there is no visible opposition to work with. We only have the regime to work with. However, as with all governments, hard-liners and moderates do exist within the regime. If there's a way to identify and sway moderates, and perhaps open the country to the outside, could a more credible nuclear deal be struck?

Liberals and Human Rights

Intuitively, one would assume that "liberals" would take a stronger stand on human rights than conservatives. The demand for civil liberties, transparency, and basic freedoms are all issues liberals would naturally demand. Yet human rights have become the agenda of conservatives. When did human rights and the demand for liberal values abroad become the issue of conservatives (i.e. the rise of the neocons)? Are Democrats wary of pushing the human rights button, evoking the "freedom" rhetoric which rings so close to the Bush agenda.

We see the delicate balance Obama faces with Iran. Obama should provide the Iranian opposition moral support and denounce the use of violence to quash protestors. Yet he's been careful not to denounce Ahmadinejad, or make comments which would further incite the opposition, or suggest the illegitimacy of Ahmadinejad's rule (and by extension grounds for regime change). And from a "realist" perspective, Obama will likely be negotiating with Ahmadinejad's government on future nuclear policy. Thus he's exercising caution now with his words so as to not undermine future prospects of diplomacy or engagement with Ahmadinejad.
therefore is exercising caution. Glenn Kessler below gets at some of these points

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/17/AR2009061703850.html


But this digression still doesn't get at the heart of my question about the position of political liberals (i.e. Democrats on human rights). More salient for my research is figuring out what the liberal position is on human rights in North Korea. My tentative answer is that they have no position. Liberals have been largely silent on human rights in N.Korea. The agenda has been dominated by conservatives and evangelical Christians. I think there is a "moderate" position here, which I would fall under. Focus on providing humanitarian aid. Denounce the lack of political, eocnomic, and religious freedom in N.Korea, but w/out openly promoting regime overthrow (even if this is desirable). Perhaps there is a way to silently promote regime change, by pulling internal levels, providing humanitarian assistance, and working with local officials to institute market reforms.